Bradford v. Belknap Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 12 November 1900 |
| Docket Number | 517. |
| Citation | 105 F. 63 |
| Parties | BRADFORD v. BELKNAP MOTOR CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Clifton V. Edwards, for complainant.
Edward M. Rand and Seth L. Larabee, for respondent.
This case relates to applied dynamic electricity with reference to some of its most complicated and delicate phases. A thorough understanding of the purposes which the inventor sought to accomplish, and of the principles applicable thereto in the absence of a thorough explanation by experts of both practical and scientific attainments in the art, requires a mastery of the particular science to which the patent in suit relates. Although the patent issued in March, 1895, the inventor's device never has gone into commercial use, and no practical machine illustrating it has ever been constructed. Neither has the court been assisted by any model, and the expert testimony on either side proceeds too much on the assumption that the court has a special knowledge which it would not be justified in making use of, even if it thought itself possessed of it. Packard v. Lacing-Stud Co., 16 C.C.A. 639, 70 F. 66, 67; Boston & R Electric St. Ry. Co. v. Bemis Car-Box Co., 25 C.C.A 420, 80 F. 287, 290; Parsons v. Seelye, 40 C.C.A 484, 100 F. 452, 454.
At the hearing we gathered an apprehension of the conclusions which we must reach. Our subsequent investigations have not changed that apprehension; and, although it has increased our doubts with reference thereto, yet we are satisfied that they would not be removed by further consideration of the case, and that the interests of the parties will be better advanced by a disposition of the suit which will enable an appellate tribunal seasonably to review it, rather than by holding it longer under advisement.
Although the fact that the complainant's device has not gone into practical use does not necessarily defeat the patent, and although, on the authority of Packard v. Lacing-Stud Co., ubi supra, it probably passed the experimental stage, yet, applying the rules with reference to mere paper machines, stated in Ford v. Bancroft, decided in this circuit and reported in 85 F. 457, 461, and in the same case on appeal (39 C.C.A. 91, 98 F. 309, 312, 313), we must proceed with great caution, and avoid giving the complainant the benefit of anything beyond what his invention and patent clearly require. That the complainant has shown great ingenuity in certain directions is admitted; but to precisely what the ingenuity relates, and how far its results are limited by the prior art, are the main questions in the case.
The patent contains five claims, of which the first, second, fourth, and fifth are in issue. For the purpose of making clear the conclusions we have reached, it is necessary to repeat only claim 1, as follows:
'In an electric regulating apparatus, the combination of a current-varying device, an electro-magnet, with differential windings to govern the movements of said current-varying device, electric circuits, and a device responsive to variations in the current, to be regulated to control action of said magnet, and driving gear to move said current-varying device progressively.'
The patent concerns the method and apparatus for regulating electric circuits. The elements admittedly common to the art prior to the patentee's invention were: First, at one terminus a 'current-varying device,' which operates by moving either the arm of the rheostat or the brushes which control the subcurrent shunted to the magnets of the electric dynamo; and, second, at the other terminus, a so-called 'solenoid,' or, in other words, a subsidiary helix, which is more or less magnetized according as the current to be regulated is more or less weak. This helix, according as the main current varies, draws down or relaxes, through its varying increase or diminution of magnetic power, an arm which, directly or indirectly, operates to move the current-varying device. It is plain, however, that, while we use the expression 'current-varying device' as limited to the mechanism which directly impinges on the arm of the rheostat, yet that expression may well be construed to cover the entire mechanism, including both termini which we have named. At various points throughout the claims and specification this expression is used in either sense indiscriminately. In claim 1 it is used in the narrower sense, but in claims 4 and 5 we find the words 'current-varying apparatus'; and, on the whole, we are unable to discover anything in the varying use of the expression in question which will enable us to solve the problems which we have to dispose of.
The respondent's alleged infringement grows out of the construction of machines in accordance with the claims of patents to William H. Chapman, dated, respectively, August 31, 1897, March 1, 1898, and November 8, 1898. It is, however, now admitted that the machines constructed in accordance with the earliest to these patents do not infringe. This eliminates 13 from the case. Independently of this, there arises an important question whether, even if the bill were sustained, the complainant would be entitled to any relief beyond an injunction. The respondent urges laches as a reason why an account should not be decreed; but the complainant seasonably notified the respondent of his demand, and he testifies that he was unable to follow up his notice on account of lack of means to carry on patent litigation. That class of litigation, unfortunately, often involves so much expense that the courts are tender to patentees under such circumstances, and the complainant cannot be charged with laches. The difficulty is of a more complicated character.
The record raises in a formidable manner the proposition that the complainant's device was never put on the market because the cost of construction, according to his specification would be disproportionately expensive. It may be that, even if Chapman can be charged with adapting complainant's underlying conception, he improved on it in the way of simplicity of construction to such an extent as involved invention, and so as to overcome the disproportionate cost of construction. Indeed, the case seems to fall within the late decisions of the supreme court to such an extent as to lay no basis for substantial damages. Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 15 Sup.Ct. 199, 39 L.Ed. 263, and cases based thereon. So far as relates to an account of profits, how can equity require such an account where it appears that the complainant's device is altogether too costly to have any...
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