Bradley v. Swift & Co.

• Decision Date: 29 October 1928
• Docket Number: 29337,29290
• Citation: 119 So. 37,167 La. 249
• Parties: BRADLEY v. SWIFT & CO. BALTHAZER v. SAME. In re BALTHAZAR et al
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

119 So. 37

167 La. 249

BRADLEY v. SWIFT & CO.

BALTHAZER v. SAME.

In re BALTHAZAR et al

Nos. 29290, 29337

Supreme Court of Louisiana

October 29, 1928

Rehearing Refused November 26, 1928

Action by Elizabeth Bradley, widow of William Balthazar, and by Paul Balthazar, against Swift & Co., consolidated for trial. Judgment in favor of Elizabeth Bradley was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and judgment dismissing suit of Paul Balthazar was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and both parties apply for certiorari or writ of review. Judgment of Court of Appeal in case of Elizabeth Bradley affirmed, and judgment of such court in case of Paul Balthazar vacated and set aside and such case remanded.

See also (La.App.) 119 So. 906.

Judgment of Court of Appeal in case of Elizabeth Bradley affirmed, and judgment of such court in case of Paul Balthazar vacated and set aside and such case remanded.

Normann Breckwoldt & Schwartz, of New Orleans, for applicant Balthazar.

L. O. Pecot, of Franklin and Paul A. Sompayrac, of New Orleans, for applicant Bradley.

John D. Miller, of New Orleans, for applicants in both cases.

OVERTON, J. O'NIELL, C. J.

OPINION

OVERTON, J.

William Balthazar, while working in the course of his employment for Swift & Co., the defendant in these suits, was accidentally killed on April 1, 1925. A few months after the deceased was killed, his widow, Elizabeth Bradley Balthazar, and his father, Paul Balthazar (the deceased leaving no child or mother), brought the present suits to recover compensation, under the Employers' Liability Act, Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended.

The defense to the suit, instituted by the widow, is that she was not living with the deceased when he was injured and killed, nor was she actually dependent upon him for support at that time. There is no dispute concerning the law applicable to this defense. It is as follows:

"No compensation shall be payable under this section to a widow unless she be living with her deceased husband at the time of the injury and death, or be then actually dependent upon him for support." Section 8, subsec. 2, par. (L) of Act 216 of 1924.

The points in dispute in the widow's case involve purely questions of fact. They are whether she was living with the deceased at the time of his injury and death, and, if not, whether she was then actually dependent on him for support. The trial court found that the widow was dependent on the deceased when the fatal accident occurred, and allowed her compensation, but the Court of Appeal found that she was not then dependent upon him, and, moreover, had not lived with him for some 20 years immediately preceding the accident. Our examination of the record fails to disclose that the Court of Appeal erred in so finding. Therefore the judgment of that court, in the widow's case, will be affirmed.

In the suit instituted by the father of the deceased, it is urged, in addition to a denial of his legitimate relationship to the deceased and of his dependency upon the latter, that the father cannot recover, because the deceased left a widow, which fact it is contended, excludes the father's right to recover, whether the widow be entitled to compensation or not. The plea last mentioned is urged not only in the answer, but in an exception of no cause of action. In the trial court it was tried on the exception, and was overruled, but on the trial of these consolidated cases on the merits, the court, having found that the widow was entitled to recover, dismissed the father's suit, for the finding in favor of the widow necessarily excluded the father's right to recover. On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that, as the deceased left a widow, the father was excluded, whether he was dependent on the deceased or not and although the widow was not entitled to recover, and affirmed on that ground the dismissal of the father's suit.

The question presented is not wholly free of difficulty. In considering it, it should be borne in mind that statutes granting rights of action for the death of another should be restricted to the beneficiaries named in them, and should not be enlarged by construction so as to include others, not named. Vaughan v. Dalton-Lard Lumber Co., Limited, 119 La. 61, 43 So. 926. It should also be borne in mind, in considering the question presented, that:

"In interpreting a part or section of an act, in dispute, the part or section should be interpreted in connection with the rest of the act, and in connection with all laws on the same subject matter. Moreover, the object that the Legislature had in view should be ascertained, and the interpretation adopted which best harmonizes with the context and with that object." Thibaut v. Board of Commissioners of Lafourche Basin Levee Dist., 153 La. 501, 96 So. 47.

The provisions of the Employers' Liability Act, as amended, which are pertinent to the question presented, are paragraphs (g) and (h) of subsection 2 of section 8 of Act 216 of 1924. The first reads, in naming the father as a beneficiary and in fixing his compensation, as follows:

"If there be neither widow, widower nor child, then to the father or mother of the deceased employee, if actually dependent on the deceased employee to any extent for support at the time of the injury and death, thirty-two and one half per centum of wages. * * *"

The second reads, in naming the brothers and sisters and other members of the family of the deceased as...