Bradshaw v. Enter. Realty, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 December 2012
• Docket Number: 2101074.
• Citation: 115 So.3d 922
• Parties: Gary D. BRADSHAW, Monica Bradshaw, Robert W. Crumpler, and Betty Crumpler v. ENTERPRISE REALTY, INC., Enterprise Country Club, Inc., et al.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

115 So.3d 922

Gary D. BRADSHAW, Monica Bradshaw, Robert W. Crumpler, and Betty Crumpler

v.ENTERPRISE REALTY, INC., Enterprise Country Club, Inc., et al.

2101074.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 25, 2012.

Certiorari Denied Dec. 7, 2012

Alabama Supreme Court 1111175.

Gary D. Bradshaw, Enterprise, for appellants.

David F. Holmes, Slocumb, for appellee Coral S. Lewis.

THOMAS, Judge.

Gary D. Bradshaw, Monica Bradshaw, Robert W. Crumpler, and Betty Crumpler filed a declaratory-judgment action in the Coffee Circuit Court naming Enterprise Realty, Inc., and Enterprise Country Club, Inc. (“the country club”), as defendants and requesting the termination or extinguishment of an ingress/egress easement across the property owned by the Bradshaws and abutted by property owned by the Crumplers, which is located in the Creek Pointe subdivision (“the subdivision”). Orwin Lewis and Coral Sue Lewis, owners of a lot in the subdivision, intervened in the action. Enterprise Realty and the country club each moved to be dismissed from the action, stating that they had no interest in the easement and denying that they were the dominant-estate owners whose interests the easement served. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss, and the Bradshaws and the Crumplers moved for a summary judgment, which the trial court also denied. After a trial, the trial court entered a judgment determining that the subdivision was the dominant estate served by the easement, dismissing Enterprise Realty and the country club as parties, determining that the easement had not been overburdened, and declining to terminate or extinguish the easement. The Bradshaws and the Crumplers appealed the trial court's judgment to the Alabama Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 12–2–7(6).

The record discloses the following pertinent facts. In 1996, Coffee Developers recorded a plat of the subdivision with the Probate Court of Coffee County. The plat indicated that the subdivision had approximately 100 home lots, named streets, several utility and drainage easements, and a 10–foot–wide ingress/egress easement across Lot 7. The ingress/egress easement across Lot 7 leads to the property owned by Enterprise Realty and upon which the country club operates a country club and golf-course facility.

In 1998, the Lewises purchased Lot 34 in the subdivision. According to Orwin, at the time he purchased Lot 34, no lots abutting the golf course were available for purchase. He explained that he had discussed with Burt Barr, a builder for the subdivision, his desire for access to the golf course. Orwin testified that Barr had explained that the subdivision intended to cater to golfers and that an easement for access to the golf course had been reserved across Lot 7, which was located near Lot 34. Orwin testified that access to the golf course through the easement was a major consideration in his decision to purchase Lot 34; Coral Sue also testified that the easement had formed part of the basis for their decision to purchase a lot in the subdivision.

Although the easement was not passable for the first few years Orwin owned his home because trees were growing in the easement, Orwin explained that he and others would cross Lot 7 diagonally to access the back of Lot 7, which, at that time, was unimproved, to utilize the rear of the easement. In 2001, Orwin arranged to have the trees blocking the easement cut. He also arranged to have a ramp over the curb installed so the easement could be accessed from the street. At that point, he and others began using the easement for access to the golf course.

The Crumplers own Lot 8, which abuts the easement across Lot 7. They built their home in 2000 and have lived in it since that time. Robert testified that he was aware of the easement when he purchased Lot 8. According to Robert, the easement was not being utilized at the time he purchased Lot 8 and constructed his home. After 2003, however, Robert testified, there had “been a lot of different use” on the easement. Notably, the Crumplers testified that, although Robert was a golfer, he never used the easement to access the golf course but, instead, utilized another route that added less than a minute to the time it took to reach the golf course.

