Bradshaw v. Barnes

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: GREEN
• Citation: Bradshaw v. Barnes, 496 N.E.2d 276, 145 Ill.App.3d 866, 99 Ill.Dec. 701 (Ill. App. 1986)
• Decision Date: 22 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 4-85-0811,4-85-0811
• Parties: , 99 Ill.Dec. 701 Raymond BRADSHAW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bruce W. BARNES, Chairman of the Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, Defendant-Appellee.

Page 276

496 N.E.2d 276

145 Ill.App.3d 866, 99 Ill.Dec. 701

Raymond BRADSHAW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bruce W. BARNES, Chairman of the Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4-85-0811.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

July 22, 1986.

Burger, Fombelle, Baxter, Zachry & Rathbun, P.C., Decatur, (Jon C. Baxter, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago, Roma Jones Stewart, Sol. Gen., Jerome J. Webb, William L. Ward, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, for defendant-appellee.

Justice GREEN delivered the opinion of the court:

The Administrative Review Law provides in section 3-103 that: "[e]very action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected thereby." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 3-103.) Section 3-107 of the Administrative Review Law provides that "[i]n any action to review any final decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 3-107.) This case turns on the questions of (1) whether a plaintiff to such an action can cure a failure to join such parties in his original complaint by amendment made after the expiration of the 35-day period described in section 3-103; and (2) if so, under what circumstances the court, sitting in administrative review, is required to allow such an amendment.

We hold that an amendment made after the expiration of the 35-day period does cure the original failure to join the required parties and that here, the circuit court erred in denying leave to make such an amendment.

Plaintiff, Raymond Bradshaw, was discharged by his employer, Toxigenics, Inc., and filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the Illinois Department of Employment Security (Department). On October 19, 1984, a claims adjudicator determined that plaintiff was eligible for unemployment benefits. Toxigenics, Inc., appealed this determination of eligibility, a hearing was held before a referee, and on November 30, 1984, the determination of eligibility was affirmed. On December 17, 1984, Toxigenics, Inc., appealed the determination to the Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security (Board), and on May 22, 1985, the Board reversed the referee's finding of eligibility.

On June 24, 1985, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Macon County naming only Bruce W. Barnes, Chairman of the Board, as a defendant. On September 24, 1985, Barnes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because neither Sally A. Ward, Director of the Department, nor Toxigenics, Inc., were named as additional defendants. On October 24, 1985, at the time set for a hearing on the motion to dismiss, plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to add Ward and Toxigenics, Inc., as defendants. The circuit court denied plaintiff's motion to amend on the grounds that it was dilatory and dismissed the complaint on November 6, 1985. Plaintiff has appealed. We reverse and remand to the circuit court with directions to allow the motion to amend adding the parties.

Article VI, section 9 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 states that circuit courts should have such powers of review of administrative decisions as the legislature shall determine. (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, sec. 9.) The legislature has provided that decisions of the Board are reviewable under the Administrative Review Law and, in addition to the requirements of section 3-107 of the Law, has specifically required that the Director of the Department be a party to such a review (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 48, par. 520). The parties here do not dispute that the joinder of all necessary parties is necessary for the circuit court to conduct an administrative review. (Cuny v. Annunzio (1952), 411 Ill. 613, 104 N.E.2d 780; Department of Communications v. Secretary of State Merit Com. (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 877, 87 Ill.Dec. 21, 476 N.E.2d 482.) The supreme court has never passed on the question of whether the failure to join necessary parties can be cured, as attempted here, by an amendment joining those parties made after the expiration of the 35-day period of section 3-103.

