Bradley v. Rapp

• Decision Date: 24 February 1975
• Citation: Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J.Super. 429, 334 A.2d 61 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1975)
• Parties: Robert F. BRADLEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John RAPP and/or Margaret Rapp, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 429

132 N.J.Super. 429

334 A.2d 61

Robert F. BRADLEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.John RAPP and/or Margaret Rapp, Defendants-Appellants.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued Jan. 6, 1975.

Decided Feb. 24, 1975.

John Rapp, pro se.

Conrad Koch, Newark, for plaintiff-respondent(Accardi & Koch, Newark, attorneys).

Before Judges LORA, HANDLER and TARLETON.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant tenants appeal from a judgment for possession entered in the Essex County District Court.The judgment was based upon a determination that plaintiff landlord was within the exception of N.J.S.A. 2A:18--61.1(L.1974, c. 49).

On March 15, 1974plaintiff purchased the premises at 29 Old Indian Road, West Orange.It is an 80-year-old, two-family home in a residential section, with two dwelling units.Defendants(mother and son) reside in one of the two apartments and another tenant resides in the other.Defendants are month-to-month tenants under an oral lease calling for a monthly rental of $175.

Plaintiff purchased the premises for the express purpose of residing therein with his wife and five children.On April 16, 1974plaintiff's then attorney served defendants with a notice to quit as of June 1, 1974, a demand for possession and a notice of increase in rent to $450.Plaintiff(now unrepresented by counsel) accepted a tender of the $175 June rent.On June 26, 1974plaintiff's present attorney served defendants with a second notice to quit as of August 1, 1974 and a demand for possession.Defendants tendered the $175 August rent, which plaintiff refused to accept.Defendants did not vacate and on August 6, 1974 a summons and complaint were served.

The matter was heard in the county district court on August 20, 1974 and the trial judge entered a judgment for possession but ordered that issuance of the warrant for removal be stayed until September 1, 1974 with leave to apply for a further stay to October 1, 1974.

On appeal defendants contend that plaintiff's failure to establish 'good cause' and to specify the cause of termination under N.J.S.A. 2A:18--61.1 and 61.2 create a jurisdictional question warranting review and reversal.Plaintiff argues that as an 'owner-occupant'he is excepted from the statute's provisions.

We agree that the case is properly before us, Cf.Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526(1970);Carteret Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 49 N.J. 116, 228 A.2d 674(1967);Ivy Hill v. Handa, 121 N.J.Super. 366, 297 A.2d 201(App.Div.1972), and pass to the merits of the narrow question raised: whether plaintiff falls within the 'owner-occupied' exception of N.J.S.A. 2A:18--61.1.

Assembly BillNo. 1586 was enacted on June 25, 1974 and provided that it shall take effect 'immediately'; hence it governs the instant case.

The relevant portion of N.J.S.A. 2A:18--61.1 reads:

No lessee or tenant of the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the county district court or the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes, Other than owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guest house or part thereof rented to a transcient guest or seasonal tenant, except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause * * *.(Emphasis supplied)

N.J.S.A. 2A:18--61.2 provides that the requisite notice 'shall specify in detail the cause of the termination of the tenancy.'Plaintiff proceeded under N.J.S.A. 2A:18--53(a) which requires no such specificity in the notice regarding hold-over tenants.The notice in issue did not specify any cause of termination and it is not suggested that any of the enumerated grounds of 'good cause'(N.J.S.A. 2A:18--61.1) exist.

It is not without significance that the statement accompanying this legislation refers to the absence of any statutory limitations upon the reasons a landlord may utilize to evict tenants from confortable quarters where they have not created any problems.Recognizing that this has resulted in frequent unfair and arbitrary residential ousters and citing the critical housing shortage, the act proposes to limit evictions to 'reasonable grounds' and 'suitable notice.'

In our review of the statutewe are compelled to give primary regard to the fundamental purpose for which it was enacted.At the same time we should strive to avoid an anomalous, unreasonable, inconceivable or absurd result.New Jersey Builders v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 338, 288 A.2d 855(1972);Union County Bd. of Freeholders v. Union County Park Comm'n, 41 N.J. 333, 341, 196 A.2d 781(1964);Robson v. Rodriguez, 26 N.J. 517, 528, 141 A.2d 1(1958);Sandler v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, 113 N.J.Super. 333, 345, 273 A.2d 775(App.Div.1971).

Our approach to this task is tempered by the realization that in drafting legislation it is all but impossible for the draftsman to anticipate all contingencies and all situations.As Chief Justice Weintraub aptly stated in New Capitol Bar & Grill Corp. v. Div. of Employment Security, 25 N.J. 155, 135 A.2d 465(1957):

Hence cases inevitably arise in which a literal application of the language used would lead to results incompatible with the legislative design.It is the proper function, indeed the obligation, of the judiciary to give effect to the obvious purpose of the Legislature, and to that end 'words used may be expanded or limited according to the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law.The spirit of the legislative direction prevails over the literal sense of the terms.'(at 160, 135 A.2d at 467)

We have considered the underlying background and objectives of this legislation and are satisfied that our construction should be...