Bradley v. Crow Tribe of Indians

• Decision Date: 09 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-229.,04-229.
• Citation: 2005 MT 309,124 P.3d 1143,329 Mont. 448
• Parties: Raymond John BRADLEY, Personal Representative for the Estate of Stephen E. Bradley, d/b/a Native American Indian Design, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

124 P.3d 1143

2005 MT 309

329 Mont. 448

Raymond John BRADLEY, Personal Representative for the Estate of Stephen E. Bradley, d/b/a Native American Indian Design, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 04-229.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs January 11, 2005.

Decided December 9, 2005.

For Appellant: Urban J. Bear Don't Walk, Crow Legal Department, Crow Agency, Montana.

For Respondent: Thomas E. Towe, Towe, Ball, Enright, Mackey & Sommerfield, PLLP, Billings, Montana.

Justice JOHN WARNER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Crow Tribe of Indians (Tribe) appeals from a November 12, 2003, judgment filed in the District Court for Yellowstone County. The judgment is based on an order of the District Court which reinstated a prior judgment of February 15, 2002, which granted summary judgment to Bradley's predecessor personal representative, Sarah Bradley. The current personal representative is Raymond John Bradley, and both the predecessor and current personal representative are referred to as "Bradley." We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

¶ 3 Did the District Court err when it reinstated the February 15, 2002, Judgment in favor of Bradley?

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Most of the facts of this already protracted litigation are stated in Bradley v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 2003 MT 82, 315 Mont. 75, 67 P.3d 306, (Bradley I). Those facts stated in Bradley I that are relevant to this appeal are summarized as follows:

¶ 5 Bradley sued the Tribe alleging it breached an employment contract with him and failed to pay him as provided by contract. The Tribe moved to dismiss the action on grounds that the District Court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction due to the Tribe's sovereign immunity. The District Court denied the Tribe's motion to dismiss, concluding that applicable law permitted Indian tribes to be sued in state courts for causes of action arising from "commercial activities" carried on in the United States, and that the alleged contract provision was a waiver of the Tribe's sovereign immunity. However, the District Court reserved the right to readdress the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

¶ 6 Later, Bradley moved for summary judgment. The Tribe failed to respond to Bradley's motion, and for this reason the District Court granted Bradley's motion on February 5, 2002, and entered judgment in his favor on February 15, 2002, in the amount of $113,972.79.

¶ 7 On March 12, 2002, the Tribe moved to either alter or amend the February 15, 2002, judgment under Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P., or in the alternative to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P. The tribe said that its prior counsel had failed to notify the Tribe of Bradley's motion for summary judgment and, as a result, the Tribe had not filed a timely brief in opposition to the motion. The Tribe also argued that the District Court should set aside the judgment because the District Court's order on which it was based addressed sovereign immunity and whether the District Court had the subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the alleged contract. This motion was timely under Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P.

¶ 8 The District Court ordered a hearing on the Tribe's motion to set aside the judgment of February 15, 2002, and 87 days after the motion was filed, on June 7, 2002, granted relief under Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P., in favor of the Tribe, dismissing the lawsuit in its entirety. Bradley appealed, resulting in the decision in Bradley I.

¶ 9 In Bradley I, this Court addressed and decided the issue of whether the District Court erred when it dismissed Bradley's claim because the Tribe had not unequivocally waived its immunity from suit in state court. The Court concluded the District Court did err when it dismissed Bradley's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and determined that the undisputed evidence established two things: (a) a valid contract existed between Bradley and the Tribe; and (b) in such contract, the Tribe unequivocally waived its right to sovereign immunity. Bradley I, ¶ 22. Accordingly, the District Court's order dismissing Bradley's complaint for lack of jurisdiction was reversed, and this case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. Bradley I, ¶ 22.

¶ 10 The saga continued upon remand to the District Court. Bradley moved for Entry of Judgment in his favor. He argued that the summary judgment of February 15, 2002, should be reinstated. On November 12, 2003, the District Court granted Bradley's Motion for Entry of Judgment, and ordered the summary judgment of February 15, 2002, reinstated. On November 20, 2003, judgment was again entered in favor of Bradley and against the Tribe in the amount of $113,972.79, together with interest from February 15, 2002. The District Court did not rule on the Tribe's motion to alter or amend judgment within the 60 days provided by Rule 60(c), M.R.Civ.P., and it was deemed denied. The Tribe now appeals the November 20, 2003, judgment.

