Bradley v. Lightcap
Decision Date | 24 April 1903 |
Citation | 202 Ill. 154,67 N.E. 45 |
Parties | BRADLEY v. LIGHTCAP. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Fulton County; G. W. Thompson, Judge.
Bill by Lydia Bradley against H. W. Lightcap. Judgment dismissing the bill, and complainant appeals. Affirmed.
See 66 N. E. 546.
Wallace & Lacey, H. W. Masters, and George B. Foster, for appellee.
The appellee, H. W. Lightcap, brought five suits in ejectment in the circuit court of Mason county against tenants of the appellant, Lydia Bradley. Upon changes of venue the suits were transferred to Fulton county, where they were consolidated by agreement, and appellant was substituted as defendant. The consolidated suit was for the recovery of 680 acres of farm lands. Upon a trial before the court there were a finding and judgment in favor of appellant. Appellee brought the case to this court by appeal, and the judgment was reversed, and the cause was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion then filed. Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510, 58 N. E. 221. The cause was reinstated in the circuit court, and was again tried, resulting in a judgment against appellant. She took a new trial as provided by the statute, and then filed the bill in this case to enjoin the further prosecution of the ejectment suit. A demurrer was sustained to the bill, and, appellant having elected to stand by the bill, it was dismissed for want of equity, and she appealed.
The substantial averments of the bill are as follows: That on June 30, 1867, complainant was the owner of a mortgage given by Thomas B. Breedlove on 1,200 acres of land in Mason county, including the 680 acres involved in the ejectment suit, to secure $19,616; that Breedlove and wife conveyed the whole premises, subject to the mortgage, to Benjamin S. Prettyman, who on August 13, 1868, conveyed the 680 acres to Absalom McCune, taking from McCune a trust deed on the same to E. G. Johnson, as trustee for complainant, to secure the payment of three notes, for the sum of $5,000 each, with interest at 10 per cent. due in one, two, and three years from date; that Prettyman delivered said notes and trust deed to the agent of complainant in part payment of the Breedlove mortgage, and she released said Breedlove mortgage; that on November 13, 1868, McCune and wife reconveyed the 680 acres to Prettyman; that nothing was paid on the McCune notes, and no taxes were paid on the land, and in 1871 she investigated, and found the lands to be swampy and worthless, vacant and unoccupied; that she took possession and redeemed from tax sales, and paid the current taxes, and at the March term, 1872, filed her bill in the circuit court of Mason county against Prettyman, McCune, and others, alleging that she had been induced to accept the McCune notes by fraudulent misrepresentations as to the value of the lands, and praying the court to set aside the release of the Breedlove mortgage, and foreclose the same upon the whole 1,200 acres; that while said bill was pending, in the summer of 1872, complainant personally entered on said lands and employed Allison Breedlove to hold and look after the same for her, and put him in charge thereof, to rent them for pasture and cut hay from them; that said Breedlove took and held active possession of the property, putting up fences as they were needed to keep in stock, and cutting and selling hay, and continued in actual possession until 1878, when complainant leased the lands to John Coddington; that she gradually reduced the lands to cultivation, and joined in forming a drainage district, by which they were thoroughly drained and became of great value as farming lands; that the bill filed in the circuit court was contested by Prettyman, and was pending until 1879, when a decree adverse to complainant was rendered, decreeing the foreclosure of the McCune trust deed upon the 680 acres, instead of the Breedlove mortgage on all the lands; that the lands were sold under the decree by the master in chancery, and were struck off to complainant for $10,000, leaving a deficit due from McCune of $21,000, which has never been paid; that the time allowed for redemption from the sale expired January 27, 1881, and no redemption was made; that she did not take out a deed on the certificate of purchase, but continued in the actual, adverse possession of the lands, and was in such possession when she filed the bill in this case; that after the expiration of the time for redemption she expended pended about $5,000 in the drainage distrct, about $5,000 in imporvements, and over $5,000 in taxes on the property; that the trustee, E. G. Johnson, died intestate in June, 1885, and on June 11, 1894, his heirs sold the lands at public sale, after notice as provided for in the trust deed, and they were struck off to complainant for $35,000, and said heirs at law conveyed the same to her in conformity with the power in the trust deed; and that on November 30, 1894, there was put on record a quitclaim deed of said lands from Benjamin S. Prettyman to the defendant, purporting to have been executed on September 4, 1893. The bill gives the history of the ejectment suit, and alleges that complainant has fully presented her defense at law, and has no remedy by the rules of law, and can only have relief in equity. The prayer of the bill is that the defendant be permanently enjoined from further prosecuting the action of ejectment, or asserting ownership of the lands, or entering upon or taking possession thereof; that he be required to convey to complainant all his right, title, and interest in the same; and that her right to the lands may be confirmed and established by a decree of the court.
In seeking a reversal of the decree of the circuit court, counsel say that they present and rely upon the following four propositions:
The fourth of these propositions has already been directly disposed of by decisions adverse to it in Ryhiner v. Frank, 105 Ill. 326, and also in Bradley v. Lightcap, 201 Ill. 511, 66 N. E. 546, on the second appeal in the ejectment suit. The limitation act of 1872, being valid and constitutional, is equally binding upon the court in this case as in the action at law. Furthermore, if that act, which limits the life of a certificate of purchase and the rights of a purchaser thereunder to five years after the expiration of the period of redemption, were unconstitutional, or if the construction given to it rendered it unconstitutional, a defense upon that ground would be complete and adequate at law, and the unconstitutionality of the act would be no ground for a bill in equity. Complainant could not maintain her bill to have that question determined, since the circuit court, in the action of ejectment, would have full power to pass upon it and award to complainant all her rights. The constitutionality of the statute is now beyond question, and the only duty of the court is to enforce it according to its terms. Courts do not hesitate to execute the legislative will as expressed in statutes of limitation, or try to demonstrate a hidden meaning or intention not expressed in the statute, or contrary to its terms, for the purpose of defeating it. Mr. Justice Story, speaking of former efforts of that kind, said in Spring v. Gray, 5 Mason, 505, Fed. Cas, No. 13,259: ‘Happily that period has passed away, and judges now confine themselves to the more appropriate duty of construing the statute, rather than devising means to evade its operation.’
The language of this statute is clear and unambiguous. Plainer terms could not have been employed for the purpose of setting bounds to the rights acquired by a certificate of purchase, and limiting them to five years after the period of redemption. The statute was so construed in Peterson v. Emmerson, 135 Ill. 55, 25 N. E. 842. The court, in the absence of express legislation on the subject, had formulated in Rucker v. Dooley, 49 Ill. 377, 99 Am. Dec. 614, an equitable rule based upon the analogies of the law, and it was urged upon the court that equity might order a conveyance based on a foreclosure sale after the certificate was barred. The court, speaking by Mr. Justice Baker, said (page 60, 135 Ill., page 843, 25 N. E.): ...
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