The Crumplers both testified that the use of the easement included not only use by residents of the subdivision but also use by other people from outside the subdivision. They also explained that the easement was not solely utilized by golf carts going to and from the golf course but by bicycles, all-terrain vehicles/four-wheelers (“ATVs”), motorcycles, and even automobiles and trucks. According to the Crumplers, people on foot, joggers, and people walking their dogs also used the easement. The Crumplers complained that the activity was not confined to the daylight or early evening hours but extended into the nighttime hours, sometimes even so late as to disturb them while they slept. They further testified that the use of the easement caused trash, debris, and dirt to accumulate on their porch and in their back and side yards and that the use of the easement had caused erosion in the easement track that, they said, had caused people to alter their path to cross the Crumplers' yard, which, in turn, caused damage to or the destruction of their property such as sprinkler heads and outdoor lighting. Finally, the Crumplers complained that some of the people who had used the easement had vandalized their home.

The Bradshaws purchased Lot 7 in 2001 and built a home on the lot in 2002–2003. Both testified that they were aware of the easement when they purchased the lot; in fact, the existence of the easement is contained in their deed. Like the Crumplers, the Bradshaws complained of the use of the easement both day and night and of erosion damage, damage to their driveway and sprinkler heads, an increase in trash and debris along the easement, and the inappropriate use of their backyard as a “short cut” to the easement. In addition, Monica complained that dog walkers allowed dogs to defecate along the path on her property and that people often trespassed in her yard at all hours, citing, as one example, a set of teenagers who she discovered walking in her backyard at 2:30 a.m. Both Gary and Monica testified that, at least five nights per week, the easement was used between 10:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m., interrupting their “quiet enjoyment” of their property. According to Gary, he had once apprehended a group of teenagers using the easement in the early morning hours; those teenagers had allegedly broken into the country-club clubhouse, stolen liquor, and driven a country-club golf cart into a lake on the golf course. Gary testified that another route to access the golf course was available to the subdivision owners who desired to use the course. ¹

Norris Pfeifer, another resident of the subdivision, testified at the trial. He testified that he had looked at both Lot 7 and Lot 8 when he was looking to purchase a lot in the subdivision. He said that the presence of the easement had resulted in his decision not to purchase either of those lots because he had expected that the use of easement would be an annoyance to the owners of those lots. Pfeifer testified that the subdivision development had been touted as a golfing community and that the easement across Lot 7 was one of the biggest selling points of the subdivision.

David Naumann, who does not reside in the subdivision but owns property abutting the subdivision and the golf course, part of which is located behind Lot 7, testified regarding the use of the easement. He said that he had seen automobiles, motorcycles, trucks, ATVs, bicycles, and skateboards being used on the easement. He indicated that he had presumed that those using the easement in such a manner were not members of the country club. He also noted that the use and misuse of the easement occurred both day and night. According to Naumann, the use of the easement interferes with his quiet enjoyment of his property and poses a threat to his security. Naumann specifically stated that he had no concerns with the drivers of golf carts utilizing the easement.

As noted above, the Bradshaws and the Crumplers desired to terminate or extinguish the easement across the Bradshaws' property. The trial court refused to do so. In the process, the trial court determined that the dominant-estate owners served by the easement were not Enterprise Realty or the county club but instead were the owners of lots in the subdivision. On appeal, the Bradshaws and the Crumplers take issue with the trial court's determination as to who are the dominant-estate owners and with the trial court's failure to extinguish the easement despite what they argue was clear evidence that the easementwas overburdened. After a consideration of the law governing easements and a review of the evidence and testimony presented at trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Bradshaws and the Crumplers first complain that the trial court erred when it determined that Enterprise Realty and the country club were not the dominant-estate owners served by the easement. The way the Bradshaws and the Crumplers view the evidence, the easement benefited the country club because it allowed access to the golf course across the servient estate, i.e., the Bradshaws' property. Enterprise Realty and the country club view the evidence quite differently. They argue that they receive no benefit, other than an incidental one, from the easement, which, they say, they never requested or bargained for at any time. We agree with the trial court that the dominant-estate owners in the present case are clearly the owners of lots in the subdivision.

To explain our conclusion, we will first discuss the general law governing appurtenant easements.² An easement is a property right. Magna, Inc. v. Catranis, 512 So.2d at 913–14.

“ ‘ “A...