Bradford Associates v. DIV. OF PURCHASES
Decision Date | 23 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 2000-188-APPEAL., No. 2000-160-APPEAL |
Citation | 772 A.2d 485 |
Parties | BRADFORD ASSOCIATES et al. v. RHODE ISLAND DIVISION OF PURCHASES et al. Shaw Construction Corporation v. Rhode Island Division of Purchases et al. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Warren D. Hutchinson, Thomas W. Heald, Lauren E. Jones, Roger N. LeBoeuf, Providence, for Plaintiff.
Harris Weiner, Richard B. Wooley, for Defendant.
This consolidated appeal comes before us on the appeal of the State of Rhode Island Division of Purchases (State), contesting an order of the Superior Court declaring that the State is constitutionally required to conduct an adjudicatory hearing before finalizing the suspension of a government contractor. Because the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to make that determination under G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 and because the court erred in declaring that the suspension implicated a constitutionally protected liberty interest, we vacate the decision of the motion justice. The facts insofar as pertinent to this appeal are as follows.
In April 1996, the State sought architectural, engineering, and contracting services for a veterans memorial planned for the Rhode Island Veterans Cemetery in Exeter, Rhode Island. The memorial, the central monument in the cemetery, was scheduled to be dedicated on Memorial Day, 1999. After the bidding period, the State awarded the engineering contract to Waterman Engineering, Inc. (Waterman or plaintiffs). Waterman was responsible for preparing the monument site, foundation design plans, and roadway design plans. Waterman hired a subcontractor, Bradford Associates (Bradford or plaintiffs), to design the monument and site. The State hired a general contractor, Shaw Construction Corporation (Shaw or plaintiffs), to build and manage the entire project.
The agreement between plaintiffs and the state was comprised of the state Procurement Regulations (Regulations), state General Conditions of Purchase (State Conditions), and General Conditions of the Contract for Construction (General Conditions). Section 044 200 of the General Conditions described the masonry specifications, the source of the dispute leading to the current litigation. The granite was to be Section 044 200(2.01(B)).
In May 1998, Shaw issued its construction schedule with a planned completion date of November 1998. In July 1998, Shaw became unhappy with its planned granite supplier. Because Shaw doubted the timely delivery of the granite, and in an attempt to maintain the November completion date, Shaw discussed its concerns with the State. Shaw suggested retaining an alternate granite supplier, andBradford inquired whether another type of granite could be substituted. Shaw then contacted another granite supplier, who subsequently provided samples to Bradford. Bradford approved a sample of peribonka-type granite. Unfortunately for our veterans, the granite chosen was not delivered until December 1998, not installed until sometime thereafter, and the memorial could not be dedicated on time.
In August 1999, the State notified Shaw that the peribonka that had been installed had major problems. The peribonka allegedly was of such a poor quality that it could not be engraved. In fact, the engraver hired by the State refused to work with the peribonka. An expert later retained by the State corroborated the engraver's opinion and found that the peribonka had "large open seams [and] cracks" and was wholly inappropriate for a memorial of this type. In September 1999, the State formally rejected the peribonka and ordered Waterman to replace it with black impala granite by October 15, 1999. Waterman refused. Waterman asserted that it was not involved in the process of selecting the granite, and alleged that Shaw, as general contractor, was responsible for any cure. In turn, Shaw blamed Bradford because it had approved the peribonka. Furthermore, Shaw alleged that Waterman was responsible for cure, since Bradford was Waterman's subcontractor.
In October 1999, the state purchasing agent notified Waterman that:
Similar notices were sent to Shaw and Bradford. Additional complaints were lodged against Shaw for alleged water retention on pavement, quality of pavement, and the leaching of a substance from pre-castcapstone. Pursuant to § 4.9 of the Regulations governing suspension, the State gave plaintiffs an opportunity to contest the suspension in writing.
The plaintiffs submitted written objections in which they requested a hearing and protested the reasons for the suspension. In December 1999, plaintiffs received the State's response. The State advised plaintiffs that it found "no argument or information sufficient to rescind or revise its tentative notice" of suspension. The request for a hearing was denied, as none was required by either statute or regulation. Waterman and Bradford submitted written appeals to the director of the State Department of Administration (DOA) (director). The director affirmed the decision to suspend the plaintiffs. Meanwhile, Shaw filed a demand for arbitration pursuant to its contract with the State.1 While the arbitration was pending, Shaw also submitted an appeal, with a request for a hearing, to the director. The director rejected both the appeal and the hearing request.
The plaintiffs filed complaints in the Superior Court, alleging that the written procedures available to contest and appeal the suspension violated the due process clause and that, had the State afforded them a hearing, plaintiffs would have been vindicated. Shaw requested a declaratory judgment. The motion justice consolidated the claims. On March 29, 2000, after hearings and upon consideration of the memoranda of the parties, the motion justice entered an order instructing the State to give the plaintiffs a hearing. The motion justice suggested that the State follow the format in G.L. 1956 § 42-35-9, the contested case provision of the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act (APA). In addition, the court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the state from continuing the existing suspensions. However, he stayed that portion of the order for thirty days. The State then filedthe instant appeal and, at the same time, requested a stay in the Superior Court with respect to the order to conduct a hearing, pending the outcome of the appeal. The motion justice granted that request, but denied the state's request to continue the stay of the preliminary injunction. The State contested the motion justice's decision with respect to the suspension, which we vacated by order of this Court on May 18, 2000.
The State's first argument is that the Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Pine v. Clark, 636 A.2d 1319, 1321 (R.I.1994) (citing La Petite Auberge, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 280 (R.I.1980); Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b) & (h)). The jurisdiction of the Superior Court was invoked pursuant to two statutes — § 42-35-15 and G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1. We will discuss the propriety of each seriatim.
The plaintiffs' Superior Court complaints requested both a review of the validity of the suspension decision and a review of the constitutionality of the regulatory and statutory procedures. Bradford and Waterman filed their Superior Court complaint pursuant to § 42-35-15, the judicial review provision of the APA. The State argues that the motion justice did not have jurisdiction because there is no statutory authority to review suspension decisions in either the Purchases Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 2 of title 37, or in the Regulations. Therefore, the State's position is that since the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction, we must refuse to address the issues raised by plaintiffs on appeal. See Pine, 636 A.2d at 1325
( ); see also Scolardi v. City of Providence, 751 A.2d 754, 756 (R.I.2000) ( ). We agree.
Generally, all administrative agencies within the State are bound by the rulemaking provisions of the APA. See Jefferson v. Moran, 563 F.Supp. 227, 229 (D.R.I.1983)
; § 42-35-18(a). In comparison, the APA authority to review agency decisions is more narrow. There are two sections that, if applicable, prevent such review. See §§ 42-35-15, 42-35-18(b).
First, agency decisions are not reviewable in the Superior Court if the agency is expressly exempted by § 42-35-18(b). Decisions made pursuant to the Purchases Act do not enjoy such exemption. See id. Second, agency decisions are not reviewable by the Superior Court unless the suit is initiated by a person "who is aggrieved by a final order in a contested case." Section 42-35-15(a). (Emphasis added.) A contested case is "a...
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