Bradshaw v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 10 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 07–CV–274.,07–CV–274.
• Citation: 43 A.3d 318
• Parties: Trinetta C. BRADSHAW, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

43 A.3d 318

Trinetta C. BRADSHAW, Appellant,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 07–CV–274.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued Oct. 5, 2011.

Decided May 10, 2012.

Lisa Alexis Jones, Washington, for appellant.

Andrew Brisker, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Peter J. Nickles, Attorney General for the District of Columbia at the time the brief was filed, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before THOMPSON,^* Associate Judge, RUIZ, Associate Judge, Retired, and NEBEKER, Senior Judge.

THOMPSON, Associate Judge:

Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officer Milan Jones arrested appellant Trinetta Bradshaw at a club in the early morning hours of October 24, 2004.¹Thereafter, Bradshaw filed this civil suit against the District of Columbia and Officer Jones,² alleging false arrest and imprisonment and a deprivation of liberty in violation of her constitutional rights (as to which she asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).³ After hearing arguments by counsel, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants/appellees the District of Columbia (“the District”) and Jones. This appeal followed. On June 16, 2010, we issued a Memorandum Opinion and Judgment reversing the trial court's ruling, but subsequently, in an order dated July 28, 2011, we granted the District's petition for rehearing and vacated the Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. Having heard oral argument on October 5, 2011, we now, once again, reverse and remand for the reasons discussed below.⁴

I. Background

In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court had before it the deposition testimony of both Officer Jones and Bradshaw, as well as a portion of the transcripts of Officer Jones's and Bradshaw's testimony from Bradshaw's criminal trial (see note 1, supra ). Officer Jones testified in his deposition that at around 2:00 a.m. on October 24, 2004, during the course of his midnight to 8 a.m. shift, he went to Club H2O to speak with another MPD officer on a personal matter. Jones had worked overtime providing security at the club on a number of occasions and knew several people at the club. According to Jones, while he was standing in the hallway of the club just outside the dance floor area, one of the club's bouncers approached him and “advised ... that he had a female that was refusing to leave the club.” Jones testified that, to the best of his recollection, the bouncer's exact words were “that he had a female that needed to be removed from the club.” He further testified that the bouncer had the woman (Bradshaw) by the arm, escorting her out, and that he (Jones) put his arm out to stop her and grabbed her by the arm “when she tried to walk past me and go back in the club,” i.e., “back into the location that she was just escorted from.” Jones testified that he had “no idea” whether, prior to telling Jones that Bradshaw needed to leave, the bouncer had asked her to leave. When asked specifically whether the bouncer said “that he had asked [Bradshaw] to leave and she had refused to leave,” Jones responded, “Not that I'm aware of.” In addition, Jones agreed that he could not “extrapolate” from the bouncer's statement that the bouncer had asked Bradshaw to leave. In response to a question about whether he had asked the bouncer why Bradshaw “needed to be removed,” Jones stated, “Well, he implied that, you know, she had been drinking too much and was attempting to fight another female.”

In follow-up questioning, Bradshaw's counsel said to Jones, “You testified that [the bouncer] in addition to saying that she needed to leave, he told you that she had been attempting to fight another woman and had been drinking too much?” Jones replied, “Correct.” ⁵ Jones further testified that Bradshaw had “[a]n odor emanating from [her] breath consistent with several alcoholic beverages” and that “[h]er eyes were glazed over” and “she was speaking sluggish or slurrish,” but acknowledged that he “had not observed” those things, and had not spoken with her, before he stopped her. Jones agreed that the “basis of ... [his] physical detention of [Bradshaw] was the bouncer's information to [him] that she had been ... attempting to fight another woman and ... had been drinking too much ... and ... needed to leave.” Jones also acknowledged his testimony during Bradshaw's criminal trial that he was “only going by what the bouncer said that she needed to leave the club ... I am going by the bouncer's motion that he said she needs to leave the club so we were escorting her out of the club[.]” ⁶ Finally, Jones testified that after he grabbed Bradshaw's arm to stop her from re-entering the club, she struck him in the mouth and an “altercation on the floor occurred.”

