Bradford v. Avery

• Decision Date: 10 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14 cv 131 EJM,14 cv 131 EJM
• Parties: JAQUAN BRADFORD, Plaintiff, v. IIONA AVERY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

JAQUAN BRADFORD, Plaintiff, v. IIONA AVERY, et al., Defendants.

No. 14 cv 131 EJM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION

March 10, 2016

ORDER

This matter is before the court on defendants' resisted Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 11, 2016. Granted.

Plaintiff, a young man housed at the Iowa Juvenile Home (IJH), brings this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged abuse, especially prolonged isolation, suffered at that facility. Jurisdiction is under 28 U.S.C. §1331.

Movant for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue." PSK, LLC v. Hicklin, 757 F.Supp.2d 836 (N.D.Iowa 2010), citing Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8^thCir. 2005.) Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there are no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(c). A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and give the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986.)

Defendants seek summary judgment on a variety of theories. First, defendants claim that the statute of limitations has run. Since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, the limitations period is borrowed from the personal injury statute of limitations of the state where the § 1983 claim arose. Ketchum v.City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992). Section 1983 claims are governed by the state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims and may be subject to any tolling rules that Iowa courts have applied to that statute. DeVries v. Driesen, 766 F.3d 922, 922 (8th Cir. 2014). Iowa's general statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Iowa Code § 614.1(2). Crucially, Iowa Code § 614.8, a minority tolling provision, provides that "minors shall have one year from and after attainment of majority within which to...commence an action."

Both sides agree plaintiff's birthday is April 26, 1996. Therefore, his 18^th birthday is April 26, 2014. He filed his complaint on Dec. 9, 2014, within the one year extension. Defendants claim that the one year extension is itself limited by the "discovery rule", Iowa Code § 614.1(9)(a), which limits claims arising out of patient medical care to within two years of discovery. This section does not apply because plaintiff's claim does not arise out of patient medical care. The statute of limitations has not run on plaintiff's claim.

Next, defendants claim that qualified immunity attaches to all defendants and immunizes them from liability. The substantive standard of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 530, 535 (1979) provides: "there must be a mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application." Id. at 546. To state a valid conditions-of-confinement claim, Plaintiffs must show both an objective and a subjective element. Revels, 382 F.3d at 875 (applying Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) standard to involuntary patients). The objective element requires that the defendant's conduct objectively rises "to the level of a constitutional violation by depriving the plaintiff of the 'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 342 (1981)). The subjective element requires that the defendant's conduct show deliberate indifference - "that the defendant was substantially aware of, but disregarded an excessive risk to [patient] health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1977)). To demonstrate unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must meet a "high bar" by demonstrating "extreme deprivations." Chandlery Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004).

As government officials, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the performance of discretionary functions. Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 711 (8th Cir. 2004). "Qualified immunity 'is an immunity from suit rather than merely adefense to liability.' It entitles an individual to not be subject to trial or the other burdens of litigation and 'is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'" Jones v. McNeese, 746 F.3d 887, 894 (8^th Cir. 2014) (quoting Solomon v.Petray, 699 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8^th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). "Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Reihm v. Engelkina, 538 F.3d 952, 962 (8^th Cir. 2008) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

To defeat this qualified immunity, plaintiff must show how each defendant's individual conduct violated a "clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. To make this showing, plaintiff must: (1) considering the facts in the light most favorable to the pIaintiff, demonstrate that each Defendant violated a constitutional right; and if that criterion is satisfied, (2) show the constitutional right was clearly established. Ware v. Morrison, 276 F.3d 385, 387 (8^th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must identify the clearly established...