Bradshaw v. State

Decision Date08 October 1982
Docket NumberNo. 64313,64313
Citation296 S.E.2d 119,163 Ga.App. 819
PartiesBRADSHAW v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

H.G. Bozeman, Dublin, for appellant.

Beverly B. Hayes, Dist. Atty., H. Jeff Lanier, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dublin, for appellee.

CARLEY, Judge.

This is the second appearance of this probation revocation case before us. The instant appeal is from orders entered by the trial court in compliance with the mandate of this court's judgment in Bradshaw v. State, 160 Ga.App. 88, 286 S.E.2d 323 (1981). In that case, we reversed and remanded for the entry of new orders of revocation "containing a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking appellant's probation, the new orders being based upon the evidence stated. [Cits.]" Bradshaw, 160 Ga.App. at 89, 286 S.E.2d 323, supra. In so holding, we relied in part upon Brinson v. State, 158 Ga.App. 189, 279 S.E.2d 488 (1981), a case which was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court on certiorari. State v. Brinson, 248 Ga. 380, 283 S.E.2d 463 (1981). Accordingly, we would point out for the benefit of the bench and bar that it is not the opinion of this court in the prior appearance of the instant appeal or any case cited therein which establishes the appropriate standard for determining whether an order of probation revocation satisfies the minimum standards of due process. The appropriate standard is established by State v. Brinson, 248 Ga. 380, 283 S.E.2d 463, supra.

1. Appellant first asserts that the trial court erred "in that he considered evidence which should have been suppressed under the [appellant's] Motion to Suppress because of the illegal arrest."

The commission of the three crimes of motor vehicle theft, burglary and arson served as the basis for the revocation of appellant's probation. Appellant contends that his arrest for these three crimes was "illegal" and that any evidence discovered as the consequence thereof should have been suppressed at the revocation hearing. "A defendant's probation may not be revoked on the basis of illegally seized evidence. [Cit.]" Austin v. State, 148 Ga.App. 784, 785, 252 S.E.2d 696 (1979). It does not appear in the instant case, however, that any tangible physical evidence was introduced at the revocation hearing. " 'It is harmless error to overrule a motion to suppress evidence which is never introduced; furthermore, testimony is outside the scope of a motion to suppress, and should be objected to on the trial. [Cit.]' [Cits.]" Jackson v. State, 146 Ga.App. 736(1), 247 S.E.2d 512 (1978).

Construing this enumeration as addressing the admission over objection of oral testimony concerning the post-arrest discovery of evidence demonstrating appellant's guilt of the three underlying crimes, it does not appear that any reversible error occurred in the instant case. Our review of the transcript demonstrates that the trial court was authorized to find that such testimony did not relate to the "fruits" of appellant's illegal arrest but to the fruits of a valid consent search. "[T]he state 'may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.' [Cit.]" Park v. State, 154 Ga.App. 348, 350, 268 S.E.2d 401 (1980). We find no error for any reason urged on appeal in the trial court's "consideration" of evidence concerning events and circumstances which occurred subsequent to appellant's arrest.

2. Prior to the revocation hearing, appellant escaped from confinement and was recaptured. In revoking appellant's probation, the trial court considered and relied upon evidence of appellant's escape. On appeal, appellant asserts, in essence, that the arrest warrants on which he was being held were "illegal and invalid" and that the trial court thus erroneously considered and relied upon evidence of appellant's flight from "illegal" detention.

It appears that, subsequent to appellant's escape and recapture but prior to the revocation hearing, appellant was afforded a commitment hearing as to the three underlying crimes. The magistrate who conducted the commitment hearing entertained and orally granted appellant's "motion to dismiss" the arrest warrants on the ground that those warrants had not been issued by a "neutral and detached" magistrate. Appellant contends that this oral "dismissal" by the committal magistrate should have been given res judicata effect at the revocation hearing so as to establish that the flight was from confinement under invalid warrants and thus was flight from illegal detention rather than escape from lawful confinement.

In the first instance, the committal magistrate's oral pronouncement was not a final order. " 'What the judge orally declares is no judgment until it has been put in writing and entered as such. [Cits.]' [Cit.] The defendant in a criminal case cannot claim that the trial court's oral pronouncements from the bench have the finality of a judgment. [Cits.]" Harden v. State, 160 Ga.App. 514, 515, 287 S.E.2d 329 (1981). "Until an order is signed by the judge it is ineffective for any purpose." Majors v. Lewis, 135 Ga.App. 420, 421, 218 S.E.2d 130 (1975).

Moreover, the committal magistrate had no authority to "dismiss" the warrants on the ground stated. "The jurisdiction of such courts, as to State offenses is limited to determining 'whether there is sufficient reason to suspect the guilt of the accused, to require him to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 13, 1989
    ...at trial and the error, if any, in denying the motion as to such evidence would be harmless at most. See generally Bradshaw v. State, 163 Ga.App. 819(1), 296 S.E.2d 119 (1982). Compare State v. Cochran, 135 Ga.App. 47, 217 S.E.2d 181 (1975); Wallace v. State, 131 Ga.App. 204, 205 S.E.2d 523......
  • Allen v. State, A15A1446.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 22, 2015
    ...is no judgment until it has been put in writing and entered as such.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bradshaw v. State, 163 Ga.App. 819, 820(2), 296 S.E.2d 119 (1982). See also OCGA § 5–6–31 (“[t]he filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of a j......
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 7, 1996
    ...938, 938-39, 321 S.E.2d 433 (1984); see also Robinson v. State, 208 Ga.App. 528, 530(2), 430 S.E.2d 830 (1993); Bradshaw v. State, 163 Ga.App. 819, 820(1), 296 S.E.2d 119 (1982). Smith's motion to suppress cannot be deemed a motion in limine to exclude this testimony, so he has failed to pr......
  • Allen v. State, A15A1446
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 22, 2015
    ...is no judgment until it has been put into writing and entered as such." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bradshaw v. State, 163 Ga. App. 819, 820 (2) (296 SE2d 119) (1982). See also OCGA § 5-6-31 ("[t]he filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT