Bradley v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Writing for the Court: Black
• Citation: 4 S.W. 427,91 Mo. 493
• Decision Date: 21 March 1887
• Parties: BRADLEY and others v. MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO.

4 S.W. 427 91 Mo. 493 BRADLEY and others
v.
MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO. Supreme Court of Missouri. March 21, 1887.

1. HUSBAND AND WIFE — CONVEYANCE OF WIFE'S LAND — HUSBAND SOLE GRANTOR.

The signing, sealing, and acknowledgment, by a married woman, of a deed conveying land owned by her in her own right, will not operate to pass her estate, where her name does not appear in the body of the deed, and there is nothing in it to show that the husband, who is the sole grantor, is a married man.

2. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS — RUNNING OF THE STATUTE — HUSBAND AND WIFE.

A deed of land in Missouri, belonging to a married woman in her own right, conveyed by her husband by a deed in which he was sole grantor, executed in 1853, prior to the passage of the act (Gen. St. 464, § 14) now known as Rev. St. 1879, § 3295, providing that "no conveyance made, during coverture by the husband, of * * * any interest in such real estate, shall be valid, unless the same be by deed executed by the wife jointly with the husband," etc., though void as to the estate of the wife, is competent to pass the interest of the husband as tenant by the curtesy initiate; and, the right of action to recover the land being suspended during his life, the statute of limitations begins to run, as against the wife and her heirs, from his death, and not from the date of possession taken under the deed.

3. EJECTMENT — WHEN IT LIES — LAND TAKEN BY RAILROAD — ESTOPPEL.

As against a railroad company which entered upon land, and laid its tracks under a deed of purchase purporting to convey the fee, but passing only the curtesy of the husband of the owner, the wife or her heirs are not estopped from bringing ejectment to recover the land after the death of the husband.¹

4. SAME — MATTER IN PAIS.

Nor are they estopped from maintaining the action by the fact that the land sued for has been foreclosed under a mortgage given by the original road, and has passed into the hands of a corporation formed by the consolidation of several companies, and has been mortgaged for large sums of money to its entire value; it appearing that, while those proceedings were going on, the plaintiffs in ejectment were living in a distant state, and it not being shown that they encouraged or knew of what was being done.

Appeal from circuit court, Pettis county.

BLACK, J.

This is an action of ejectment. The land sued for is used and occupied by the defendant as a right of way, and for side tracks and depot purposes at Smithton station, in Pettis county. The 80 acres of which the land in question is a part was patented to Lucy A. Price. In 1853, her husband, Argillon Price, conveyed the same to Edwards, who conveyed the same to Combs in 1857, and the latter conveyed the land in question to the Pacific Railroad Company in 1860, and by virtue of various deeds the defendant has acquired the title of that company. Edwards and Combs had continuous possession of the 80 acres, under their deeds, from 1853 to 1860. At the latter date the Pacific Railroad took possession of the land in question, and it, and those claiming under it, have ever since used and possessed the property for the purposes before stated. Argillon Price died in April, 1875.

4 S.W. 428

Lucy A., his widow, died in April, 1877. The plaintiffs are their heirs, and this suit was begun in December, 1881.

1. The ground of this controversy lies in the fact that the deed to Edwards purports to be the deed of Argillon Price only. The name of Lucy A. Price does not appear in the body of it, nor is there anything in the body of the deed to show that he was a married man. It concludes: "In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal," etc. The deed, however, is signed by her and her husband, and acknowledged by her on the twenty-second July, 1853, and by him on the fourteenth September, 1853. The wife, as will be seen, owned the property in her own right, and the fact that she signed her name to the deed, and acknowledged it before a proper officer, does not make it her grant. The party in whom the title is vested, must use appropriate words to convey the estate. Signing, sealing, and acknowledging a deed by the wife in which her husband is the only grantor, will not convey her estate. Whiteley v. Stewart, 63 Mo. 360; Agricultural Bank of Mississippi v. Rice, 4 How. 225; City of Cincinnati v. Newell, 7 Ohio St. 37. Whether it would be sufficient to release her dower in her husband's estate we do not...