Bradley v. Booker

• Decision Date: 25 March 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 08-13560-BC
• Citation: Bradley v. Booker, Case No. 08-13560-BC (E.D. Mich. Mar 25, 2011)
• Parties: ANTHONY BRADLEY, Petitioner, v. RAYMOND BOOKER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

ANTHONY BRADLEY, Petitioner,

v.RAYMOND BOOKER, Respondent.

Case No. 08-13560-BC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

Dated: March 25, 2011

Hon. Thomas L. Ludington

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY OR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Petitioner Anthony Bradley, presently confined at the Ryan Correctional Facility in Detroit, Michigan, has filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Wayne County Circuit Court of first-degree felony murder, Mich. Comp Laws § 750.316; and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, Mich. Comp Laws § 750.227b.¹ Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on the first-degree murder conviction and received a consecutive two year prison sentence on the felony-firearm conviction. Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree felony murder, that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial due to the fact that the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 took place while Petitioner's second trial was in progress, that his Double Jeopardy rights were violated when the trial court judge declared a mistrial after the jury in Petitioner's first trial indicated that they were unable to reach a verdict, that his sentence was based on inaccurate information, that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial and appellatecounsel, that he should be granted a new trial based upon the recantation of a witness's trial testimony, and that his custodial statements should have been suppressed after he invoked his right to counsel. The respondent has filed an answer to the petition, asserting that the claims are procedurally defaulted and/or lack merit. The Court agrees that Petitioner's claims are meritless, therefore the petition will be denied.

I.

This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):

On July 12, 2000, shortly after midnight, defendant Bradley, along with codefendant Derico J. Thompson, stole marijuana from the thirty-year-old victim, who was shot and killed during the robbery. The victim's body was found on a porch near his home in Westland. The defendants were friends and co-workers. The defense maintained that, although a robbery and shooting occurred, defendant was merely present.

Here, the evidence shows that defendant was an active participant in the planning and execution of the robbery, and supplied the handgun used during the crime. Specifically, the evidence showed that defendant and the victim were friends, that defendant was aware that the victim possessed marijuana, and that, shortly before the incident, defendant asked a mutual friend of both defendant and the victim about robbing the victim. Defendant used his girlfriend's car to drive himself and codefendant Thompson to commit the crime. After the incident, defendant told his girlfriend that he and codefendant Thompson had robbed the victim of marijuana, and marijuana was observed in his girlfriend's car, which defendant unexpectedly had painted blue on the day after the incident. Defendant also commented to his girlfriend that he hoped the victim died, and that codefendant Thompson was having trouble moving the marijuana. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant was the source of information about the victim having marijuana, was the architect of the scheme to rob the victim, and was involved in executing the robbery.

Furthermore, the evidence supported a reasonable inference that defendant suppliedthe gun used during the robbery. The victim was shot with a nine-millimeter handgun. There was evidence that, when discussing robbing the victim with a mutual friend of both defendant and the victim, defendant was armed with a nine-millimeter handgun. Also, the owner of the house where defendant stayed with this girlfriend saw a nine-millimeter handgun in their room shortly before the shooting. Moreover, when talking to the police after the incident, defendant admitted that he owned a nine-millimeter handgun, but refused to disclose its location. Defendant also declared to the police that they would never find the murder weapon.

People v. Bradley, No. 240746, 2004 WL 201617, at * 1-2 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 3, 2004).

The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal, concluding that "we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court." People v. Bradley, 688 N.W.2d 828 (Mich. 2004) (table). The United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari. Bradley v. Michigan, 544 U.S. 1002 (2005).

Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mich.Ct.R. 6.500, et. sep., which was denied. People v. Bradley, No. 00-8732-01 (Wayne Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 17, 2006). The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Bradley, No. 279978 (Mich.Ct.App. March 24, 2008). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court. While his application was pending in that court, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court, which was held in abeyance pending the outcome of his case with the Michigan Supreme Court. On October 27, 2008, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Bradley, 769 N.W.2d 205 (Mich. 2008). This Court subsequently reinstated the petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Court's active docket. Bradley v. Woods, No. 08-13560-BC, 2009 WL 801741 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2009). ²

Petitioner raises the following issues in his petition:

I. Whether petitioner was convicted on insufficient evidence of felony murder where no "Aaron malice" was shown in this ill-fated drug deal.

II. Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to a fair trial was violated by the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial, order a continuance or instruct the jury regarding the tragic events or September 11, 2001 that were unfolding during petitioner's trial.

III. Petitioner's second trial violated double jeopardy because there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial of his first trial.

IV. Petitioner was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his sentence is invalid because he was sentence (sic) on inaccurate information of the jury's verdict, and petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the inaccurate verdict forms and during sentencing.

V. Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to request a Remmer hearing to determine the jurors' state of mind concerning the events that took place on September 10, and September 11, 2001 during petitioner's trial. Also, counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial judge's comments and to the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's statement which violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.

VI. Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and a fair trial were violated where the prosecutor threatened, intimidated, and solicited false testimony from witness Quiana Mckay, committing prosecutorial misconduct.

VII. Petitioner's Fifth Amendment rights not to be a witness against his(sic) self were violated when the court admitted his custodial statements into evidence after he unambiguously invoked his right to counsel. The court committed clear error by denying petitioner's motion to suppress these custodial statements to police when the testimony shows that he unambiguously invoked his right to counsel.

II.

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief unless the state court's adjudication of his claims on the merits

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). And, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), a state court's factual determinations are presumed to be correct unless the habeas petitioner rebuts them with clear and convincing evidence.

Granting a habeas petition under the "contrary to" clause is only appropriate "if the state court arrive[d] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decide[d] a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 326, 412-13 (2000). A state court's decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the [Supreme] Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principal to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Instead, a habeas court must ask "whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409. To obtain habeas relief in federal court, "a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87...