Bradley v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 08 May 2023
• Docket Number: 21-cv-11669
• Parties: CRAIG J. BRADLEY, Petitioner, v. SHERMAN CAMPBELL, Respondent,
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

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CRAIG J. BRADLEY, Petitioner, v. SHERMAN CAMPBELL, Respondent,

No. 21-cv-11669

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

May 8, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

LINDA V. PARKER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

On July 7, 2021, Michigan prisoner Craig J. Bradley (“Petitioner”) filed a pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state court convictions for first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct (“CSC”) in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws §§ 750.520b and 750.520c, respectively. For the reasons that follow, the Court is denying the petition.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 2015, a jury convicted Petitioner of the above offenses in the Circuit Court for Berrien County, Michigan. As set forth in the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision, the convictions arose from offenses against Defendant's sisterin-law, who was 15 at the time. People v Bradley, No. 328806, 2016 WL 7493715, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2016).

The victim spent the day swimming at Petitioner's home and then spent the night there with her sister and her nieces and nephews. Id. During the evening, Petitioner sexually assaulted the victim, including digitally and orally penetrating her. Id. Before going to swim at Petitioner's home, the victim had been at a park with her boyfriend who allegedly digitally penetrated her. Id.

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions but remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v. Lockridge, 870 N.W.2d 502 (Mich. 2015). Bradley, 2016 WL 7493715, at *7-8. On remand, the trial court denied Petitioner's motion for resentencing. Petitioner did not appeal. He did, however, file the pending application for federal habeas corpus relief.

On Petitioner's request, these proceedings subsequently were stayed so he could return to the state courts and exhaust claims in the petition which were unexhausted. (ECF No. 4.). On December 21, 2021, Petitioner moved to reopen these federal habeas corpus proceedings and to amend the petition to delete the claims that were unexhausted when it was filed (Claims III and IV). (ECF No. 5.) The Court granted the motion, reopened the case, ordered service on Respondent, and set a briefing schedule. (ECF No. 6.)

Petitioner seeks relief on the following remaining grounds:

I. [His] constitutional rights were violated when the trial court sustained the prosecution's objection to defense counsel presenting his position or theory to the jury during opening statements.

II. [He] was denied the constitutional right to testify when, during his testimony, the trial court sustained the prosecution's objection to [Petitioner]'s characterization of an officer's testimony.

(ECF No. 1.)

II. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000). An “unreasonable application” occurs when “a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case.” Id. at 409.

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal citations omitted). A “state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). A “readiness to attribute error [to a state court] is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law.” Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).

A state court's factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption is rebutted only with clear and convincing evidence. Id. Moreover, for claims adjudicated on the merits in state court, habeas review is “limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

III. Discussion

A. Procedural Default

Respondent contends that Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to preserve the issues by objecting at trial and, as a result, the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed the claims for plain error only.

Under the procedural default doctrine, a federal habeas court will not review a question of federal law not substantively decided by the state courts:

When a habeas petitioner fails to obtain consideration of a claim by a state court, either due to the petitioner's failure to raise that claim before the state courts while state-court remedies are still available or due to a state procedural rule that prevents the state courts from reaching the merits of the petitioner's claim, that claim is procedurally defaulted and may not be considered by the federal court on habeas review.

Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80, 84-87 (1977); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78 (1971)). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applies a four-factor test to decide whether a claim has been procedurally defaulted due to a state procedural rule:

(1) whether there is an applicable state procedural rule that the petitioner failed to follow; (2) whether the state court enforced its rule; (3) whether the default is an independent and adequate ground on which the state can foreclose review of the petitioner's constitutional claim; and (4) whether the petitioner demonstrated good cause for failing to adhere to the procedural rule and actual prejudice as a result of the constitutional error.

Mariswamy v. Warren, 570 Fed.Appx. 461, 462 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 672-73 (6th Cir. 2001)). As to the second factor, the state court “must clearly and expressly state that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262-65 (1989); Cunningham v. Shoop, 23 F.4th 636, 673 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Harris).

Addressing Petitioner's opening statement claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that “[u]npreserved constitutional issues are reviewed for plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights.” Bradley, 2016 WL 7493715, at * 4. Nevertheless, the court found that Petitioner did not waive the issue. Id. at *4 n. 4. Further, the court's passing reference to the plain error standard, without any indication that it was applying such review, did not “clearly and expressly convey that its decision rested on a state procedural bar. See Dantzler v. Rewerts, No. 201059, 2021 WL 3754248, at *8 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2021) (finding that the state court's reference at the outset and conclusion to the standard for evaluating procedural default under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D)(3) was not an explicit statement); Smith v. Cook, 956 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the state court does not clearly and expressly invoke a procedural bar where it refers to the bar without directly concluding that forfeiture has occurred and then addresses the merits); Patterson v. Haskins, 316 F.3d 596, 604-05 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the petitioner's claim was not procedurally defaulted, although the petitioner's counsel failed to object to the jury instructions, where the state court made no mention of the petitioner's failure to object in its decision). Thus, the procedural default doctrine does not bar this Court from considering the merits of Petitioner's first ground for relief.

Nor is the Court precluded from addressing Petitioner's second ground for relief. Regarding the claim, the state court stated: “To the extent defendant raises a constitutional issue, we review unpreserved constitutional issues for plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights.” Id. at * 6. But, again, the state court did not “clearly and expressly” invoke a state procedural bar and it evaluated the claim on the merits. Id. at *6-7. Further, the court never found that Petitioner failed to preserve the claim.

B. Merits of Petitioner's Opening Argument Claim

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims that his Constitutional rights were violated when the trial court precluded defense counsel, during his opening statement, from advancing the theory that the victim's injuries were caused by her boyfriend. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in sustaining the...