Bradshaw v. State
| Decision Date | 05 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 29A02-0106-CR-366.,29A02-0106-CR-366. |
| Citation | 759 N.E.2d 271 |
| Parties | James E. BRADSHAW, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
James H. Pickering, Jr., Richards, Boje, Pickering, Benner & Becker, Noblesville, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Timothy W. Beam, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
James E. Bradshaw brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, namely marijuana detected on his person by a canine sweep that took place during a routine traffic stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. Specifically, he maintains that the canine sweep was conducted without reasonable suspicion of drug activity. Because a canine sweep is not a search, the officer had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop, and the vehicle was still lawfully detained at the time of the canine sweep, we affirm.
Bradshaw was a passenger in Henry V. Chalfont's truck when Officer John Douglas Grishaw, a canine officer with the Arcadia Police Department, pulled the vehicle over because it did not have an operating light illuminating the license plate. Once the vehicle was stopped, Officer Grishaw approached the driver's side of the vehicle and asked Chalfont for his license and registration. As he was doing this, Officer John L. Woods, also of the Arcadia Police Department, arrived at the scene to assist. Officer Grishaw handed the license and registration to Officer Woods to run a license and warrants check on Chalfont. While Officer Woods ran the license and warrants check, Officer Grishaw and his canine, Justice, conducted a canine sweep around the vehicle, based on information that Chalfont and Bradshaw were involved with marijuana. During the canine sweep, Justice sat down at the passenger side door signaling the presence of illegal narcotics in the vehicle.
Officer Grishaw asked Chalfont to exit the vehicle and proceeded to conduct a pat down search of Chalfont. The results of the pat down of Chalfont were negative. Next, Officer Grishaw asked Bradshaw to exit the vehicle so that a pat down search could be performed. In the course of patting down Bradshaw, Officer Grishaw found a bag containing marijuana and a partially smoked marijuana cigarette inside a tin located in the jacket Bradshaw was wearing. Officer Grishaw gave Chalfont a warning for the equipment violation and then released him. Bradshaw, however, was arrested for possession of marijuana under 30 grams. Subsequently, Bradshaw was charged with possession of marijuana as a Class D felony.1 Bradshaw moved the trial court to suppress the marijuana as the product of an illegal search. The trial court denied Bradshaw's motion after holding a hearing. In its Order the trial court found that a canine sweep is not a search and that the canine sweep was permissible even without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because the vehicle was legally detained for another reason at the time of the canine sweep. This interlocutory appeal ensued.
Bradshaw contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an illegal search. In particular, Bradshaw alleges that the arresting officer had no reasonable suspicion to conduct a canine sweep of the vehicle in which Bradshaw was a passenger while the vehicle was detained for a routine traffic stop.2 Further, Bradshaw maintains that even if we agree with the trial court that only the detention of the vehicle, not the canine sweep, required reasonable suspicion, we should still reverse because the evidence was insufficient to establish whether the traffic stop was ongoing or completed prior to the completion of the canine sweep. We disagree.
We begin by noting that a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Dowdell v. State, 747 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. Accordingly, we will reverse a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence only when it has been shown that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. Upon review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we examine the evidence most favorable to the ruling, together with any uncontradicted evidence. Sullivan v. State, 748 N.E.2d 861, 865 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id.
It is well-settled that a canine sweep is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. D.K. v. State, 736 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)). While a canine sweep is not a search, upon the completion of a traffic stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to proceed thereafter with an investigatory detention. D.K., 736 N.E.2d at 762 (citing United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 270 (6th Cir.1999), cert. denied). See also United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1998)
(); accord United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir.1990). The critical facts in determining whether a vehicle was legally detained at the time of the canine sweep are whether the traffic stop was concluded and, if so, whether there was reasonable suspicion at that point to continue to detain the vehicle for investigatory purposes. D.K., 736 N.E.2d at 762.
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