Bradshaw v. Richey, No. 05-101.
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | Per Curiam |
| Citation | 163 L. Ed. 2d 407,546 U.S. 74,126 S. Ct. 602 |
| Parties | BRADSHAW, WARDEN <I>v.</I> RICHEY. |
| Docket Number | No. 05-101. |
| Decision Date | 28 November 2005 |
v.
RICHEY.
Respondent was convicted in Ohio state court of aggravated murder, based on a theory of transferred intent, and he was sentenced to death. His petition for federal habeas relief was denied, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding (1) that transferred intent was not a permissible theory for aggravated felony murder under Ohio law at the time of his conviction, and (2) that the performance of respondent's trial counsel had been constitutionally deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668.
Held: The Sixth Circuit erred in holding that the transferred intent doctrine was inapplicable under state law and that respondent was entitled to relief under Strickland. The Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of the relevant state statute, as announced in its review of respondent's case, directly contradicts the Sixth Circuit's analysis. The State Supreme Court's perfectly clear and unambiguous explanation that the transferred intent doctrine "`is firmly rooted in Ohio law'" is binding on a federal court sitting in habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68. The Sixth Circuit also erred in its adjudication of the Strickland claim by, inter alia, relying on evidence not properly presented to the state habeas courts. Respondent contends that the State failed to preserve that objection before the Sixth Circuit. Because the relevant errors had not yet occurred, the Sixth Circuit has had no opportunity to address this argument, and it is better situated to do so in the first instance.
Certiorari granted; 395 F.3d 660, vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
In 1987, respondent Kenneth T. Richey was tried in Ohio for aggravated murder committed in the course of a felony. Evidence showed that respondent set fire to the apartment of his neighbor, Hope Collins, in an attempt to kill his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend, who were spending the night together in the apartment below. The intended victims escaped unharmed, but Hope Collins' 2-year-old daughter
Cynthia died in the fire. At trial, the State presented evidence of respondent's intent to kill his ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend, but not of specific intent to kill Cynthia Collins. The State also offered expert forensic evidence to show that the fire had been started deliberately. Respondent did not contest this forensic evidence at trial because his retained arson expert had reported that the State's evidence conclusively established arson. Respondent was convicted of aggravated felony murder on a theory of transferred intent and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, where he was represented by new counsel.
Respondent sought postconviction relief in state court. The state trial court denied his request for an evidentiary hearing and denied relief on all claims, and the state appellate court affirmed. Respondent then sought federal habeas relief. The District Court permitted discovery on certain issues, but ultimately denied all of respondent's claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that respondent was entitled to habeas relief on two alternative grounds. First, that transferred intent was not a permissible theory for aggravated felony murder under Ohio law, and that the evidence of direct intent was constitutionally insufficient to support conviction. Second, that the performance of respondent's trial counsel had been constitutionally deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in his retaining and mishandling of his arson expert and in his inadequate treatment of the State's expert testimony.
We now grant the State's petition for writ of certiorari and vacate the judgment below.
The Sixth Circuit erred in holding that the doctrine of transferred intent was inapplicable to aggravated felony murder for the version of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(B) (Anderson 1982) under which respondent was convicted.
See Richey v. Mitchell, 395 F.3d 660, 675 (2005). The Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of that section, as announced in its review of respondent's case, directly contradicts the Sixth Circuit's analysis:
"The fact that the intended victims escaped harm, and that an innocent child, Cynthia Collins, was killed instead, does not alter Richey's legal and moral responsibility. `The doctrine of transferred intent is firmly rooted in Ohio law.' Very simply, `the culpability of a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill is not altered by the fact that the scheme is directed at someone other than the actual victim.'" State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St. 3d 353, 364, 595 N. E. 2d 915, 925 (1992) (citations omitted).
This statement was dictum, since the only sufficiency-ofevidence claim raised by respondent pertained to his setting of the fire....
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