In his testimony at Bradshaw's criminal trial, Officer Jones testified that the club bouncers who flagged him down “advised that [Bradshaw] was asked to leave at which time she refused.” He testified that he stopped Bradshaw when, even though “[s]he was already ordered to leave,” she attempted to walk past him “to gain further entry into the club.” Jones similarly testified that “[t]hey just said she need [sic] to leave, and she is refusing,” and that Bradshaw “refused to leave the establishment after she was told to leave.” Officer Jones later described the bouncer's statement to him as, “Officer, can you stop her, she's—she needs to get out of the club.”

In her deposition, Bradshaw gave a quite different account of what transpired at Club H2O on October 24, 2004. Bradshaw testified that she “was starting to leave” the club and was in the hallway leading outside, when, distracted by a man who was attempting to talk to her, she accidentally stepped on the bouncer's foot with the heel of her high-heeled shoes. She then stopped in the hallway to talk with the man, but saw the bouncer pointing at her. She told the man, “Okay, I got to go,” and then turned to leave the crowded club, but “wound up on the ground” after someone (Officer Jones, Bradshaw contends) pulled the back of her shirt.” When Bradshaw looked up, she saw Officer Jones, who “dragged [Bradshaw] off the ground and pulled [her] out of the club” and told her that she was under arrest but did not indicate why. Jones testified that the bouncer, whose identity she still did not know at the time of her deposition, did not say anything to her. When asked whether she knew or had an idea “as to why Officer Jones would have pushed you,” Bradshaw responded, “Because the bouncer was pointing at me and telling them, I guess, telling me to leave, remove me, trying to get my attention probably, too.” Bradshaw denied that the bouncer escorted her from inside the club out into the hallway, and she testified that she did not hear the bouncer tell the police officer that she had to leave. She acknowledged, however, that the bouncer “was wearing his ear piece, talking” and that she saw him pointing at her. Bradshaw gave similar testimony during her criminal trial, explaining that she was “on her way to leave anyway,” both at the time she stepped on the bouncer's foot and when she came into contact with Officer Jones.

In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the trial court reasoned as follows:

The court finds that there is no constitutional violation as a result of the actions taken by Officer Jones that would go to a false arrest. Even if the court looks at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court is required to look at testimony of Officer Jones in terms of what information he had, which would have constituted probable cause for arrest. In this particular case, the testimony of Officer Jones is that he received, and although it is somewhat inconsistent, the testimony is that he received information from the bouncer that Ms. [Bradshaw] was required to leave the premises, and that once that information is obtained by him, he has legal authority to escort Ms. Bradshaw out of the club.

The court granted summary judgment as to Bradshaw's § 1983 claims, her false arrest/false imprisonment claims,⁷ and her claim of negligent training and supervision (a claim that Bradshaw has not pursued in this appeal).

II. The Parties' Arguments on Appeal

The gravamen of Bradshaw's complaint is that Officer Jones restrained, detained, and arrested her without a basis for believing that she had committed a crime or was a danger to him or others. In challenging the trial court's dismissal of her § 1983 claims and false imprisonment claims, Bradshaw argues that “Officer Jones did not possess probable cause to arrest Ms. Bradshaw for trespass or unlawful entry given the utter lack of evidence that Ms. Bradshaw had been asked to leave by someone with the lawful authority to so ask and that she had refused to leave upon that request.”

Although the District sought summary judgment on the ground that Officer Jones had probable cause to arrest Bradshaw for disorderly conduct and for assaulting Officer Jones and Officer Penlan, its argument on appeal is different. The District's brief does not argue that Officer Jones (as the trial court's ruling implied) was justified in arresting Bradshaw merely upon hearing from the bouncer that Bradshaw was required to leave the premises. The District argues instead that we can uphold the grant of summary judgment on the ground that Officer Jones was given reasonably trustworthy information, from the bouncer, that Bradshaw had committed an offense warranting arrest—specifically, that Bradshaw “was attempting to fight with another club patron.” The District asserts that this information from the bouncer gave Officer Jones probable cause to arrest Bradshaw, without a warrant, for attempted assault, pursuant to D.C.Code §§ 22–404, and 23–581(a)(1)(C) & (a)(2)(A) (authorizing arrest without a warrant where an officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed assault and “unless...