Bradley v. Milliken, Civil No. 35257.

• Court: United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Western District Michigan)
• Writing for the Court: DeMASCIO
• Citation: 411 F. Supp. 943
• Parties: Ronald BRADLEY et al., Plaintiffs, v. William G. MILLIKEN, Governor of the State of Michigan, et al., Defendants.
• Docket Number: Civil No. 35257.
• Decision Date: 04 November 1975

411 F. Supp. 943

Ronald BRADLEY et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
William G. MILLIKEN, Governor of the State of Michigan, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 35257.

United States District Court, E. D. Michigan, S. D.

November 4, 1975.

Louis R. Lucas, Ratner, Sugarmon & Lucas, Memphis, Tenn., Thomas Atkins, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.

George T. Roumell, Jr., Riley & Roumell, Detroit, Mich., Theodore Sachs, Marston, Sachs, O'Connell, Nunn & Freid, Detroit, Mich., George L. McCargar, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DeMASCIO, District Judge.

At the inception of the remedial phase of this litigation, the court directed the parties to submit plans to effectively establish a unitary school system. After affording the parties approximately 30 days to attempt to resolve their differences, the court conducted extensive

411 F. Supp. 944

hearings on the plans submitted.¹ The parties were persistent in their different views of what constituted desegregation. The plaintiffs adhered steadfastly to the view that desegregation required that the racial composition of every school in the system conform to within 15% of the system-wide racial ratio, that other considerations furthering integration were not relevant toward the formulation of a desegregation plan, and that existing practicalities at hand were not relevant. The defendant Detroit Board of Education contended that a just and feasible plan must give consideration to the "practicalities of the situation" such as the racial ratio existing in the school community, which is predominantly black by wide margins, shifting population trends and demography, the financial plight of the school district, the need for school, neighborhood and community stability, and assurances that the district be able to provide optimal educational opportunities for all children, and that an effective desegregation plan should not look merely to the present, but should desegregate "now and hereafter" by preventing resegregation

Upon completion of the hearings, the court carefully examined the plans together with all the evidence submitted. We concluded that both plans were too rigidly structured because of adherence to fixed racial ratios (which was found to be not only undesirable but constitutionally infirm), that both plans failed to properly weight the essential "practicalities of the situation", that neither plan exhausted alternatives in light of such practicalities, and that neither plan appropriately balanced the equitable burdens with the desegregative results achieved. On August 26, 1975, we directed the defendant Detroit Board to prepare a revised plan, which was submitted on September 19, 1975. On October 8, 1975, we directed the Detroit Board to re-evaluate various aspects of its September 19, 1975 plan, and the Board again submitted a revision on October 21, 1975.

Thus, this is the third occasion the court has had to carefully examine every detail of the Detroit Board's desegregation plan. The sole purpose of our detailed examination has been to devise a "just, feasible and equitable" desegregation plan pursuant to a United States Supreme Court mandate that we formulate a "decree directed to eliminating the segregation found to exist in the Detroit city schools. . . ." We have found that the revised plan closely parallels the court's guidelines. There are instances in which the Detroit Board employs parameters at variance with the guidelines, but we have said that the Detroit Board may do so, provided the plan itself discloses that the additional effort will have a salutary affect upon desegregation (Memorandum Opinion, August 15, 1975, p. 121), since a cooperative board should be afforded discretion to weigh the practicalities at hand. This does not mean, however, that the Detroit Board is free to charter a course beyond the guidelines to accommodate individual philosophies or regional goals. We have been careful to ensure that where the plan exceeds the court's guidelines, the plan discloses the practicalities considered and the reasons for affording varying weight to those practicalities.

We are satisfied that the revised plan, which we today order implemented with some modifications made by the court,² is an effective and equitable desegregation plan within the constitutional guidelines that we have provided. The plan exhausts alternatives to two-way bussing, such as re-zoning and creation of satellites, and does not adhere to rigid racial ratios. Rather, the plan is flexible, as it permits variations derived by weighing the practicalities at hand and places into equitable balance the objectives sought and the results to be

411 F. Supp. 945

achieved. (Memo. Op., p. 87).³ The plan recognizes the need to preserve walk-in schools in integrated neighborhoods, and contains the flexibility needed to encourage stability in integrated neighborhoods. The flexibility of the plan is further demonstrated by the fact that where reassignments are made at the elementary level, the students involved are assigned to a walk-in middle school or high school. Moreover, the plan provides for rotation of classes between paired schools to lessen or equalize the transportation burden (Memo. Op., pp. 91, 93). Most important, the plan avoids transportation serving no desegregative purpose, such as bussing black children long distances to attend predominantly black schools. The court is satisfied that wherever transportation of white or black children is ordered, it serves a desegregative purpose. Thus, the plan is sensitive to the educational aspirations of the children and parents of Detroit who are not themselves responsible for the invidious violations exposed during the liability phase of these hearings

We do not mean to imply that the plan, even with the modifications made by the court, is perfect. Future events may well dictate that other selections are more desirable;...