Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1952
• Citation: Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp., 58 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1952)
• Parties: BRADLEY v. ASSOCIATES DISCOUNT CORP. et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 857

58 So.2d 857

BRADLEY v. ASSOCIATES DISCOUNT CORP. et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.

April 22, 1952.

Rehearing Denied June 3, 1952.

Boyd H. Anderson, Jr., and Fleming, O'Bryan & Fleming, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

McCune, Hiaasen & Kelley, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

THOMAS, Justice.

The insurance company issued a policy to Associates Investment Company and its subsidiaries, of which the appellee, Associates Discount Corporation, was one, to cover any damage caused by collision to an automobile purchased by appellant from Trammel Motors Inc., under a conditional sales contract later, evidently, transferred to Associates Discount Corporation. The purchase price included the premium on the insurance contract which was to cover the period of two years from January 1948.

Installments of the purchase price were met by the purchaser to and incuding the one due in July 1949.

On August 6, 1949 the car was badly damaged by collision, and the appellant reported the loss to Associates Discount Corporation where employees informed him the insurance had been cancelled the preceding June. He then communicated with the insurance company where he received the same information.

Suit was brought against the appellees resulting in a verdict in favor of the discount company and against the insurance company. The court granted the latter's motion for new trial, observing that 'the mailing of notice [of cancellation], without receipt, * * * [was] sufficient. * * * As to conformity of the notice with the policy provisions, see Summers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 845.' Later he clarified the comment by stating, simply, 'That the order granting the new trial was based on the Court's error in charging the Jury as requested in Plaintiff's Charge No. 10.' So it may be said that the judge had in mind two aspects of the case: first, the actual receipt by the insured; and second, the form of the notice given, inasmuch as the cited case dealt with the latter proposition.

Turning to this charge we find these two thoughts because the jury was told that strict compliance with the terms of the policy was necessary to accomplish cancellation; also, that liability would not cease unless the 'Plaintiff received actual notice that said policy had been cancelled prior to loss sustained thereunder.'

The cancellation clause in the policy reads: 'The insurance under any individual policy * * * may be canceled at any time by the Company by mailing to the Named Insured and to the Purchaser * * *, for account of all parties at interest, written notice stating when not less than five (5) days thereafter such cancelation shall be effective. Notice of cancelation to Purchaser * * * shall state that the return premium, if any, will be paid to the Named Insured for account of all parties at interest.' Immediately following was a provision that 'Notice of cancelation mailed to the Named Insured and Purchaser * * * at the address of each stated in the * * * Policy * * * shall be sufficient proof of notice to all parties at interest.'

A copy of the...