Bradford v. Underwood Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1891
• Citation: 48 N.W. 1105,80 Wis. 50
• Parties: BRADFORD v. UNDERWOOD LUMBER CO. ET AL.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

80 Wis. 50

48 N.W. 1105

BRADFORD

v.UNDERWOOD LUMBER CO. ET AL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 3, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Oneida county; J. K. PARISH, Judge.Miller & McCormick, for appellant.

L. J. Billings, for respondent.

COLE, C. J.

The plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendants McPhee and Mitchell to furnish board for men who were employed by them in running logs upon the Wisconsin river. The price of board was one dollar a day for each boarder. McPhee and Mitchell did not own the logs, but were running them for the owner, the defendant the Underwood Lumber Company. The plaintiff seeks to enforce a lien for the board furnished by him against the logs which the men were engaged in running while boarding with him. The sole question presented is, does the law give a lien for such a claim? The plaintiff lived in Oneida county, and the board was furnished in that county. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a lien upon the logs which his boarders were engaged in running depends upon the construction of chapter 413, Laws 1889, which was in force when the board was furnished. By section 17 of chapter 413 it is provided that no lien for supplies shall be had under the act except in the two counties named, which does not include the county of Oneida. The subsequent section repeals certain provisions of the Revised Statutes, and also certain session laws in conflict with the provisions of the act. This court, in construing the word “supplies,” as used in section 1, c. 167, Laws 1879, held that it included board furnished men who were engaged in getting out, driving, or rafting logs and timber. Kollock v. Parcher, 52 Wis. 393, 9 N. W. Rep. 67. Now, it is very evident that, if we give the word “supplies,” as used in the act of 1889, the same construction we did in the act of 1879, we must hold that it includes board or food for men, for which the act of 1889 says no lien shall be given; and we certainly perceive no reason for attaching to it a different meaning or signification. Presumably the legislature, when it enacted the law of 1889, knew the sense which this court had given the word in the act of 1879, and intended in the later statute to take away the right of a lien for board. This conclusion is irresistible, when the history of the legislation upon the subject is considered. So we must hold that the word “supplies,” as used in section 17 of the law of 1889, includes board furnished the men employed in running the logs, for which no lien is given. But the learned counsel for the plaintiff relies upon section 14 of the act as giving the right to a lien for board. That section, in effect, provides that any and all persons doing or performing any labor or services by cooking food for the men who are performing any labor upon logs shall be deemed to have performed work, and shall have the right to a lien therefor, the same as the men for whom the food is furnished. That is, as we understand the section, so far as the right to a lien is concerned, it placed the cook upon precisely the same footing as the other employes performing work upon logs or timber. That is to say, any person who cooks food for men employed in doing any labor upon logs or timber...