Bradshaw v. OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BOARD

Decision Date13 August 2004
Docket NumberNo. 100836,100836
Citation98 P.3d 1092,2004 OK 69
PartiesCHARLENE K. BRADSHAW, Petitioner, v. OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BOARD, Glo Henley, Chairperson, Kenneth Monroe, Vice Chairman, Thomas E. Prince, Member and Tom Cole, Respondents.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
ORDER

¶1 Original jurisdiction is assumed and a writ of mandamus is hereby issued. The Oklahoma State Election Board is directed to place petitioner's name on the Oklahoma general election ballot as an Independent candidate for the office of United States Representative for the 4th District of Oklahoma. The provisions of 26 O.S. Supp. 2004 §5-105 are, by their express terms, uninvocable against candidates for federal offices.

¶2 Glo Henley, Kenneth Monroe and Thomas E. Prince, to the extent that they are named in the caption hereof in their individual capacities, are not proper parties respondent. These individuals are proper parties respondent only in their official capacities as members of the Oklahoma State Election Board.

¶3 Petitioner's request for costs and an attorney's fee is denied. Rule 1.191(j) of the Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules.

¶4 DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE THIS 13th DAY OF AUGUST, 2004.

Watt, C.J., Opala, V.C.J., Boudreau and Edmondson, JJ. and Simms, SJ., concur; Hodges, Hargrave and Kauger, JJ., dissent; Lavender, J., not participating; Winchester, J., disqualified.

OPALA, V.C.J., with whom WATT, C.J., and EDMONDSON, J., join, concurring.

¶1 I concur in today's assumption of jurisdiction and in the issued command that the State Election Board place the petitioner's name on the general election ballot as an Independent candidate for the U.S. Congress from District No. 4.

¶2 The question presented by the petitioner's writ quest is whether she is a qualified candidate for the congressional office she seeks. The State Election Board ruled her disqualified by the provisions of 26 O.S. Supp.2004 §5-105(A),1 finding that she fails to meet that statute's requirement for an independent office-seeker who must be "a registered voter in . . . [her] party for the six[-]month period immediately preceding the first day of the filing period prescribed by law."

¶3 The body of public law that governs qualifications of a candidate for public office from this State is entirely statutory.2 It may be neither supplemented nor diluted by the norms of common law injected into its corpus by an agency or by a judicial syringe. One's opportunity to seek a public office must stand unburdened by extra-statutory hurdles. This right is guaranteed and guarded by the Oklahoma Constitution, the State's highest law.

¶4 This case is not about the constitutional validity of a restriction the present incumbent seeks to impose on the petitioner's candidacy; rather, it is about whether such restriction does in fact stand imposed by Oklahoma's fundamental law or by one of her statutes.

I THE STATUTE INVOKED BY THE RESPONDENTS IS FACIALLY UNAMBIGUOUS

¶5 The provisions of 26 O.S.Supp.2004 § 5-105(A), the statute on which the respondents rely, are, by their express terms, uninvocable against candidates who seek a federal office. This is so because federal office-seekers are not included among those to be affected by its provisions. Where a statute is plain and unambiguous, it will not be subject to judicial construction, but must be given the effect its language dictates.3

II A LONG-FOLLOWED ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION IS NOT BINDING ON THIS COURT WHEN IT IS PLACED BY AN AGENCY UPON AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE

¶6 Administrative construction cannot override the plain language of a statute.4 Where a statute is neither ambiguous nor of doubtful meaning, the rule that weight is to be given to an agency construction in determining the effect of the statute5 will not be applied.

III NEITHER AN AGENCY NOR THIS COURT MAY BURDEN A FEDERAL OFFICE SEEKER WITH QUALIFICATIONS NOT IMPOSED BY FEDERAL OR STATE STATUTORY LAW

¶7 This case is not about the constitutional validity of the qualification that the respondents seek to inject but rather whether that very qualification is in fact imposed by state law. Neither an agency nor this court can foist upon a candidate qualifications for office that are not prescribed by written law. No voting- or election-related issue may be resolved by invoking a norm of unwritten law.6 In short, there is no common law to aid the court in disposing of the contested issue here. The law's command that courts may not inject common-law solutions in resolving a candidate's qualifications for public office is persuasively informed by Oklahoma's firm constitutional commitment to the principle of providing unimpeded access for filing to those who desire to seek public office by election.7 In sum, one who seeks public office is entitled to file as a candidate for election unless it clearly appear that one fails to meet a qualification prescribed for that office by the "written law" — Oklahoma's constitution or one of her legislative enactments.8

IV SUMMARY

¶8 I concur in today's assumption of original jurisdiction and in the issued command that the State Election Board place petitioner's name on the general election ballot as an Independent candidate for the U.S. Congress from District No. 4.

KAUGER, J. dissenting:

¶1 The issue presented is not whether any qualified individual should have the right to file for office or whether that right will be protected by this Court. There is no question that candidates are entitled to all constitutional and statutory protections. Nevertheless, public policy concerning election regulation is expressed in the statutes and is mandatory, controlling and applicable to all political parties and nonpartisan candidates alike.9 It exists to protect the electorate and to ensure disclosure of the political positions and qualifications of candidates. Undoubtedly, the petitioner could have filed for election as a member of the party with which she is registered and aligned. Nevertheless, to allow her to file as an independent when she is a member of a political party with an espoused party platform with which she presumably agrees, if not fraudulent, would at the least be misleading and confusing. Voters are entitled to know for whom and for what they are casting their ballots.

¶2 The real question involves whether voters should be subjected to a member of a political party — disguised as an independent — in order to get on the ballot when our Constitution requires a mandatory primary system or whether a candidate may deign to dodge the bullet of the primary and participate in the general election under questionable pretenses? If we allow such a result, we undermine the Legislature's authority to detect and prevent election fraud by minimizing differences, leaving the public without an opportunity to make choices on the issues. Instead, we would force them to make distinctions on personality or other matters even less important to public policy. In requiring an independent candidate not to have been affiliated with a political party for six months before the primary, the Oklahoma Legislature has expressed a general state public policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the ballot10 and preventing chaos in the electoral process. This Court should do the same.

¶3 The Oklahoma Constitution art. 3, §311 provides that the Legislature may enact laws for a mandatory primary system in all elections for federal, state, county and municipal offices. It also mandates that the Legislature enact laws whereby citizens, by petition, may place names of independent, nonpartisan candidates for office, including the office of presidential electors, on the ballot.

¶4 The Oklahoma statutes were enacted in accordance with the provisions of art. 3, §3. Title 26 O.S. 2001 §6-101, et seq. delineates how candidates may be placed on the ballot. Pursuant to 26 O.S. 2001 §5-102,12 state and federal candidates must file declarations of candidacy with the Secretary of the State Election Board.

¶5 Title 26 O.S. 2001 §5-10513 requires a candidate filing as an independent for any state or county office to have been registered to vote as an independent for the six-month period preceding the first day of the filing period. There is an apparent lacuna — a gap in the law14 — in 26 O.S. 2001 §5-105 insofar as federal offices are concerned. However, when read with §5-102 and art. 3, §3 which set forth the way candidates must file to be placed on the ballot, it is clear that the language of 26 O.S. 2001 §5-105 was not intended to be confined to state and county offices, but encompasses federal candidates as well.

¶6 The United States Supreme Court explained in McPherson v. Glacker, 146 U.S. 1, 13 S.Ct. 3, 7, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1892), that although the federal constitution is implicitly imposed on the Oklahoma scheme, state legislatures have not been deprived of the right to determine methods of effectuating constitutional election processes. The McPherson Court stated:

"[The constitution] recognizes that the people act through their representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method of effecting the object."

¶7 Art. 3, §4 of the Oklahoma Constitution15 does precisely what the United States Supreme Court recognized as a state right in McPherson — it affords the Oklahoma Legislature the authority to prescribe the manner and conduct of all elections. Furthermore, the same provision places the duty on the legislative body to enact such laws as are necessary to detect election fraud.

¶8 In enacting election laws, state legislatures act under the power and the grant of the United States Constitution art. 2, §1, cl. 2 which provides:

"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . ."

Oklahoma's Const...

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