Bradford v. Phelps County

• Decision Date: 10 May 1948
• Docket Number: 40504
• Citation: 210 S.W.2d 996,357 Mo. 830
• Parties: Llyn Bradford v. Phelps County, Missouri, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

210 S.W.2d 996

357 Mo. 830

Llyn Bradford v. Phelps County, Missouri, Appellant

No. 40504

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 10, 1948

Appeal from Phelps Circuit Court; Hon. Claude E. Curtis Judge.

Reversed.

Breuer & Northern for appellant.

(1) The provisions of Article 2 of Chapter 73, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939, known as the County Budget Law, made it the duty of respondent as Prosecuting Attorney of Phelps County to file with the Clerk of the County Court an itemized statement of the estimated amount required for payment of expenses of his office, including stenographic service.This he did for the years 1945, 1946 and 1947. Sec. 10912, R.S 1939.(2) The County Budget Law then makes it "the first duty of the County Court at its regular February term to go over the estimates and revise and amend the same in such way as to promote efficiency and economy in County government."The act further provides that the court may alter and change any estimate as public interest may require first giving the party an opportunity to be heard.Sec. 10917, R.S. 1939.(3) The county court, in the discharge of its duty in going over the estimated budget filed, and revising and amending the same "in such a way as to promote efficiency and economy in County government," as provided by the County Budget Act, acts as an administrative board, and not judicially, and the circuit court, as a reviewing tribunal, is without authority to substitute its own judgment for that of the county court.Wood v. Wagner Electric Corp.,197 S.W.2d 647;Seabaugh's Dependents v. Garver Lbr. Co.,200 S.W.2d 55;Mo. Constitution, 1945, Sec. 22, Art. V, Judicial Department.(4) County courts are purely an administrative body, not a court of record and without judicial authority.Mo. Constitution, 1945, Sec. 1, Art. V, Judicial Department.Laws 1945, p. 806.(5) The County Budget Law, having been pleaded as a defense and kept as a live issue throughout the trial and the further defense having been pleaded and contended for throughout the trial that the act of the county court was not arbitrary, capricious, unfair or unreasonable, but the allowance fixed by the court deemed reasonable and proper, the whole case was brought squarely under the County Budget Law, which provisions thereof precluded the circuit court from rendering an independent money judgment in excess of the amount fixed by the county court.Rinehart v. Howell County, 153 S.W.2d 381.

Llyn Bradford and J. Ben Searcy for respondent.

(1) All appeals from final rulings made by county courts are tried de novo in circuit court.Sec. 2490, R.S. 1939.(2) This is particularly true as to accounts presented against counties and rejected by county courts, either as a whole or in part, from which an appeal is taken to circuit court where the case is tried de novo.Sec. 2496, R.S. 1939.(3)Circuit courts have jurisdiction expressly conferred upon them in all appeals taken from county courts.Sec. 2100, R.S. 1939.(4)These statutes have not been repealed, either by the County Budget Law, nor the new Constitution, nor the 1945 Sessions Act of the Legislature, and are still in full force.(5)This case, having reached the circuit court by respondent's appeal, taken from the action of the county court in turning down a claim presented against Phelps County, under these statutes, the circuit court had the jurisdiction to hear, try and determine the case anew and was required to render its own independent judgment.(6) It has been held that an appeal from the action of the county court, as provided by these statutes, constitutes an adequate legal remedy so that mandamus or any other extraordinary remedies cannot be used to compel a county court to pay an account against the county.State ex rel. Becker v. Wehmeyer,113 S.W.2d 1031;State ex rel. Mitchell v. Rose,281 S.W. 386.(7) The restricted jurisdiction of circuit courts in Workmen's Compensation cases is solely by reason of a specific statute and applies only to Workmen's Compensation cases.Sec. 3732, R.S. 1939.(8)Circuit courts not only have jurisdiction to determine appeals from county courts upon a trial de novo, but also have a superintending control over all inferior courts, including county courts.Sec. 2100, R.S. 1939.(9) County courts, in auditing and passing on claims against a county, act ministerially, but an appeal is always allowed to the circuit court.Sears v. County,105 Mo. 236, 16 S.W. 878.(10) Where a case is tried before the circuit court without a jury, the judgment should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.Mound City Finance Co. v. Frank,199 S.W.2d 902.(11) County is liable for all necessary office expenses of its various officers.Buchanan v. Ralls County,283 Mo. 10, 222 S.W. 1002;Harkreader v. Vernon County,216 Mo. 696, 116 S.W. 523;Ewing v. Vernon County,216 Mo. 681, 116 S.W. 518;Motley v. Pike County,233 Mo. 42.(12) The county is liable for necessary stenographic expenses of respondent as Prosecuting Attorney.Rinehart v. Howell County,153 S.W.2d 381.(13) The prosecuting attorney has a wide variety of duties to perform requiring stenographic service in addition merely to the prosecution of criminal cases in circuit court.Secs. 12942-12946, R.S. 1939;Sec. 9701,Laws 1945, p. 630;Miles v. Miles,137 Mo.App. 38.(14) The prosecuting attorney, in a county of the third class, such as Phelps County, is not disqualified from engaging in the general practice of law in addition to the performance of his duties as prosecuting attorney.

