Bradley v. Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco

Citation48 Cal.2d 509,310 P.2d 634
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Decision Date07 May 1957
PartiesJames Parks BRADLEY, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, IN AND FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent, Frances (Bradley) Lane, Real Party in Interest. S. F. 19646.

Sullivan, Roche, Johnson & Farraher and James Farraher, San Francisco, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Aaron N. Cohen, Sidney Rudy and Ted Finman, San Francisco, for real party in interest.

SCHAUER, Justice.

A writ of certiorari was issued for the purpose of reviewing an order of the superior court adjudging petitioner to be in contempt for refusing to make certain payments to his former wife in accordance with the provisions of their property settlement agreement and decree of divorce, and directing that petitioner be imprisoned if he fails to comply with the court's order of payment. We have concluded that although upon the record before us certain of petitioner's contentions concerning interpretation of the provisions of the property settlement agreement cannot be upheld, the order directing his imprisonment for contempt upon his continued failure to make payment should nevertheless be annulled as in violation of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. (Cal.Const., art. I, § 15.)

In May, 1946, petitioner and his then wife, Frances, entered into a property settlement agreement in which it is declared that the parties owned both community and separate property, and that they desired to agree to a separation and to settle and determine their respective property rights and to provide for the care and custody of their two minor children. The agreement further declares that it 'is intended as a Property Settlement Agreement and to refer only to property rights. * * *' (Italics added.) The wife then instituted divorce proceedings in the state of Nevada and in June, 1946, was awarded a default divorce decree. Such decree by its terms purports to order, among other things, that the written property settlement agreement between the parties dated May 14, 1946, is 'hereby approved, ratified, confirmed and adopted by the Court, and by reference made a part of this judgment and decree * * * and each of the parties is hereby ordered to carry out * * * each and all of the provisions by him or her respectively required under the terms of said agreement * * *'.

In September, 1952, the Nevada decree was established in California as a decree of respondent superior court and such California decree declares that 'the parties are hereby ordered to perform each and every obligation provided for by' the Nevada decree. The California decree was affirmed on appeal and became final in June, 1954. (See Lane v. Bradley (1954), 124 Cal.App.2d 661, 268 P.2d 1092.)

Under the property settlement agreement petitioner agreed, among other things, to transfer certain real and personal property to the wife, Frances, and to place in escrow as security for performance of his obligations under the agreement certificates evidencing 40,000 shares of stock of Bradley Mining Company, which stock is the property of petitioner; under certain circumstances the stock could be sold with the proceeds going to Frances. Petitioner further agreed to pay to Frances 'forty per cent. (40%) of his net income, commencing January 1st, 1947, exclusive of capital gains and losses and distributions out of capital, but before deduction of income taxes or charitable contributions, less one per cent. (1%) of such net income for each 1,000 shares of said 40,000 shares of capital stock of Bradley Mining Company placed in escrow which have been sold with the consent of First Party (Frances) pursuant to * * * this contract.'

Following the Nevada divorce, petitioner remarried in March, 1948, and Frances remarried in October, 1948. For four and one-half months after his remarriage petitioner computed his payments to Frances on the theory that half his income belonged to his new wife as community property and that therefore he was obligated to pay to Frances forty per cent of only his one-half of such community income. Petitioner was then advised by the attorney who had represented both parties in preparing the property settlement agreement that his apportionment theory was erroneous in that his remarriage did not affect the computation of the amounts accruing under his obligations to Frances. Thereafter, from August, 1948, until he secured independent counsel in March, 1950, petitioner computed his payments to Frances without any adjustment based on his remarriage. Then such independent counsel advised petitioner that in his opinion petitioner was obligated to pay to Frances only forty per cent of one-half of the community income of petitioner and his new wife, and, further, that the words 'net income' as used in the property settlement agreement meant net income as computed for income tax purposes (that is, gross income less certain deductions not theretofore taken by petitioner in computing his payments to Frances). Relying upon such advice petitioner paid Frances only $1,800 during the year 1950. (The factual data used for computing such amount are not shown in the present record.)

