Bradford v. City of Shreveport
| Decision Date | 23 April 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 12261,12261 |
| Citation | 294 So.2d 855 |
| Parties | W. C. BRADFORD et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Pugh & Nelson by Robert G. Pugh, Shreveport, for W. C. Bradford, et al.
Dixon & Thomas by Neil Dixon, Shreveport, for City of Shreveport, defendant, appellant, appellee.
Peters & Ward by Hugh T. Ward, Shreveport, for Professional Fire Fighters Assn. of La., AFL-CIO and Shreveport Fire Fighters Assn., Local No. 514, AFL-CIO, amicus curiae.
Booth, Lockard, Jack, Pleasant & LeSage by Troy E. Bain, Shreveport, for Murton Edwards, et al., amicus curiae.
Before AYRES, HALL and WILLIAMS, JJ.
Plaintiffs are 21 policemen employed by the Department of Public Safety of the City of Shreveport in the Subdepartment of Police. This suit by plaintiffs against the City is to recover wages for time and one-half pay for overtime hours worked in excess of 48 hours per week. The time period covered extends from June, 1968 to May 15, 1971. Plaintiffs base their claims on LSA-R.S. 33:2213 which provides:
This suit was originally filed on September 23, 1971. This case was previously before this court (Bradford, et al. v. City of Shreveport, 266 So.2d 254) at which time the judgment of the trial court sustaining an exception of no cause of action filed by the City was annulled and set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings. Writs refused, 263 La. 364, 268 So.2d 556.
After remand to the trial court, defendant City filed a peremptory exception of prescription as to all claims of plaintiffs which accrued more than one year prior to September 23, 1971, the date suit was filed. Subject to this exception the City filed an answer denying any liability to plaintiffs and incorporated therewith a special plea of laches and estoppel. These pleas were based on each plaintiff's action in:
A. Accepting his pay as paid to him without protest;
B. Without protest, permitting defendant to expend its public funds for other purposes, said funds being appropriated on a yearly basis; and
C. Neglecting to timely file his claim and permitting an unreasonable delay to elapse before making his claim.
For these reasons defendant City argues plaintiffs are guilty of laches and are estopped to recover their claims because this would impose an unreasonable hardship on the fiscal processes of the City.
The trial court overruled defendant's plea of estoppel by laches. The plea of prescription was sustained and final judgment granted in favor of 15 plaintiffs for such overtime as was earned by them during the year prior to the date suit was filed. From this judgment plaintiffs and defendant City appealed.
The issues before this court raised by the City, as appellant, are (1) LSA-R.S. 33:2213 has no application to the City of Shreveport; (2) if said statute is applicable to the City, all of plaintiffs' claims for time and one-half pay for overtime are barred by estoppel and laches.
Plaintiffs-appellants argue (1) the question of the applicability of LSA-R.S. 33:2213 to the City of Shreveport has been previously decided by this court and this contention by the City is without merit; (2) they are not guilty of laches and are not estopped to obtain the payments due them for overtime hours of work; (3) the prescription of one year provided by LSA-C.C. Art. 3534 is inapplicable to the class of employment to which plaintiffs belong, and accordingly, they are each entitled to the full sum of time and one-half pay each has earned over the entire period from June, 1968 until May 15, 1971.
It is appropriate to recite some of the factual background from which the present suit arose. In 1968 it was decided by officials of the Sub-department of Police, Department of Safety for the City of Shreveport that additional patrols in the predominently Negro area of the City were required. It was also determined these patrols would best be done by Negro patrolmen. To accomplish this, the Negro policemen employed by the City were asked to volunteer to work 12 hour shifts, six days a week. This program began in June, 1968 and continued, and for such overtime each was paid at his regular pay instead of time and one-half as required by LSA-R.S. 33:2213. The program was discontinued when the Department of Public Safety had to cut down on its budget due to the failure of a tax renewal to pass. About this time plaintiffs learned for the first time that each was entitled to be paid time and one-half his usual hourly scale for such overtime. Demand for payment was made and after refusal by the City to pay, this suit followed.
