Braddock Jones, Plaintiff In Error v. James Soulard

Decision Date01 December 1860
Citation65 U.S. 41,16 L.Ed. 604,24 How. 41
PartiesBRADDOCK JONES, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. JAMES G. SOULARD
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

THIS case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Missouri.

It was an action of ejectment brought by Soulard, a citizen of Illinois, against Jones, a citizen of Missouri, to recover a parcel of ground lying in the city of St. Louis, in Missouri, described as the northern half of United States survey four hundred and four of the St. Louis series of school lands. In finding a verdict for the plaintiff, the jury described the property as so much of the northern half of the United States survey 404 of the St. Louis series of school lands as is contained in the St. Louis city block 873.

In the course of the trial below it was admitted that the plaintiff had in him all the title to the land that was vested in the schools under the acts and proceedings which will be presently mentioned; and that the defendant, who was in possession, had in him all the title that was vested in the city of St. Louis and Robert Duncan, under his pre-emption entry.

As to the description of the property, it was further admitted that on the 13th of June, 1812, there was a naked sand-bar in the Mississippi river, near St. Louis, which was, at that time, surrounded on all sides by fresh water, navigable, in fact, for the craft usually navigating said river, but many miles above the influence of the ebb and flow of the tide, and was covered by ordinary high water when the river was within its banks, and that it continued to be such a bar, and unfit for cultivation, until after Missouri was admitted into the Union; that the premises in dispute were part of an island called Duncan's island, which was formed from said sand-bar, after Missouri was admitted into the Union; and that they lie, and always did lie, west of the main channel of the Mississippi river, and within township 45 north, range 7 east of the 5th principal meridian, and are also within the assignment to the schools, and the out-boundary directed to be run by the 1st section of the act of 13th June, 1812, provided that that boundary is to be construed as extending to the middle of the main channel of the Mississippi river; that said premises are also within Duncan's pre-emption entry aforesaid; and that the island is now connected with the Missouri shore by the filling up of the intervening channel, brought about by dikes constructed by the city of St. Louis since the year 1840.

It was proved that the premises in the possession of said defendant were worth three thousand dollars.

As the plaintiff below claimed under the schools, and the principal question in the case was, whether or not the land assigned to the schools extended into the river so as to make the middle of the channel the eastern boundary thereof, it is necessary to state the title more particularly.

In 1809, the town of St. Louis was incorporated by an order of the Court of Common Pleas for the district of Louisiana. Its eastern boundary was the river Mississippi.

On the 13th of June, 1812, Congress passed an act confirming the titles of the inhabitants of out lots, village lots, &c., which were to be surveyed; and enacting, further, 'that all town or village lots, out lots, or common field lots, included in such surveys, which are not rightfully owned or claimed by any private individuals, or held as commons belonging to such towns or villages, or that the President of the United States may not think proper to reserve for military purposes, shall be and the same are hereby reserved for the support of schools in the respective towns or villages aforesaid.'

As the property in question was not rightfully owned or claimed by any private individual, or held as commons, or reserved by the President, of course it fell within the reserving clause, provided the legal boundaries included it.

On the 26th May, 1824, an act was passed directing the surveyor general to survey, designate, and set apart, the vacant lots for the support of schools mentioned in the act of 1812. This survey was not executed until 1856, and the report of the surveyor general stated that the property in question was within the limits of the town of St. Louis, as it stood incorporated on the 13th of June, 1812.

In 1831, Congress passed an act on the 27th of January, relinquishing all their right, title, and interest, in and to the town and village lots, out lots, and common field lots, in the State of Missouri, reserved for the support of schools, to be sold and disposed of, or regulated for the above purposes, in such manner as may be directed by the Legislature of said State.

In execution of the above power, the Legislature of Missouri passed an act on the 13th of February, 1833, creating a school corporation. By it all free persons residing in St. Louis were erected into a corporation, who were directed to take possession of all the lots which had been reserved for school purposes, the title to which was vested in the corporation.

