Bradley v. Saxbe

Citation388 F. Supp. 53
Decision Date18 December 1974
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 74-1327.
PartiesTom BRADLEY et al., Plaintiffs, v. William B. SAXBE, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Charles S. Rhyne, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

David J. Anderson, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GESELL, District Judge.

Plaintiff organizations representing their member cities, counties and mayors, respectively, seek a declaratory judgment to the effect that they, their named officers, and their full-time salaried employees are exempt from registration under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. § 261 et seq. They contend that the organizations are, in each case, mere extensions or agents of the public officials who created them, that all their activities are financed entirely from public funds, and that while their officers and employees are admittedly engaged in lobbying activity, they are not required to register under section 308 of the Act because such organizations, officers and employees are exempted from registration as "public officials acting in their official capacity," by section 308 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 267(a). Asserting that they are threatened with imminent criminal prosecution for failure to register, they filed this complaint to resolve the controversy. The matter comes before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment and has been fully briefed and argued.*

The general rule that equity will not act in anticipation of criminal prosecutions is subject to exceptions. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 19, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 79 S.Ct. 178, 3 L.Ed.2d 222 (1958). While there is no precise test in such situations, one important factor is whether the penalties involved are so great that unless declaratory relief is entertained, the plaintiffs will, as a practical matter, be compelled to forego their legal position and be obliged to submit. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 212, 44 S.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255 (1923). See also, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). This factor is clearly present here since under 2 U.S.C. § 269(b) any person convicted of violating the Lobbying Act is automatically prohibited for three years from "attempting, directly or indirectly, to influence the passage or defeat of any proposed legislation" in Congress. To the employees of plaintiff organizations, the threat that upon conviction they would be barred for three years from continuing their employment is obviously far more imposing than the possibility of being fined in a test case. Rather than run that risk, if declaratory relief is denied, they may well be forced to submit to a statute they sincerely claim cannot legally be applied to them. See National Assn. of Manufacturers v. McGrath, 103 F.Supp. 510, 512 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, 344 U.S. 808, 73 S.Ct. 31, 97 L.Ed. 627 (1952).

This in terrorem effect is made all the more compelling by the disturbing First Amendment overtones, discussed more fully below, of threatened criminal prosecutions in these circumstances. See N. A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-489, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968); National Student Assn. v. Hershey, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 56, 412 F.2d 1103 (1969); Tatum v. Laird, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 72, 444 F.2d 947, rev'd, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 231, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972).

It should also be noted that the principles of federalism and comity which have prompted federal courts to abstain from intervening in pending state criminal prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed.2d 669 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974), work in quite the opposite direction here where agents of state officials threatened with federal prosecution seek to invoke the aid of a federal court of equity to clarify their obligations under federal law, cf. Steffel v. Thompson, supra, 415 U.S. at 462, 94 S.Ct. 1209, particularly since the issues presented are purely legal involving statutory interpretation, uncluttered by factual disputes. Compare Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), with United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947). Thus a declaratory judgment is not barred because the issue may also be tested by criminal prosecution.

It is necessary next to consider whether there is a sufficient real and tangible threat of criminal prosecution to present a "case or controversy." The Court has concluded this case presents "a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941). The Attorney General has apparently pointedly informed some interested public officials that prosecutions will be brought. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, supra, 415 U.S. at 455-456, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209. Defendant Saxbe's counsel has, moreover, not undertaken to deny this alleged threat, but rather has reiterated as the official position of the Department of Justice in this litigation that plaintiff organizations are in fact required to register.** Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, 387 U.S. at 152, 87 S.Ct. 1507 (1967). This is not theoretical. Agents of the FBI, acting under the direction of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, have begun active field investigations to gather evidence against certain employees of at least two of the three plaintiff organizations. While it may be true, as the Government maintains, that the Department of Justice has not yet selected particular employees of plaintiff organizations to indict, the fear of prosecution here is "realistic" rather than "chimerical" in light of these undisputed facts. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed.2d 989 (1961).

With these considerations in mind, the equities of the situation call for prompt resolution of the controversy in the public interest. The involvement of cities, counties and municipalities in the day-to-day work of the Congress is of increasing and continuing importance. The Court must recognize that the voice of the cities, counties and municipalities in federal legislation will not adequately be heard unless through cooperative mechanisms such as plaintiff organizations they pool their limited finances for the purpose of bringing to the attention of Congress their proper official concerns on matters of public policy. Cf. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-617, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). Registration involves numerous administrative and practical difficulties in this instance. On the other hand, criminal prosecution would create uncertainties and interfere with the on-going work of the plaintiff organizations by creating doubts as to the propriety of their lobbying efforts.

The issues here are purely federal and of such major national consequence that the Court has concluded a declaratory judgment is appropriate in the public interest. The Court therefore reaches the merits.

The question of statutory interpretation presented is easily delineated but not without its difficulties. On the one hand, a clear exemption exists for public officials acting in their official capacity. On the other hand, those who work for "organizations" must register their individual lobbying employees. Here the plaintiff organizations are, although corporate in form, organizations financed with public money concerned solely with lobbying in the public interest for officials...

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6 cases
  • Donaggio v. Arlington County, Va.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • 28 Marzo 1995
    ...engage in lobbying and expressly exempted them from the lobbyist registration requirements of 2 U.S.C. § 267. See Bradley v. Saxbe, 388 F.Supp. 53 (D.D.C.1974) (interpreting exclusion for public officials to include organizations lobbying on behalf of member cities, counties, and 24 Compare......
  • Ashton v. Brown
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 1 Septiembre 1992
    ...are very broad terms whose meanings are generally defined in part by the context in which they are used. See, e.g., Bradley v. Saxbe, 388 F.Supp. 53, 57 (D.D.C.1974) (limiting "organization" to business, professional and philanthropic organizations in a lobbying context); Newton Evangelisti......
  • Paradyne Corp. v. US Dept. of Justice
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 3 Noviembre 1986
    ...criminal or civil liability. The Court believes that Paradyne's fear of prosecution here is real, not chimerical. In Bradley v. Saxbe, 388 F.Supp. 53 (D.D.C.1974), a court in this jurisdiction was called upon to determine whether the threat of prosecution by the DOJ of individuals not compl......
  • Presser v. Brennan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • 27 Febrero 1975
    ...prospective application. 1 The complete name of the Fund is Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund. 2 Bradley v. Saxbe, 388 F.Supp. 53 (D.C. D.C.1974). 3 Although the complaint asks for both injunctive and declaratory relief, plaintiff now requests declaratory relief 4 Ci......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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