Bradshaw v. State
| Decision Date | 22 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-0403-CR-219.,49A02-0403-CR-219. |
| Citation | 818 N.E.2d 59 |
| Parties | Antwan BRADSHAW, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Taffanee Woods-O'Neal, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Daniel Jason Kopp, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant-defendant Antwan Bradshaw appeals his conviction for the Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon,1 a class B felony, claiming that the State failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a previous conviction for dealing in cocaine that served as the basis for the enhanced firearm charge. Bradshaw also contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was in possession of the handgun that was seized from an automobile in which he was riding. Rejecting Bradshaw's sufficiency claims, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The facts most favorable to the judgment are that during the evening of July 23, 2003, Indianapolis Police Officer Alma Trowe observed a vehicle with a nonworking taillight traveling eastbound on Michigan Street. Officer Trowe stopped the vehicle, and as she walked to the driver's side, she observed four individuals inside. As Officer Trowe began conversing with the driver, she saw Bradshaw, the front-seat passenger, moving around and fidgeting with his waist. At that point, Officer Trowe ordered Bradshaw to place his hands on the dashboard. Bradshaw disobeyed that command, and he continued to fidget and reach under his seat.
Shortly thereafter, other officers arrived at the scene, whereupon Bradshaw and the driver were removed from the vehicle. Officer Jeffrey Luster found a handgun under the front passenger seat. The handle of the pistol was visible to him as he looked over the front edge of the seat, and the barrel was pointed toward the backseat. When Officer Luster announced, "we have a gun," Bradshaw — who was sitting on a nearby curb — stood up and attempted to flee the scene. Tr. p. 21-22, 35-37. Although his attempt to run failed, Bradshaw spit on one of the detectives, and kicked a police officer in the leg.
As a result of this incident, Bradshaw was charged with the handgun offense and a number of other crimes. The basis for the class B felony handgun charge was the allegation that Bradshaw had previously been convicted of dealing in cocaine.
A bench trial commenced on January 14, 2004. At trial, the State presented the testimony of Joseph Johnson, a fingerprint-identification expert, and several exhibits establishing that Bradshaw had been convicted of dealing in cocaine on March 12, 2003. Johnson testified that State's Exhibit 2 was a certified copy of Bradshaw's thumbprint, which was stamped following Bradshaw's arrest for the dealing charge. He also testified that another exhibit was a card bearing Bradshaw's thumbprint, which Johnson stamped on the afternoon of the trial. When asked to compare the thumbprints, Johnson testified that they were from the same individual.
State's Exhibit Four was a self-authenticating exhibit consisting of certified copies of six documents that related to Bradshaw's prior dealing in cocaine charge: (1) abstract of judgment; (2) plea agreement; (3) order of probation; (4) charging information; (5) probable cause affidavit; and (6) chronological case summary. Among other things, the exhibit reveals that, on March 12, 2003, Bradshaw entered a guilty plea to dealing in cocaine, a class B felony, and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on that day. However, Bradshaw was not sentenced for that offense until September 19, 2003. At the conclusion of the trial, Bradshaw was found guilty as charged, and he now appeals.
Bradshaw first contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had acquired a prior conviction for dealing in cocaine. Specifically, Bradshaw argues that the evidence showed that because he was not sentenced for that offense until September 19, 2003, and he had been charged with the instant offense on July 28, 2003, "he was not a `Serious Violent Felon' at the time he was charged and convicted of the instant offense." Appellant's Br. p. 5.
First, we note that in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court will affirm a defendant's conviction if, considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's judgment, and without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rogers v. State, 741 N.E.2d 395, 396 (Ind.Ct.App.2000),trans. denied. We also note that a conviction is a determination that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged or of a lesser-included offense. State v. Boze, 482 N.E.2d 276, 278 n. 3 (Ind.Ct.App.1985),trans. denied. Finally, a guilty plea is recognized as a conviction. Id.
Turning to the relevant statutes, Indiana Code section 35-47-4-5 provides in part as follows:
Under Indiana Code section 35-47-4-5(a)(1)(A), a person who has been convicted of committing a serious violent felony in Indiana is a "serious violent felon." (Emphasis added). Inasmuch as dealing in cocaine is a serious violent felony, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bradshaw: (A) had been convicted of Dealing in Cocaine; and (B) thereafter, knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm. I.C. § 35-47-4-5.
As set forth above, State's exhibit 4 is a self-authenticating document demonstrating, among other things, that Bradshaw entered a plea of guilty to dealing in cocaine on March 12, 2003. Contrary to Bradshaw's assertions, the fact that he was not sentenced for that offense until September 19, 2003,2 is irrelevant with regard to the instant offense. Had the legislature intended to exclude defendants who have been convicted of — but not sentenced for — committing a serious violent felony, it would have drafted the statute accordingly. That said, inasmuch as Indiana Code section 35-47-4-5...
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