Bradley v. Superintendent

• Decision Date: 16 January 1894
• Citation: 148 Ill. 413,36 N.E. 76
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. BRADLEY v. SUPERINTENDENT, ETC., OF ILLINOIS STATE REFORMATORY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

148 Ill. 413

36 N.E. 76

PEOPLE ex rel. BRADLEY

v.SUPERINTENDENT, ETC., OF ILLINOIS STATE REFORMATORY.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 16, 1894.

Petition of Tida Bradley for writ of habeas corpus. Dismissed.

Shope and Magruder, JJ., dissenting.

Sands & Murphy, for relator.

M. T. Moloney, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BAKER, C. J.

A writ of habeas corpus was issued herein by order of this court, upon the petition of Tida Bradley, for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of the imprisonment and detention of Joseph Bradley and Harry Justice in the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac. The writ was directed to superintendent, board of managers, and officials in charge of the Illinois State Reformatory, and a return was made to the writ. Said Joseph Bradley and Harry Justice were indicted in the circuit court of Peoria county for burglary and larceny, were tried before a jury upon pleas of not guilty, and the jury returned a verdict finding them guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment, and that they were each above the age of 10 years, and under the age of 21 years, i. e. of the age of 18 and 20 years, respectively. The jury did not, in their verdict, fix any punishment or term of imprisonment. Thereupon the circuit court ordered and adjudged that said Joseph Bradley and Harry Justice should be confined in the Illinois State Reformatory, in safe and secure custody, for and during a term of commitment to be terminated by the board of managers of said Illinois State Reformatory. A mittimus was issued by the clerk of the court, which contained a true copy of the final judgment and sentence of the court as entered of record, and was directed to the sheriff of Peoria county to execute; and the detention of said Joseph Bradley and Harry Justice in the reformatory is by virtue of said judgment, sentence, and commitment.

The trial and proceedings upon said indictment for burglary and larceny, and the judgment that was rendered by the court, were based upon the provisions of an act of the legislature of the state entitled ‘An act to establish the Illinois State Reformatory, and making an appropriation therefor,’ approved June 18, 1891. Laws 1891, p. 51. Section 9 of the act divides the inmates sentenced to the reformatory into two divisions, the first to include males between the ages of 10 and 16 years, and the second to include males between the ages of 16 and 21 years. Section 10 provides, in substance, that in all criminal cases tried by jury, in which the jury shall find the defendant guilty, they shall also find by their verdict whether or not the defendant is between the ages of 10 and 21 years, and, if between said ages, then find, as nearly as may be, the age of the defendant; and that if the defendant is found to be between said ages, and it shall not be shown in the cause that the defendant has previously been sentenced to a penitentiary, and if the offense of which the defendant is convicted is not a capital offense, then the jury shall not fix the punishment. Section 11 makes provision for the cases of boys between the ages of 10 and 16 years who are convicted of crime. Section 12 provides as follows: ‘Any court in this state exercising criminal jurisdiction may sentence to the said reformatory any male criminal between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one years, and not shown to have been previously sentenced to a penitentiary in this or any other state or country, upon the conviction, in such court, of such male person, of a crime punishable under existing laws in a penitentiary. And the said board of managers shall receive and take into said reformatory all male prisoners of the class aforesaid who may be legally sentenced on conviction, as aforesaid; and all existing laws requiring the courts of the state to sentence to the penitentiary male prisoners convicted of any criminal offense, between the age of sixteen and twenty-one years, and not shown to have been previously sentenced to a state prison in this or any other state or country, shall be applicable to said reformatory so far as to enable courts to sentence the class of prisoners so last defined to said reformatory, and not to a penitentiary.’ Section 13 provides as follows: ‘Every sentence to the reformatory of a person hereafter convicted of a felony or other crime shall be a general sentence to imprisonment in the Illinois State Reformatory, and the courts of this state imposing such sentence shall not fix or limit the duration thereof. The term of such imprisonment of any person so convicted and sentenced shall be terminated by the board of managers of the reformatory, as authorized by this act; but such imprisonment shall not exceed the maximum term provided by law for the crime for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced.’ Section 16 is as follows: ‘The said board of managers shall have power to establish rules and regulations under which prisoners within the reformatory may be allowed to go upon parole outside of the reformatory building and enclosure, but to remain while on parole in the legal custody and under control of the board of managers, and subject at any time to be taken back within the enclosure of said reformatory; and full power to enforce such rules and regulations to retake and reimprison any inmate so upon parole is hereby conferred upon said board, whose order, certified by its secretary and signed by its president, with the seal of the reformatory attached thereto, shall be a sufficient warrant for the officer named in it to authorize such officer to return to actual custody any conditionally released or pardoned prisoner, and it is hereby made the duty of all officers to execute said order the same as ordinary criminal process; provided that no prisoner shall be released on parole until the said board of managers shall have satisfactory evidence that arrangements have been made for his honorable and useful employment, for at least six months while upon parole, in some suitable occupation.’ Section 17, among other things, makes it the duty of the board of managers to adopt such rules concerning all prisoners committed to their custody as shall prevent them from returning to as shall prevent them from returning to and accomplish their reformation. It also provides that, if any prisoner on parole shall violate the conditions of his parole or conditional release, he shall, by a formal order entered in the manager's proceedings, be declared a delinquent, and shall thereafter be treated as an escaped prisoner owing service to the state, and shall be liable, when arrested, to serve out the unexpired term of his maximum possible imprisonment. It is provided, in substance, in section 18, that when any prisoner has served not less than six months of his parole acceptably, and has given such evidence as is deemed reliable and trustworthy that he will remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his final release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, then the judge of the court that sentenced him to the reformatory shall enter an order for the final discharge of the prisoner from further liability under his sentence, such order to be based upon a record and recommendation made by the board of managers of the reformatory; and it is provided in said section that nothing in the act contained shall be construed as impairing the power of the governor to grant a pardon or commutation in any case. By section 21 the laws that govern the penitentiaries of the state, so far as they relate to the prevention of escapes and several other specified matters, are made applicable to, and declared to be in force in, the reformatory.

That in the enactment of this law it was the humane and benign intention of the general assembly to afford a means for the reformation of youthful criminals is manifest from the fact that the institution is devoted solely to the reception of minors between the ages of 10 and 21 years, and from the various provisions of the act. At the same time we cannot concur in the suggestion made by the attorney general that a sentence imposed by virtue of the act is not intended as, and is not in fact, a punishment for crime committed, but that such sentence is for the sole and only purpose of reforming the offender. Only those who have been convicted, before a court of competent jurisdiction, of felony or other crime, can be sentenced to the reformatory; and the act requires that the sentence shall be ‘to imprisonment,’ and uses the expression ‘term of imprisonment,’ and other like language, and uniformly employs the words ‘prisoner’ and ‘prisoners' to designate those who have been committed to the reformatory. Without further reference to the various provisions of the act, many of which we have hereinbefore mentioned, we may say that in our opinion the statute is a criminal enactment, and that a sentence under it to the state reformatory must be regarded as a penalty and punishment for crime of which the party committed has been convicted. It is admitted by the relator that the judgment and sentence of the court was in accordance with the provisions of the statute, since the statute requires that every sentence to the reformatory of a person between the ages of 16 and 21 years, convicted of a felony or other crime, shall be a general sentence to imprisonment in the Illinois State Reformatory, that the courts imposing the sentence shall not fix or limit the duration thereof, and that the term of imprisonment shall be terminated by the board of managers, as authorized by the act. It is insisted, however, that...