Bradley v. Arwood

Decision Date20 October 2014
Docket NumberCase No. 14-cv-12303
PartiesSONYA BRADLEY, Plaintiff, v. STEVE ARWOOD, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Honorable Gershwin A. Drain

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PARTAND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [#9]
I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Sonya Bradley filed the original complaint [#4] in this case on June 12, 2014. Defendants filed a motion to Dismiss [#6] on July 14, 2014, prompting an amended complaint [#8] from Plaintiff on August 2, 2014. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff brings claims for purported violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VII of the Civil rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.;1 the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. I; the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) of 1976, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 28 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. Additionally, Plaintiff brings common law claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [#9]. This matter is fully briefed and a hearing was held on October 1, 2014. For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Ms. Sonya Bradley, is a division legal secretary supervisor with the Michigan Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA) Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA). Throughout her employment, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants subjected her to an unwritten practice that enforced institutional racism against the Plaintiff and all African-Americans assigned to the Detroit Attorney General's Office. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deemed all African-American employees as unfit associates of whites, and took multiple actions to violate her Constitutional rights.

Plaintiff generally alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race and gender, and that she was retaliated against for reporting potential abuses of a government credit card and making complaints of discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Plaintiff has alleged, amongst other allegations, that she was harassed and discriminated against because she has been instructed to follow the directives of her supervisors as to how to complete her work, denied overtime, had her performance criticized, given negative performance appraisals, placed on a performance improvement plan, and given written counseling.

Plaintiff alleges that she was treated differently than other employees employed in her capacity. She alleges that Defendants Shuette and Arwood are liable as her employers, and that Defendants Przekop-Shaw, Kotula, and Russell are liable as her supervisors.

III. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows the court to make an assessment as to whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' " Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Even though the complaint need not contain "detailed" factual allegations, its "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true." Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555).

The court must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and determine whether plaintiff's factual allegations present plausible claims. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff's pleading for relief must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. at 678.

"[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Id. The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do notpermit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'- 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' "Id. at 679.

B. Legal Analysis

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy both the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standards, and, thus, argue that Plaintiff's amended complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that she has satisfied the Twombly and Iqbal standards. The Court's analysis is explained herein.

1. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims for Discrimination, Hostile Work Environment, and Retaliation Claims Against Defendants Arwood and Schuette (Counts I-III) Will Be Dismissed Because Section 1983 Liability May Not be Based on Respondeat Superior

Counts I-III of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint assert that Defendants Arwood and Schuette violated Section 1983 and the First Amendment by discriminating and retaliating against plaintiff, and creating a hostile work environment. See Dkt. No. 8 at 18-22. Defendants assert that Counts I-III of Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be dismissed because Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not allege that Defendants Arwood and Schuette took any specific wrongful actions. Dkt. No. 9 at 7-8.

To make this point, Defendants note that the only mention of Defendants Arwood and Schuette in the complaint is a reference to the fact that they were the employer of Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 9 at 8. This being the case, Defendants argue that any potential liability of these Defendants would be foreclosed due to the fact that state actors cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior under Section1983. Id. at 7-9.

Plaintiff appears to contend that the Defendants Arwood and Shuette should be liable because "any reasonable person in [Defendant Arwood and Schuette's] positions would know or, at a minimum, should have known, of the Plaintiff's repeated reports of abuses to numeroushigh-ranking officials in their administration." Dkt. No. 11 at 6. Plaintiff argues that Defendants Arwood and Schuette failed to follow their own policy of ensuring transparency in government by ignoring Plaintiffs report of alleged credit card abuses. Id. at 6-7. In so doing, Plaintiff argues that Defendants Arwood and Schuette permitted continued discrimination and retaliation, for which Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief. Id.

The Court agrees with Defendants. Assuming Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Arwood and Schuette are true; Plaintiff's allegations are still nothing more than an attempt to improperly impose respondeat superior liability on these Defendants who had no direct role in the alleged discriminatory actions. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978) (finding that Section 1983 supervisory liability may not be based on respondeat superior, but only on the supervisor's own wrongful acts or omissions); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that supervisory liability "must be based on more than the right to control employees. Likewise, simple awareness of employees' misconduct does not lead to supervisory liability.") (citations omitted)

Here, Plaintiff offers no evidence of personal involvement on behalf of Defendants Arwood and Schuette, and does not advance an argument to overcome the fact that respondeat superior is inapplicable to these two Defendants. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Counts I-III from this action because Plaintiff's allegations do not establish the requisite level of personal involvement required to impose Section 1983 liability against Defendants Arwood and Schuette.

2. Plaintiff's Equal Pay Act Claim (EPA) Against Defendants Arwood and Schuette (Count IV) will be Dismissed Because These Defendants are Not the Employers of Plaintiff Under the FLSA

Count IV of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asserts that Defendants Arwood and Schuette violated the Equal Pay Act. See Dkt. No. 8 at 22. In Plaintiff's amended complaint, she asserts that "[a]t all material times, [she] was an employee, and Defendants Schuette and/or Arwood were her employer, covered by and within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act." Id. at ¶ 130. Defendants argue that Count IV should be dismissed because Defendants Arwood and Schuette are the supervisors of Plaintiff-not the employers-and, thus, cannot be sued by Plaintiff under the EPA. Dkt No. 6 at 10-11. Plaintiff does not address Defendants' argument.

The Court agrees with Defendants. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit has considered whether public officials are individually liable under the EPA. Notably, however, the Sixth Circuit has extensively analyzed the language of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and its counterpart, the Family Medical Leave Act (FLMA), to find that "[o]ur independent examination of the FMLA's text and structure reveals that the statute does not impose individual liability on public agency employers." Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 829 (6th Cir. 2003).

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