Bradshaw v. State

• Decision Date: 16 December 1977
• Docket Number: No. 77-143,77-143
• Citation: 353 So.2d 188
• Parties: Steven Leon BRADSHAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Second District
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 188

353 So.2d 188

Steven Leon BRADSHAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 77-143.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Second District.

Dec. 16, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1978.

Robert E. Jagger, Public Defender, Clearwater, and J. Marion Moorman, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, Winter Haven, for appellant.

Ronald M. Soskin, South Bend, Ind., for amicus curiae, Nat. Center for Law and the Handicapped.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard G. Pippinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

SCHEB, Judge.

Here we consider whether the trial court erred in striking appellant's asserted defense of diminished mental capacity. We conclude that under Florida law there is no such defense and, therefore, the trial court acted properly. We affirm.

The state charged appellant with receiving and concealing stolen goods, i. e., motor vehicle inspection certificates, contrary to Section 811.16, Florida Statutes (1973). Appellant pled not guilty. Defense counsel contended appellant's mental age was considerably lower than his chronological age of twenty-three years. Over the state's objection the trial judge transferred the case to the juvenile division of the circuit court for disposition. Upon appeal by the state this court reversed, noting that Section 39.02, Florida Statutes (1973), and the Rules of Juvenile Procedure do not authorize trial of a person over eighteen years of age as a juvenile. State v. Bradshaw, 337 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).

Thereafter appellant filed: (1) Notice of Intention to Rely Upon the Defense of Diminished Mental Capacity; and (2) Motion to have the Court Appoint a Psychologist to Evaluate Appellant's Mental Condition. The trial court struck the defense and denied the motion to appoint an expert. Appellant then pled nolo contendere on November 6, 1976, reserving his right to appeal. The trial court withheld adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on probation for one year. This appeal ensued.

Appellant forcefully argues that he was charged with a specific intent crime and that mental retardation or lack of mental capacity goes to the very heart of such an offense. He points out that an individual may not be capable of forming a specific intent to commit a crime because of his diminished capacity, but yet may not be considered insane. Appellant concludes that without the defense of diminished mental capacity being available to him, the jury could not have properly considered whether he had the requisite specific intent necessary for conviction of the crime for which he was charged. We disagree.

The offense of receiving stolen goods is a variant of the crime of larceny and appears to be a specific intent crime. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the state to prove not only the act but also the specific intent, since each element of a criminal offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Newman v. State, 174 So.2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). A defendant's plea of not guilty places his intent in issue, thus one charged with a specific intent crime has the right to present evidence before the finder of fact relative to the issues of knowledge or intent. Therefore, lay testimony going to a defendant's lack of specific intent may be admitted. However, it is improper, absent a plea of insanity, for the defendant to introduce expert testimony for this purpose. Tremain v. State, 336 So.2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).

In Florida the test of mental capacity is the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, rather than a person's intelligence or general mental capacity. Young v. State, 140 So.2d 97 (Fla.1962). See also Camp...