¶ 11 Bradley's initial motion for summary judgment prayed for a judgment in his favor that the Tribe was liable to him on all issues raised, damages plus interest for an invoice he had submitted to the Tribe, and the remainder of the funds held by the Tribe on the contract in question. The motion stated that the matter of consequential damages would remain to be submitted to the trier of fact. The District Court did enter judgment as demanded by Bradley, including interest and costs. In his Affidavit in Support of Calculation of Prejudgment Interest filed on February 15, 2002, Bradley claimed that his "total damages and prejudgment interest" amounted to $113,972.79, and the District Court's Judgment entered on February 15, 2002, awarded him this exact amount. After remand, in his motion to reinstate the February 15, 2002, judgment, Bradley made no prayer for any additional damages. Nor were any awarded. Bradley has made no motion to dismiss this appeal as the judgment in his favor is not complete and final. He does not pray that the case be remanded to assess additional, consequential, damages. He seeks only to have the District Court judgment affirmed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12 The District Court order of November 12, 2003, in effect, is a grant of summary judgment to Bradley. Our standard of review for a District Court's order granting summary judgment is de novo, using the same Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., criteria applied by the District Court. Abraham v. Nelson, 2002 MT 94, ¶ 9, 309 Mont. 366, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 628, ¶ 9. We look to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits to determine the existence or nonexistence of genuine issues of material fact. Erker v. Kester, 1999 MT 231, ¶ 17, 296 Mont. 123, ¶ 17, 988 P.2d 1221, ¶ 17.

¶ 13 Summary judgment is an extreme remedy which should be granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lee v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 2001 MT 59, ¶ 25, 304 Mont. 356, ¶ 25, 22 P.3d 631, ¶ 25. "The party seeking summary judgment, therefore, has the burden of demonstrating a complete absence of any genuine factual issues." Lee, ¶ 25. "The party seeking summary judgment also must overcome the burden that all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the offered evidence will be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Lee, ¶ 25.

¶ 14 Where the moving party is able to demonstrate that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains in dispute, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion. Lee, ¶ 26. "This burden shift requires that the opposing party present material and substantial evidence, rather than merely conclusory or speculative statements, to raise a genuine issue of material fact." Lee, ¶ 26.

¶ 15 This Court has routinely stated that the purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate unnecessary trials, but that summary adjudication "should never be substituted for a trial if a material factual controversy exists." Boyes v. Eddie, 1998 MT 311, ¶ 16, 292 Mont. 152, ¶ 16, 970 P.2d 91, ¶ 16.

III. DISCUSSION

¶ 16 Did the District Court err when it reinstated the February 15, 2002, Judgment in favor of Bradley?

¶ 17 In granting Bradley's Motion for Entry of Judgment, and in reinstating the February 15, 2002, judgment, the District Court concluded as a matter of law that even though it had been established by this Court that a valid contract existed between the parties and Montana Courts had jurisdiction over the controversy, it did not have jurisdiction to hear any of the issues raised in the Tribe's original Motion to Alter, Amend or Set Aside the February 15, 2002, judgment. The District Court reasoned that, prior to the appeal in Bradley I, it had lost jurisdiction over the February 15, 2002, judgment because it did not rule on the Tribe's motion to set it aside within the 60 days provided by Rule 60(c), M.R.Civ.P. Therefore, the motion was deemed denied. The District Court concluded that the reversal in Bradley I left the judgment of February 15, 2002, in place. It further concluded that it could not change that judgment, because the time within which it could do so had expired prior to the time it entered its now reversed order of June 7, 2002. Thus, the February 15, 2002, judgment must stand and the District Court had no way to reconsider it.

¶ 18 The Tribe points out that the reason all of the issues raised in its motion to set aside the judgment of February 2, 2002, were not addressed by the District Court prior to the appeal in Bradley I is because the District Court decided that it did not have jurisdiction to hear any part of the case. The Tribe argues that once this Court concluded on appeal that the District Court did have jurisdiction to hear the case and remanded for further...