In Massoud v. Board of Education (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 65, 52 Ill.Dec. 555, 422 N.E.2d 236, Norris v. City of Aurora (1978), 64 Ill.App.3d 748, 21 Ill.Dec. 549, 381 N.E.2d 996, Springfield-Sangamon County Regional Plan Com. v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1976), 45 Ill.App.3d 116, 3 Ill.Dec. 764, 359 N.E.2d 174, rev'd on other grounds (1978), 71 Ill.2d 61, 15 Ill.Dec. 623, 373 N.E.2d 1307, and Dendor v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1973), 11 Ill.App.3d 582, 297 N.E.2d 316, districts of the appellate court have upheld the jurisdiction of circuit courts to proceed upon joinder of necessary parties made after the expiration of the 35-day period.

In Dendor, the court held that the 35-day requirement was met by the filing of the complaint and that section 46(1) of the then Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 110, par. 46(1)), which is now section 2-616(a), of the Civil Practice Law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 2-616(a)), permitted amendment to add necessary parties after the expiration of the 35 days. That legislation authorizes circuit courts to allow amendments to add parties at any time before final judgment if done on reasonable terms. Then (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 110, par. 277), as now (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 1-108), the law concerning administrative review provided that the provisions applicable to civil practice were also applicable to administrative review unless otherwise provided by legislation. The Dendor court also held that the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 103 (50 Ill.2d R. 103(a)) providing for the issuance of alias summons authorized the issuance of summons as to the new defendants after the expiration of the 35-day period. The present Supreme Court Rule 103 (87 Ill.2d R. 103) has substantially similar provisions.

In Springfield-Sangamon County Regional Plan Com., this court followed Dendor in upholding the circuit court's allowance of a motion to amend adding necessary parties to a proceeding for administrative review after the expiration of the 35-day period. This court distinguished that case from those requiring dismissal for failure to join necessary parties where no motion to amend to add the parties had been made.

The Norris court also followed Dendor. There, contention was made that in order to allow amendment after the 35-day period, compliance with section 46(4) of the then Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, par. 46(4)), which is now section 2-616(d) of the Civil Practice Law (Ill.Rev Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 2-616(d)), was required to be shown. That section makes special requirements for bringing in new parties after the statutorily or contractually prescribed time for bringing the action had expired. The Norris court rejected the contention, holding section 46(1) to be the appropriate section and stating that the 35-day requirement was applicable only to the filing of the complaint and the issuance of a summons pursuant thereto.

In Massoud, the Third District held that the requirement to join necessary parties was not jurisdictional and was waived if not raised in the trial court. The appellate court cited Norris with approval. It also called attention to section 26 of the then Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110, par. 26), which is now section 2-407 of the Civil Practice Law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 2-407), which provides that no action shall be dismissed for failure to join necessary parties unless reasonable opportunity to add parties is given. The Massoud court concluded that then section 26 was applicable to administrative review as no statutory provision required otherwise.

Defendant here does not contend that section 2-616(d) is determinative as to the conditions upon which amendment to add parties to the administrative proceeding can be allowed. Accordingly, we follow the precedent of our decision in Springfield-Sangamon County Regional Plan Com. and those of the First, Second, and Third Districts in Dendor, Norris, and Massoud, respectively, and hold that the circuit court has power to allow amendment to add necessary parties after the expiration of 35 days from the administrative order.

Defendant cites Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Bowling (1981), 99 Ill.App.3d 1117, 429 N.E.2d 172, decision modified on other grounds (1983), 95 Ill.2d 397, 69 Ill.Dec. 637, 447 N.E.2d 1324, as supporting its contention that failure to join necessary parties to an action in administrative review cannot be cured by an amendment to add the parties made after the 35-day period. There, an employer sought administrative review of a decision of the Department of Labor allowing unemployment benefits to various of the employer's employees who had not been working while honoring the picket lines of a union of which they were not members. The various claimants were not named as defendants. Later, after the expiration of the 35-day period and over objection, the employer was granted leave to file an amended complaint naming those employees. On appeal, the First District held that granting leave to add the additional parties was error. The court reasoned that section 46(1) of the then Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110, par. 46(1)) would have permitted adding of the additional parties only if they were necessary parties. The appellate court held that the various claimants were not necessary parties because they could not be ordered to repay the benefits they had received. Accordingly, the court deemed the...