Bradford v. Hurt, 3647-903.
| Citation | 15 F. Supp. 426 |
| Decision Date | 25 April 1936 |
| Docket Number | No. 3647-903.,3647-903. |
| Parties | BRADFORD v. HURT et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Gordon Simpson and Lasseter, Simpson & Spruiell, all of Tyler, Tex., for complainant.
W. F. Clark, of Dallas, Tex., for respondents.
The complainant, Carson Bradford, alleges that he is an actual bona fide citizen and resident of the state of Florida and that the respondents Robert L. Hurt and Smoot Schmid are residents of Dallas county, Tex., and are respectively the district attorney and sheriff of such county. Complainant sets out that he has leased a certain lot in the confines of Dallas, Tex., and has expended large sums of money thereon; that he entered into said lease for the purpose of erecting, maintaining, and operating a racing track wherein he planned to erect grandstands, dog paddocks, booths and a race course in connection with which he intended and still intends to install a mechanical device whereby an artificial rabbit is propelled along said track for the purpose of encouraging dogs to race against one another by pursuing said rabbit, thereby affording a contest involving the skill and speed of said dogs for the entertainment of such persons as might care for an admission charge to attend and witness said races; that likewise the complainant intended and intends to establish appropriate offices for the establishment of what is called a parimutuel betting system whereby persons might bet and wager upon the outcome of said races; that the respondents Robert L. Hurt and Smoot Schmid have threatened to interfere with the operation of such establishment by a criminal prosecution and by injunctive relief. He further alleges that the proposed establishment is in all respects legal and is not prohibited by any valid law of the state of Texas or of the United States. And he alleges that the action of the said district attorney and sheriff is without warrant of law, but will have the effect of inflicting upon him an irreparable injury in the interference of his property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; that he has against the action of such respondents no adequate remedy at law.
The respondents deny any intention of interfering with the complainant in the exercise of any legal right and disclaim any intention of interfering with his operation of a rabbit and dog racing track so long as the same is not conducted in violation of the laws of the state of Texas, and they admit that the operating of such racing track is not prohibited by the laws of the state of Texas. They claim, however, that the operation of a pari-mutuel betting and wagering establishment is a legal nuisance and is prohibited by law, and they admit their intentions to interfere if betting and wagering is attempted thereon.
The action of the complainant in filing this bill is perhaps in effect a desire to obtain from the court what would in effect be a declaratory judgment.
The allegations in complainant's bill that the proposed betting and wagering establishment is entirely legal and not in violation of any law of the state of Texas or of the United States is probably due to a current misunderstanding and interpretation of the opinion in the Thomas Case lately rendered by the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas, Thomas v. State, 91 S.W.(2d) 716, 719. In that case Thomas was convicted in Houston, Harris county, Tex., and given two years in the penitentiary under the general gambling laws of Texas as contained in article 625 of the Penal Code. Thomas was in fact engaged in listing and accepting bets on horse races run in Texas and out of Texas and when the results of the races had been announced he would, by a systematic arrangement, disburse the money in accordance with the various wagers made. After the passage of the general gambling law as set forth in article 625, the state of Texas had enacted special laws dealing with gambling on horse races and the penalties under these statutes were misdemeanors only and did not subject offenders to imprisonment in the penitentiary. The holding in the Thomas Case was to the effect that the defendant should have been prosecuted under the horse racing statute and not under the general statute and that an offense at most would have been a misdemeanor and not a term in the penitentiary. Judges Morrow and Hawkins in summing up and reviewing the opinion state: "Apparently from the legislation in this State bearing upon the subject in hand, a distinction is made between the penalties for facilitating bets and gambling on horse races, and facilitating betting and gambling on other things." The effect, therefore, of the Thomas decision is that when a general law, dealing with a subject, has been enacted and thereafter a special law, dealing with some branch of the subject, is enacted, the special law will prevail over the general law as to the matters embraced therein.
There is no statute specifically dealing with betting on dog and rabbit...
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Bayer v. Johnson
...Dussault v. Kilburn, 111 Mont. 400, 109 P.2d 1113 (1941) (betting on outcome of athletic event is a "game of chance"); Bradford v. Hurt, 15 F.Supp. 426 (D.C.Tex.1936) aff'd 84 F.2d 722 (5th Cir.1936) (bookmaking on dog racing is "game of chance" or gambling device within meaning of federal ......