Bradley v. Ramsey

• Decision Date: 25 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.1:03 CV 73.,CIV.1:03 CV 73.
• Citation: 329 F.Supp.2d 617
• Parties: John Peter BRADLEY, Plaintiff, v. Gary RAMSEY, an individual; the Town of Woodfin, North Carolina; Homer Honeycutt, an individual; Leonard Clark, an individual; David Clark, an individual; Geneva Maney, an individual; Donald Honeycutt, Jr, an individual; Wanda Haynes, an individual; and Joseph Ferikes, an individual, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

329 F.Supp.2d 617

John Peter BRADLEY, Plaintiff, v. Gary RAMSEY, an individual; the Town of Woodfin, North Carolina; Homer Honeycutt, an individual; Leonard Clark, an individual; David Clark, an individual; Geneva Maney, an individual; Donald Honeycutt, Jr, an individual; Wanda Haynes, an individual; and Joseph Ferikes, an individual, Defendants.

No. CIV.1:03 CV 73.

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division.

March 25, 2004.

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C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr., Goldsmith & Goldsmith, Marion, NC, Leon N. Patricios Thomas G. Schultz, John Bustard, Alan K. Fertel, Ferrell, Schultz, Carter & Fertel, P.A., Miami, FL, Thomas C. Manning, Manning & Crouch, Raleigh, NC, for Plaintiff.

Hal F. Askins, Jeffrey R. Edwards, Dept. of Justice, Michael W. Mitchell, Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, Raleigh, NC, Robert B. Long, Jr., W. Scott Jones, Long, Parker & Warren, P.A., Asheville, NC, William A. Blancato, Blancato, Doughton & Hart, PLLC, Winston-Salem, NC, Edward L. Eatman, Jr., Elizabeth A. Martineau, Anne-Charlotte Dowless, Hedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, Charlotte, NC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

THORNBURG, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on motion of Defendants Town of Woodfin, Mayor Homer Honeycutt, Alderman Leonard Clark, Alderman David Clark, Alderman Geneva Maney, Alderman Donald Honeycutt, Jr., Alderman Wanda Haynes, and Town Attorney Joseph Ferikes (collectively, "Woodfin Defendants") for judgment on the pleadings and to dismiss.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting 13 different counts against 15 Defendants. Since that time, several claims and Defendants have been dismissed. Plaintiff's remaining claims against the Woodfin Defendants consist of a free of speech claim based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, a free speech claim based on the North Carolina Constitution, a substantive due process claim based on § 1983, and North Carolina tort claims of wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, unlawful intrusion into private affairs, and libel per se.¹ On November 3, 2003, the Woodfin Defendants moved that the Court dismiss these claims and render judgment in their favor on the pleadings.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A full recitation of the facts of this action are contained in the Court's Memorandum of Opinion filed October 7, 2003, and will not be repeated here. See generally, Memorandum of Opinion, at 3-5. However, for purposes of addressing the motions at bar, the Court sets forth the following facts specifically pertaining to the Woodfin Defendants.

In January 2002, the Plaintiff was hired as the new police chief for the Town of Woodfin, North Carolina. Complaint, ¶ 88. Plaintiff alleges that the Woodfin Mayor, Homer Honeycutt, gave him several improper orders and that he subsequently became aware of other corrupt behavior on the part of Honeycutt. Id., ¶¶ 90-93. For example, Plaintiff alleges that the Mayor instructed him not to arrest drunk drivers or domestic abusers, not to search for drugs, and to focus law enforcement efforts solely against ethnic groups whose members do not vote in large numbers. Id, ¶¶ 90, 101. Plaintiff reported these alleged improprieties to the North Carolina Police Benevolence Association ("NCPBA"). Id., ¶ 94. The NCPBA responded by sending a letter to the Woodfin Board of Aldermen on February 13, 2002, recommending the Board ask the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) to investigate Honeycutt. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that, around the same time, though possibly before Mayor Honeycutt knew that he had called the NCPBA, Honeycutt asked District Attorney Ron Moore to show him a copy of the SBI's file of its DMV investigation that contained a letter Plaintiff received threatening to reveal Plaintiff's alternative sexual lifestyle if he persisted in his allegations regarding the DMV. Id., ¶ 95. Plaintiff does not allege that Moore complied with Honeycutt's request; however, Plaintiff does claim that Honeycutt, who was at that time an employee with the Buncombe County Sheriff's Department, obtained the file from the Sheriff's Department. Id., ¶ 103, 190. Plaintiff further alleges that Mayor Honeycutt threatened to reveal the contents of the letter to retaliate against him for not following the Mayor's corrupt orders. Id., ¶ 173. Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Honeycutt did, in fact, disclose the contents of the letter to the Board of Aldermen and that the Mayor and the Board of Aldermen eventually disclosed the information to the press and to attendees of a February 19, 2002, Town meeting. Id., ¶ 174-75.