The City has here reurged LSA-R.S. 33:2213 has no application to the City. This was decided adversely to the City by this court in Bradford v. City of Shreveport, 266 So.2d 254, 263 La. 364, 268 So.2d 256, writs refused, therefore, this argument is without legal merit.
The trial court held that plaintiffs, as policemen, are 'workmen' and therefore their claims for overtime pay due more than one year prior to September 23, 1971 were prescribed under LSA-C.C. Art. 3534 which provides:
'The following actions are prescribed by one year:
'That of workmen, laborers and servants, for the payment of their wages. . . .'
In reaching this conclusion the trial court relied on the holding in Devillier v. City of Opelousas, 247 So.2d 412 (3d Cir. 1971). In Devillier the court specifically held firemen were classified as 'employees' and not 'officers' or 'officials' of the municipality. We believe this readily distinguishes the Devillier case from the instant one involving only policemen.
This court has previously held policemen employed by the City of Shreveport are 'public officials'. Houston v. Brown, 292 So.2d 911 (decided March, 1974); Jones v. Anderson, 277 So.2d 697 (La.App., 2d Cir. 1973); Bolden v. City of Shreveport, 278 So.2d 138 (La.App., 2d Cir. 1973).
The provisions of LSA-R.S. 33:2211 and the Charter of the City of Shreveport define the general duties of policemen. Plaintiffs were employed by the City as policemen and are classified as a 'public official' as each meets the definition thereof set forth in State v. Dark, 195 La. 139, 196 So. 47 (1940) as follows:
'The best general and most concise definition we have been able to find of what is a public office and who are public officers is that given by Mechem in his work on Public Officers, viz.:
Section 1, page 1.' (196 So. 47, 50)
LSA-C.C. Art. 3534 provides in part, as follows:
'The following actions are prescribed by one year:
'That of justices of the peace and notaries, and persons performing their duties, as well as that of constables, for the fees and emoluments which are due to them in their official capacity.
'That of workmen, laborers and servants, for the payment of their wages. . . .'
From a reading of this Codal article it is readily seen there is not named therein a policeman.
LSA-C.C. Art. 3470 provides:
'There are no other prescriptions than those established by this Code and the statutes of this State now in force.'
It is well settled that prescriptive statutes are strictly construed, and the facts of the case must bring the action clearly within specific provisions of the law sought to be applied. Prescription cannot be extended by analogy from one subject to another. Meyer v. Parish of Plaquemines, 11 So.2d 291 (Orl.La.App., 1934); United Carbon Company v. Mississippi River Fuel Corporation, 230 La. 709, 89 So.2d 209 (1956); and Hayes v. Levy, 81 So.2d 172 (La.App., 2d Cir. 1955).
The nature of a policeman's duties and responsibilities clearly remove him from the general classification of 'workmen, laborers and servants'. Plaintiffs are policemen and as such we hold are 'public officials' and are not 'workmen, laborers and servants' of the City of Shreveport.
The argument is also made that plaintiffs are included in the category 'and persons performing their duties' in the first paragraph of Article 3534. Such phrase obviously refers to those performing their duties as officers associated with the justice of the peace court. Nor does the use of the word 'constable' signify other than one who carries out certain duties under orders from the justice of peace court of the award in which the constable is elected. La.Const. Art. 7 § 49; LSA-R.S. 33:1701, 33:1706.
We hold the trial court erred in sustaining the plea of prescription of one year filed by the city and such plea should have been overruled. The City filed a plea of estoppel by laches which was overruled by the trial court. On appeal the plea is again urged by the City.
Plaintiffs' claims for time and one-half pay covers the period from June, 1968 to May 15, 1971. During this time the overtime was earned on a volunteer basis and regular time pay was accepted to plaintiffs' apparent satisfaction as no...
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Bradford v. City of Shreveport
...estoppel by laches to disallow plaintiffs' claims for overtime pay for hours worked prior to January 1, 1970. Bradford v. City of Shreveport, 294 So.2d 855 (La.App.2d Cir. 1974). Upon the applications of both sides to the dispute, we granted certiorari. 299 So.2d 351 (La. The facts giving r......
- Bradford v. City of Shreveport