Van Osdol, C. Bradley and Dalton, CC., concur.

OPINION

VAN OSDOL

Consolidated cases(an appeal from a county court order, and an action for a declaratory judgment) were heard by the circuit court.The cases involved questions of the county court's allowances to plaintiff-respondent as prosecuting attorney of Phelps County for expense for stenographic service for the years 1946 and 1947.The plaintiff had submitted (under the provisions of the County Budget Law, Article 2, Chapter 73, R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., as amended, particularly Section 10912 thereof) the item of $ 75 per month for stenographic service as a part of the estimated expense of his office for the year 1946, and the county court(acting under the Law in revision of the estimates, Section 10917) revised and changed the estimate to $ 50 per month.The circuit court found plaintiff-respondent was "entitled to the sum of $ 75.00 per month for stenographic hire" for the year 1947 and directed the court to accordingly pay during the year, and rendered judgment for amounts totaling $ 240 found to be due for the year 1946.Defendant County has appealed.

The action for a declaratory judgment involved the allowance for stenographic service for the year 1946.The petition alleged that plaintiff-respondent, Prosecuting Attorney, had submitted "his budget" to defendant-appellant, County, for the year 1946 including as necessary expense of his office an item of $ 900 for the year for stenographic service; that when the county court met for the purpose of approving "budgets of the various county officers, said county court arbitrarily, capriciously, without good cause, in excess of its jurisdiction . . . modified said item of stenographic expense . . . reducing the same to the sum of $ 600.00 for said year."Defendant-appellant County by answer admitted plaintiff-respondent, Prosecuting Attorney, had "submitted his budget" including the item of $ 900 for the year 1946; and that, in the performance of "the first duty of the County Court(under the County Budget Law) at its regular February term to go over the estimates and revise and amend the same in such a way as to promote efficiency and economy in County government," county court found the estimate of $ 75 a month was excessive, and proceeded to go over, revise and amend the estimate to $ 50 a month as the amount sufficient to promote efficiency and economy in county government.County denied the county court acted arbitrarily, capriciously and without good cause in so doing.(The "appealed-from" county court order in effect disallowed claims for stenographic expense in excess of $ 50 per month for January and February, 1947.)

It is contended by appellant County the trial court erred in substituting its own independent judgment for that of the county court.County urges the county court was acting in the exercise of a discretionary duty and, absent fraud or arbitrary action, the county court's revision and change of the estimate was final and conclusive.On the other hand, it is contended by respondent, Prosecuting Attorney, that appeals from the final determination of county courts are authorized by Sections 2490 and 2496, R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., which Sections provide for a trial anew in the appellate circuit court; and Prosecuting Attorney further relies on Section 2100 R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., giving circuit courts"appellate jurisdiction from the judgment and orders of county courts."Prosecuting Attorney urges that the consolidated cases were properly heard as trials de novo, and that the circuit court in trying the cases anew had the power and jurisdiction to exercise and render its own independent judgment.

Section 2100, supra, has been held to apply to county court judgments and orders which are "in their nature susceptible of a trial anew in the circuit court(Section 2490, supra) -- to cases which partake in some respect of the characteristics of a suit at law or in equity, and in which the circuit court can hear the evidence and from that enter up a judgment of its own.'In other words, the appeal can only be taken when the judgment or order appealed from is judicial.'St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry Co. v. St. Louis, 92 Mo. 160, 4 S.W. 664."State ex rel. Dietrich v....