On February 25, 2002, the Board of Aldermen fired the Plaintiff from his job as police chief. Id., ¶ 109. On the personnel action statement recording Plaintiff's termination, the Woodfin Defendants stated that Plaintiff was insubordinate, refused to follow orders, and did not communicate with his superiors. Id., ¶ 156. Plaintiff alleges that the Woodfin Defendants fabricated these reasons and published these allegedly false statements to the press. Id., ¶ 156. Plaintiff also contends that knowledge of his sexual lifestyle contributed to the Woodfin Defendants' decision to fire him but that their primary reasons for terminating him were his refusal to follow Mayor Honeycutt's corrupt orders and his reporting Mayor Honeycutt's corruption. Id., ¶¶ 159-160, 169.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review.

In ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court "must accept the nonmovant's allegations as true; viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Judgment on the pleadings should be granted if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Moore's Federal Practice, § 12.38 (3d ed.) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The standard is similar to that used in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "with the key difference being that on a 12(c) motion, `the court is to consider the answer as well as the complaint.'" Continental Cleaning Serv. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1999 WL 1939249, *1 (M.D.N.C.1999) (quoting Menominee Indian Tribe v. Thompson, 943 F.Supp. 999, 1005 (W.D.Wis.1996)). The Court should also consider documents attached to the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c); see also Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462 (4th Cir.1991).

The Court will first determine whether Plaintiff's federal claims survive the Woodfin Defendants' motion. The Court will then determine whether the Plaintiff's state claims are sufficiently related to the federal claims for it to assert supplemental jurisdiction. If the Court does have supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state claims, it will determine whether those state claims survive this motion. Finally, the Court will consider the Woodfin Defendants' contention that Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages.

B. Federal claims.

1. Free speech.

Plaintiff alleges that he was suspended and eventually fired from his position as Woodfin Police Chief "because he exercised his right to free speech by publicly complaining of Mayor Honeycutt's illegal and unethical" behavior. Complaint, ¶ 125. He claims that such retaliation for exercising protected speech constitutes a violation of the First Amendment and is actionable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Id., ¶ 127. The Woodfin Defendants conclusively state, without advancing any argument, that Plaintiff "fails to make out a claim for a violation of his rights to free speech." Town of Woodfin Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Dismiss ("Woodfin Defendants' Brief"), filed November 3, 2003, at 8. The Woodfin Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to hold the Town of Woodfin vicariously liable for an alleged First Amendment violation. Id., at 7-8.

A government employee claiming retaliatory discharge in violation of the First Amendment must allege that his speech involved an area of public concern, that legitimate government interests in keeping the employee silent do not outweigh the employee's interest in speaking, and that there was a causal link between the employee's speech and the discharge. See Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. Number 2, 31 F.3d 183, 192 (4th Cir.1994).² In the present case, the Plaintiff has alleged that he spoke to both the NCPBA and the local press about corruption within the Woodfin Town Hall, clearly a matter of public concern. Complaint, ¶¶ 122-23. It would be difficult to conceive of a legitimate interest the government would have in concealing corruption, and whatever that interest may be, it clearly does not outweigh Plaintiff's interest in speaking. Finally, Plaintiff has alleged that the Woodfin Defendants terminated him "because" he exercised his right to free speech. Id., ¶ 125. This allegation satisfies the causation element. Therefore, Plaintiff states a claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of the First Amendment.

Defendants argue that, even if Plaintiff does state such a claim, the Town of Woodfin is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled the facts required to find the Town vicariously liable. However, Defendants correctly admit that the Town may be held liable if Plaintiff alleges that "his rights were violated by someone with final policymaking authority for the Town of Woodfin." Woodfin Defendants' Brief, at 8; see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Plaintiff alleges that the Mayor and Board of Aldermen violated his constitutional rights. Though the Defendants inexplicably claim otherwise, the Mayor and Board of Aldermen clearly possess final policymaking authority. Woodfin Defendants' Brief, supra. Therefore, the Town of Woodfin may be held vicariously...