Bradley v. Doe

Decision Date06 July 2007
Docket NumberNo. 4274.,4274.
Citation649 S.E.2d 153
PartiesErnest Lamar BRADLEY and Esther K. Bradley, Appellants, v. John DOE and AccuSweep, Inc., Respondents.
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals

Donald Higgins Howe and Walter Bilbro, Jr., of Charleston, for Appellants.

Margaret Helen Fanning, of Charleston, for Respondents.

ANDERSON, J.

Ernest Lamar Bradley (Bradley) appeals the trial court's decision granting John Doe (Doe) summary judgment on Bradley's claim for recovery under his uninsured motorist coverage.1 Bradley (1) contends the trial court erred in finding no one independently witnessed Bradley's accident, and (2) maintains independent witnesses existed to provide circumstantial evidence that an unknown vehicle caused the accident. We affirm.2

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 18, 2002, Bradley left the Waffle House restaurant at approximately 3:00 a.m. and began driving home. After traveling less than one-quarter mile on College Park Road in Ladson, South Carolina, Bradley swerved to avoid an object in the northbound lane. Bradley lost control of his vehicle, veered off the road, and struck a tree.

Bradley telephoned his son, whom he left minutes earlier at the Waffle House, to come and assist him. After summoning his son Bradley walked to the side of the road and began signaling for help with a flashlight. At about 3:15 a.m., United States Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Clifton Douglas, Jr. drove passed Bradley, turned his vehicle around, and headed toward the accident scene. When Douglas returned in the northbound lane he saw a "large white garbage can bag" in the middle of his lane. Douglas parked his vehicle, approached Bradley, and observed that Bradley was bleeding from a head laceration. While helping Bradley, Douglas heard another passing vehicle strike and drag the garbage bag down the road. Bradley's son and daughter subsequently arrived and noted the trash bag and trash scattered on the roadway.

Bradley's friend, Thomas Bosley, had been with Bradley at the Waffle House. As Bosley drove home on College Park Road minutes before Bradley, he saw "a large trash bag in the middle of the [northbound] lane," less than one-quarter mile from the restaurant. Bosley claimed he narrowly avoided the garbage bag and continued driving about another quarter-mile on College Park Road when he encountered a "white street sweeper's truck." Bosley observed this truck "drop another similar trash bag onto the public roadway." He learned the next morning about Bradley's accident.

Bradley brought this action against his insurer to collect under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy. The insurer represented Doe as the unknown driver. Doe moved for summary judgment arguing Bradley failed to satisfy the statutory requirement for recovery under the uninsured policy provision because no one independently witnessed Bradley's accident. The trial court granted Doe's summary judgment motion and denied Bradley's motion to alter or amend the judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard of review as the trial court under Rule 56, SCRCP. Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 563, 633 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2006). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP ("The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."); Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Center, Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 134, 638 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2006); Houck v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 7, 11, 620 S.E.2d 326, 329 (2005); Pittman v. Grand Strand Entm't, Inc., 363 S.C. 531, 536, 611 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2005); B & B Liquors, Inc. v. O'Neil, 361 S.C. 267, 270, 603 S.E.2d 629, 631 (Ct.App. 2004). In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; Medical Univ. of South Carolina v. Arnaud, 360 S.C. 615, 619, 602 S.E.2d 747, 749 (2004); Rife v. Hitachi Constr. Mach. Co., Ltd., 363 S.C. 209, 213, 609 S.E.2d 565, 567 (Ct.App.2005).

The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of clearly establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 364 S.C. 222, 228, 612 S.E.2d 719, 722 (Ct.App. 2005) (citing McCall v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 359 S.C. 372, 376, 597 S.E.2d 181, 183 (Ct.App.2004)). Once the party moving for summary judgment meets the initial burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the opponent's case, the opponent cannot simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings. Id. citing Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 354 S.C. 648, 660, 582 S.E.2d 432, 438 (Ct.App. 2003). Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Jones, 364 S.C. at 228, 612 S.E.2d at 722 (citation omitted). The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite disposition of cases which do not require the services of a fact finder. Id. "Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should be cautiously invoked so that a litigant is not improperly deprived of a trial on disputed factual issues." BPS, Inc. v. Worthy, 362 S.C. 319, 326, 608 S.E.2d 155, 159 (Ct.App.2005).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Bradley asserts the trial court erred in granting Doe's summary judgment motion. Specifically, Bradley urges that he satisfied the independent witness requirement in section 38-77-170(2) of the South Carolina Code of Laws by providing testimony from independent witnesses regarding circumstantial evidence of an unknown driver's negligence. We disagree.

I. Requirements of S.C.Code Ann. § 38-77-170

Section 38-77-170 establishes the conditions under which an insured may recover uninsured motorist coverage when the owner or operator of the motor vehicle causing injury or damage is unknown:

If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, there is no right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist provision, unless:

(1) the insured or someone in his behalf has reported the accident to some appropriate police authority within a reasonable time, under all the circumstances, after its occurrence;

(2) the injury or damage was caused by physical contact with the unknown vehicle, or the accident must have been witnessed by someone other than the owner or operator of the insured vehicle; provided however, the witness must sign an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts of the accident contained in the affidavit;

(3) the insured was not negligent in failing to determine the identity of the other vehicle and the driver of the other vehicle at the time of the accident.

S.C.Code Ann. § 38-77-170 (2002) (emphasis added).

Where there is no physical contact with a vehicle driven by an unknown motorist, someone other than the owner or operator of the insured vehicle must have witnessed the accident and attest to the facts of the accident in a signed affidavit. See Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company v. Howser, 309 S.C. 269, 274-75, 422 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1992) (holding "no physical contact with the unknown vehicle is necessary when a witness other than the owner or driver of the insured vehicle is available to attest to the facts of the accident.").

II. Rules of Statutory Construction

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996); Shealy v. Doe, 370 S.C. 194, 199, 634 S.E.2d 45, 48 (Ct.App. 2006). The first question of statutory interpretation is whether the statute's meaning is clear on its face. Wade v. Berkeley County, 348 S.C. 224, 229, 559 S.E.2d 586, 588 (2002); Eagle Container Co., LLC v. County of Newberry, 366 S.C. 611, 622, 622 S.E.2d 733, 738 (Ct.App.2005) (cert. granted January 31, 2007).

When a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed, and this Court has no right to impose another meaning. Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina v. State, 372 S.C. 519, ___, 642 S.E.2d 751, 754 (2007); see Vaughn v. Bernhardt, 345 S.C. 196, 198, 547 S.E.2d 869, 870 (2001). "[T]he words of the statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation." Mun. Ass'n of S.C. v. AT&T Communications of S. States, Inc., 361 S.C. 576, 580, 606 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2004); see also Miller v. Doe, 312 S.C. 444, 447, 441 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1994) ("In determining the meaning of a statute, the terms used therein must be taken in their ordinary and popular meaning, nothing to the contrary appearing.").

The legislature's intent should be ascertained primarily from the plain language of the statute. Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 364 S.C. 222, 230, 612 S.E.2d 719, 723 (Ct.App.2005) (citing State v. Landis, 362 S.C. 97, 102, 606 S.E.2d 503, 506 (Ct.App. 2004); Stephen v. Avins Const. Co., 324 S.C. 334, 339, 478 S.E.2d 74, 77 (Ct.App.1996)). What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Jones, 364 S.C. at 230, 612 S.E.2d at 723 (citing Bayle v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp., 344 S.C. 115, 122, 542 S.E.2d 736, 740 (Ct.App.2001)). The language must be read in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose. Jones, 364 S.C. at 230, 612...

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