Thereafter, in April, 1951, petitioner consulted different independent counsel and was advised that the remarriage of Frances terminated petitioner's obligations to pay to her forty per cent of his net income and that he had already overpaid her under the terms of the property settlement agreement. Petitioner thereupon ceased all such payments, and in June, 1951, Frances commenced the action 1 by which the Nevada divorce decree was established as a decree of the California superior court. Petitioner defended the action on the ground that the provision for payment to Frances of forty per cent of his net income was an alimony provision and therefore was terminated by the remarriage of Frances. The trial court made its findings and conclusions to the effect that petitioner's obligation to make payments to Frances was a continuing one which 'has not terminated or been diminished by reason of the remarriage of plaintiff (Frances) or for any other reason.' Judgment was entered awarding Frances recovery of the sums accrued to that date on the theory indicated in the above mentioned findings and conclusions, and establishing the Nevada decree in this state. As hereinabove mentioned, the judgment, which became final in June, 1954, also ordered the parties 'to perform each and every obligation provided for by' the Nevada decree.

In February, 1955, Frances instituted the present contempt proceeding, asserting that since June 16, 1951, petitioner has wilfully failed and refused to pay to her forty per cent of his net income, except for a payment of $15,000 on account, and that as of February, 1955, he owed her an additional $37,969.30. Petitioner defended on the ground that the term 'net income' should be construed so as to permit him to make various deductions and that one-half his salary (i. e., one-half of the community income of himself and his present wife) should be excluded on the theory that it was not his income but belonged to such wife.

The evidence which was presented to the trial court consisted in part of the judgment roll in the California action. In addition testimony was submitted in the form of affidavits. The court found that in using the term 'net income' the parties had not intended that petitioner be allowed any of the deductions for which he contended or that a half of the community income be excluded in case he remarried. Judgment was rendered accordingly, and petitioner was held in contempt and ordered imprisoned unless he made installment payments to Frances pursuant to a schedule set forth in the order of contempt and commitment. This petition for review followed.

Petitioner, contending that the trial court erred in its finding as to the meaning of the term 'net income,' cites (Messenger v. Messenger (1956), 46 Cal.2d 619, 626(4), 297 P.2d 988) and quotes the rule that 'In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the agreement, the trial court's interpretation of it is not binding on this court.' But where, as here, conflicting extrinsic evidence was presented, the quoted rule does not apply. On the contrary, under such circumstances if there is evidence which supports the trial court's interpretation, including inferences which it could reasonably draw, the court on appeal will adhere to the interpretation placed by the trial court on the writings and conduct of the parties. (Quader-Kino A. G. v. Nebenzal (1950), 35 Cal.2d 287, 294(1), 217 P.2d 650, and cases cited therein; Abbott v. Hauschild (1952), 113 Cal.App.2d 383, 387(2), 248 P.2d 41.) Petitioner's suggestion, that because in the present case the evidence was presented by affidavit rather than orally it will be weighed by an appellate court, is without merit. (See Riley v. Turpin (1956), 47 Cal.2d 152, 301 P.2d 834.)

Following the rule stated, it appears that the evidence supports the trial court's interpretation of the agreement here involved, based upon its finding as to the intent of the parties. Such supporting evidence consists of affidavits of Frances and of the attorney who drafted the agreement, the language of the agreement itself, and petitioner's own conduct. Inasmuch as petitioner argues the weight of the evidence rather than seriously urging that there is no evidence whatsoever supporting the trial court's construction of the agreement, no useful purpose would be served by here relating the evidence in detail. 2 Petitioner's argument that since his remarriage his present wife's community (one-half) interest in his earnings must be deducted before computation of the forty per cent payable to Frances, likewise is without merit in view of the trial court's determination that such a deduction was contrary to...

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