Bradford v. Vill. of Lombard, 11 C 37
| Decision Date | 29 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 11 C 37,11 C 37 |
| Parties | BRUCE M. BRADFORD Plaintiff, v. VILLAGE OF LOMBARD, POLICE CHIEF RAY BYRNE, individually, and BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF THE VILLAGE OF LOMBARD, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Bruce M. Bradford claims that Defendants the Village of Lombard (the "Village") and Police Chief Ray Byrne ("Chief Byrne"), in his individual capacity, caused his termination as a police officer in retaliation for filing a prior lawsuit for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Currently before the Court are the parties' motions in limine to bar certain evidence from trial. For the reasons set forth here, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.
A motion in limine is "any motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). See also Mason v. City of Chicago, 631 F. Supp. 2d1052, 1055 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 570 (7th Cir. 1999) (). District courts have broad discretion in ruling on motions in limine, but evidence should not be excluded before trial unless it is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. Betts v. City of Chicago, Ill., 784 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1023 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Otherwise, rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, competency, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context. Id. See also Thomas v. Sheahan, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1087 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
"The denial of a motion in limine [to bar evidence] does not mean that the evidence is necessarily admissible, rather, it means only that the party moving in limine has not demonstrated that there is no possible basis for the admission of the evidence." Austin v. Cook County, No. 07 C 3184, 2012 WL 1530452, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2012). Accordingly, "[t]rial judges may alter prior 'in limine rulings, within the bounds of sound judicial discretion.'" Kiswani v. Phoenix Sec. Agency, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 554, 557 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (quoting Townsend v. Benya, 287 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
The parties have filed competing motions relating to evidence of the October 23, 2010 administrative hearing before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the Village of Lombard (the "Board") and the Board's subsequent findings and determinations made on December 2, 2010. Plaintiff argues that the jury should not hear any such evidence, describing it as irrelevant because it was "of course not known to Defendant [Byrne] at the time he made the disputed decision" to file charges againstPlaintiff in July 2010. (Doc. 232, at 2). Relying on Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 403, Plaintiff says it would be unfair to require him to "meet Defendants' offensive use of the [Board's] findings with acquiescence," and he proposes a limiting instruction stating that he disputes them. (Doc. 242, at 2-3). He also raises concerns about jury confusion and wasted trial time stemming from his need to present evidence that the Board did not consider that "may have exonerated" him such as "video footage of the parking lot where [Plaintiff] allegedly exited his truck and check [sic] damage to it [and] hand written notes of key interviews that were destroyed, etc.)." Plaintiff would argue that the Board did not consider such evidence because "Defendants did not take logical, reasonable and customary steps to locate and secure such evidence." (Doc. 232, at 4). Further, Plaintiff states that he would offer evidence "showing [during the investigation] repeated failure to follow department general orders, failure to properly interrogate witnesses, prejudging of Bradford's guilt before the investigation even started, and failing to bring Board charges against Officers Rojas, Statkus and Kelly, and Sgt. Abenante, after they committed more serious rule violations than Bradford." (Doc. 232, at 4). Defendants, on the other hand, insist that issue preclusion operates to bar Plaintiff from presenting any evidence that is inconsistent with the Board's factual findings. (Doc. 225).
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff is essentially "seeking . . . a second chance at re-litigating" facts that have already been decided in this case. (Doc. 236, at 4). It is well-settled that "under Illinois law, 'fact issues finally decided in an administrative proceeding that is judicial in nature precludes litigation of those same fact issues in a subsequent proceeding.'" Watt v. City of Highland Park, No. 01 C 6230, 2001 WL 31261216, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2002) (quoting Village of Oak Park v.Illinois Dep't of Employment Security, 332 Ill. App. 3d 141, 143, 772 N.E.2d 951, 953 (1st Dist. 2002)). Issue preclusion applies when "(1) a material fact issue decided in the earlier adjudication is identical to the one in the current proceeding; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the earlier adjudication; and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or was in privity with a party in the earlier adjudication." Goodwin v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 442 F.3d 611, 621 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Village of Oak Park, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 143, 772 N.E.2d at 953).
Here, the Board made the following factual findings after hearing sworn testimony from Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and eight other witnesses: (1) two independent witnesses with no motive to lie credibly testified that they saw Plaintiff hit and damage the hydrant, immediately pull over and get out of his vehicle to check for damage, and then leave the scene, prompting them to call 911; (2) Plaintiff knew that he had hit the fire hydrant in part because he saw that his car was damaged on the right front passenger side with some red paint transfer from the hydrant and a missing lamp bevel, but he did not report the incident to anyone despite proceeding directly to work at the police station; (3) Plaintiff first admitted he may have hit "something" when he saw Sergeant Marilyn A. Gabinski photographing his vehicle in response to the 911 call; (4) Plaintiff made untruthful statements about the incident to Sgt. Gabinski, Sergeant William Marks, Lieutenant Tom Wirsing and Lieutenant Scott Watkins during informal and formal interrogations, and his testimony at the evidentiary hearing before the Board similarly was not credible; and (5) Plaintiff made those untruthful statements in an attempt to justify his failure to report the accident as required by law, and to deceive LPD officers regarding his knowledge of a property damageaccident and his failure to report it. This Court affirmed the Board's factual findings after conducting a full administrative review. Bradford v. Village of Lombard, No. 11 C 37, 2014 WL 497677 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2014), as amended on August 20, 2014, Doc. 252.
Since Plaintiff was a party to the proceedings at all times with ample incentive to litigate the issues, the Board's findings must be given preclusive effect. See Goodwin, 442 F.3d at 621. Plaintiff does not disagree, as his motion makes no mention of issue preclusion at all. Instead, he urges the Court to consider cases addressing the admissibility of (1) a labor arbitrator's decision pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, and (2) reasonable cause determinations from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Doc. 232, at 2-4) (citing Jackson v. Bunge Corp., 40 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1994) (); Tulloss v. Near North Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 154 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1973)) (EEOC file is a "mish-mash of self-serving and hearsay statements and records; . . . justice requires that the testimony of the witnesses be given in open court, under oath, and subject to cross-examination.")). The case at bar is wholly distinguishable because as explained, the Board made its findings after hearing sworn testimony from witnesses who were subject to cross-examination, and this Court upheld those findings on administrative review. Plaintiff's attempt to analogize this case to arbitration decisions and EEOC investigations must be rejected.
Because the Board's findings have preclusive effect here, the jury certainly may hear the findings of the Board in the form of stipulated facts. This Court is notpersuaded, however, that it is necessary or appropriate for the jury to hear that these facts were "found" by the Board during an administrative hearing, though the jury may surmise this since it will hear that Chief Byrne filed charges with the Board and that the Board ultimately terminated Plaintiff. What matters for purposes of the trial is that Plaintiff cannot relitigate the findings of the Board, and so these findings must be presented to the jury as stipulated or agreed facts. Alternatively, if Plaintiff prefers, the Court could instruct the jury that these facts must be accepted as true for purposes of considering Plaintiff's claim and may not be disputed by the parties. The jury need not hear, however, that the "Board" made these hearings after an administrative hearing or that this Court reviewed and upheld the Board's findings. At the same time, Plaintiff may not suggest to the jury--through testimony, cross-examination or argument--that these "facts" about the incident are disputed or subject to question (e.g., that he did not get out of his...
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