It has been before stated that it was admitted, on the trial below, that all this title was vested in Soulard, the plaintiff in the ejectment.

The defendant claimed title under the following heads:

1. An entry made by Robert Duncan, in 1835, including the premises in controversy, but which had been cancelled by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, as having been made in violation of law.

2. Under an act of the Legislature of Missouri, passed in 1851, transferring the title of the State to two islands in the Mississippi river, in the county of St. Louis—one called and known as Duncan's island, (on which are the premises in controversy,) situated, &c.—to the city of St. Louis. The defendant below had, in himself, the whole of this title.

After the evidence was concluded upon both sides, the Circuit Court gave to the jury the following instructions, viz:

'The jury is instructed that if the land in controversy be within the Congressional township 45 north, of range 7 east, west of the middle of the main channel of the Mississippi river, and bounded on the west by the United States survey number 1,333, then it is within the out-boundary directed, by the 1st section of the act of 13th June, 1812, to be run for St. Louis; and the assignment of the schools read in evidence, the deed of the schools to H. G., B. A., and J. G. Soulard, and the lease of the said H. G. and B. A. Soulard, taken in connection with the acts of Congress of June 13, 1812, the act of 26th May, 1824, and the act of 27th January, 1831, and the act of the 13th February, 1833, of the Legislature of Missouri, vest in the plaintiff the legal title to the northern half of the survey 404; and, if the defendants were in possession of said premises at the commencement of this suit, the jury must find for the plaintiff.'

To the giving of which the defendant objected; but the court overruled the objection, and gave the instruction, to which opinion the defendant then and there excepted. And thereupon the defendant moved the court for the following instructions, viz:

'If, as early as the 13th of June, 1812, the land sued for was at low water only a naked bar in the Mississippi river, near St. Louis, surrounded on all sides by navigable water, and covered at ordinary high water, when the river was within its banks, and continued to be such a bar, unfit for cultivation, at the time Missouri became a sovereign State, then the plaintiff cannot recover upon the title he has shown in evidence.'

Which the court refused to give, and to which opinion of the court the defendant then and there excepted.

Upon these two exceptions the case came up to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Garesch e for the plaintiff in error, with whom was Mr. Montgomery Blair, and by Mr. Garett for the defendant in error, upon printed arguments.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error laid down the following propositions, viz:

1. That the town of St. Louis, as the same stood incorporated on the 13th June, 1812, did not extend to the middle of the main channel of the Mississippi river, as its eastern boundary, but only to high-water mark on its right bank.

2. Even if it did so extend, yet, at most, the land in controversy was but reserved for the support of schools, not actually granted for that purpose, and upon the admission of the State of Missouri, in 1820, it became the property of the State.

3. That the first direct grant of this land by the State was made by the act of 3d March, 1851, under which plaintiff in error claims.

The general proposition first laid down depends on the correctness of the following argument, viz: The limit of private ownership on water-courses, when these are navigable in law, or arms of the sea, is high-water mark; and such rivers as the Ohio and Mississippi are of the same nature and dignity at law, above tide-water, as ordinary rivers below the flow of the tide.

It will not be denied, that when land is bounded by a tide-water river, the limit of private property is the mark to which high tide ascends. This is the point to which the sea flows, and, whether on the seashore or in the arms of the sea, it divides the King's or the State's domain from that of the individual.

The second branch of this first general proposition is more debatable. The plaintiff in error will argue it as follows: Arms of the sea or rivers, as far as the tide ebbs and flows, are navigable waters in England; and no waters are navigable in that country except tide-waters. Above the ebb and flow of the tide, no river of England is navigable at all. In inquiring into the definition of navigable streams in that country, therefore, it was found that they were correctly described to be those in which the tide ebbed and flowed. But navigability is the principal thing; the flowing of the tide is a mere incident. When, therefore, we find that there are navigable waters in America, or elsewhere, not...

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