Bradley v. City of Oskaloosa
| Decision Date | 23 June 1922 |
| Docket Number | No. 34749.,34749. |
| Citation | 188 N.W. 896,193 Iowa 1072 |
| Parties | BRADLEY v. CITY OF OSKALOOSA. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Mahaska County; Chas. A. Dewey, Judge.
Action by the administratrix of the estate of Russell W. Hartman, deceased, to recover damages for his death caused by a city fire engine on a street of the defendant city. The trial court sustained the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the testimony, and entered judgment for costs against the plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Daniel W. Davis and Liston McMillen, both of Oskaloosa, for appellant.
George C. True, of Oskaloosa, for appellee.
DE GRAFF, J.
Plaintiff's decedent was killed when struck and run over by a fire engine belonging to the defendant city. The negligence of the defendant is predicated on the following allegations: (1) That the fire engine in returning from a fire to its garage was driven at an unlawful rate of speed at the time and place of the accident; (2) that the defendant city permitted automobiles to be parked on the street near the place of the accident, which prevented the decedent seeing the fire engine at the time of its approach; (3) that the defendant city failed to provide police supervision, whereby traffic could be directed and controlled at the time and place of the accident.
This appeal primarily involves but one question: Are the duties intrusted and exercised by the agents and servants of defendant city in the operation of its fire department governmental or ministerial in character? If they are exercised for the general good of the public, they are classed as governmental, and for injuries resulting therefrom through the negligent acts of its agents, servants, or officers the doctrine of nonliability attaches.
The line of demarcation between municipal acts strictly governmental and those which are ministerial or proprietary is not definitely fixed, nor are these terms defined with exactness in adjudicated cases or texts. It is universally recognized that the exercise of the legislative will is governmental, and this includes the power to determine whether certain things shall be done in the interest of public welfare. The exercise and expression of discretion as to the character and extent of the thing to be done is in the same category.
[1] Briefly stated, a municipal corporation in the discharge of its administrative duties is viewed in law as having two separate capacities. One is private or corporate, and acts done in the performance of a corporate function are termed ministerial or proprietary; the other is governmental or sovereign, in the exercise of which injuries may be inflicted on the person or property of a citizen without power in the courts to afford redress. With the wisdom of this legal classification a court is not necessarily concerned, except so far as to determine whether any given act upon which damages are predicated is within one class or the other. It is primarily a question of public policy. If the rule of liability or nonliability is to be changed, the appeal should be addressed to the legislative and not to the judicial department of state government. Neither the classification nor the principles declared thereunder are new, for they have been established and recognized not only under the common law, but by nearly every state in the American Union. It is strikingly strange that there is such remarkable unanimity on the subject. The decisions are so uniform that it is enough to state the principle without citation of authority.
[2] A municipality is under no obligation to provide for a fire department in order to protect the property of its residents. Whether a city shall have its own fire department, or what shall be its character and extent, is governmental, and it is the recognized rule in this state that the employés in the conduct and operation of the fire department of a city are not the agents and servants of the city, but that they act as officers charged with a public service for whose negligence no action will lie against the city. Saunders v. City of...
To continue reading
Request your trial