Bradley v. Sattler

• Decision Date: 15 June 1895
• Citation: 156 Ill. 603,41 N.E. 171
• Parties: BRADLEY v. SATTLER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

156 Ill. 603

41 N.E. 171

BRADLEY

v.SATTLER.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 15, 1895.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action on the case by Lisetta Sattler, administratrix of the estate of William Casparini, against Alexander O. Bradley. Plaintiff obtained judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. 54 Ill. App. 504. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Wolseley & Heath (John N. Jewett, of counsel), for appellants.

Brandt & Hoffmann and J. S. Kennard, Jr., for appellee.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the appellate court for the First district, affirming a judgment of the circuit court of Cook county for $5,000, rendered against the defendant below, for negligence resulting in the death of plaintiff's intestate. The defenant was engaged in manufacturing mirrors, and in beveling glass, and the deceased, at the time of the injury which caused his dath, on April 27, 1887, had been in the service of the defendant at the factory about 2 weeks. He was 12 years and 3 months old. There was a shaft along the side of the wall, 15 to 18 inches from it, and the same distance above the floor. Connecting with this shaft by belts were five machines, similar to grinstones, for polishing glass, but the wheels were of wood or felt, on which pumice was used to polish the glass. On this shaft was a coupling, locked together by a pin, which pin, when properly adjusted, did not project, but was flush with the shaft; but at the time of the injury the pin projected out from one inch to two inches. It had been in the same condition about a year, but neither deceased nor the workmen knew it. The shaft revolved at the rate of 300 times a minute, and had no covering or protection over it. There was an ordinary flour barrel, filled with the ground pumice, standing between two and three feet out from the shaft, and between the machines. Access to the barrel was obstructed in front by a box higher than the barrel, and at times on the sides by the glass which the men were polishing. It was the duty of the boy to take the pumice from the barrel, and with a brush put it on the wheels upon which the glass was polished. He used a little box which, when filling, he placed on the box in front of the barrel. At the time in question, he went behind the barrel, between it and the revolving shaft, and while filling his little box with pumice from the barrel the projecting pin caught his overalls, and he was whirled around the shaft, and received such injuries that he died within a few hours. He had been warned by the workmen to keep away from the machinery, that it was dangerous, and that he might get killed, but he was not informed of the danger from this projecting pin, nor does it appear that he was instructed by any one how to get pumice from the barrel without danger to himself, or that he could have done so at all times where the barrel stood. The deceased left, him surviving, his mother and three brothers. of the ages at the time of the trial of 25, 21, and 12 years, respectively. His father had died 8 years before.

CARTER, J. (after stating the facts).

Much of the argument of counsel in this case is directed to questions of fact, which it is not claimed are open to review in this court. It is, however, insisted by counsel for appellant that the judgment should be reversed because the damages are ‘unreasonably and irrationally excessive’; and in this connection it is insisted that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to find no more than nominal damages. Whether the damages assessed are excessive or not involves questions of fact, upon which the judgment of the appellate court is final. Railroad Co. v. Eldridge, 151 Ill. 546, 38 N. E. 246;Railway Co. v. Gaeinowski (Ill. Sup.) 40 N. E. 601. Whether or not the court erred in refusing the instruction mentioned is a question of law for review here. This instruction reads: ‘(16) The jury are instructed that the burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff in this case to show the pecuniary loss, if any, suffered by the next of kin of William Casparini, and if the jury believe from the evidence that all or any of such next of kin had not been receiving from him pecuniary assistance, and that there is no evidence showing that such next of kin, or any of them, are in a situation to require such pecuniary assistance, then it is immaterial how near the degree of relationship may be, as the jury in such case should only allow nominal damages, if they believe from the evidence that there has been no pecuniary injury.’ The argument is that as there was no evidence before the jury to prove any actual pecuniary loss to the next of kin,-the mother or either of the three surviving brothers,-proof of the relationship only being made, under the law in this state nominal damages only can be recovered. Counsel quote the following from City of Chicago v. Scholten, 75 Ill. 471, as the rule in this case: ‘Where the next of kin are collateral kindred of the deceased, and have not received pecuniary aid from him, proof of such relationship would warrant a recovery of nominal damages only; but where the deceased is a minor, and leaves a father entitled to his services, the law presumes there has been a pecuniary loss, for which compensation under the statute may be given,’ (citing Railroad Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill. 198...