Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. of San Diego, No. 76-3528
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Before MERRILL and ELY; MERRILL |
| Citation | 569 F.2d 1066 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-3528 |
| Decision Date | 03 February 1978 |
| Parties | 16 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 828, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8149 Nancy S. BRADSHAW, Individually and in behalf of others who are similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO and Pete Wilson, Individually and in his capacity as Mayor of the City of San Diego and Chief Executive Officer of the San Diego City Council, Defendants-Appellees. |
Page 1066
Dec. P 8149
are similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO and Pete Wilson,
Individually and in his capacity as Mayor of the
City of San Diego and Chief Executive
Officer of the San Diego City
Council, Defendants-Appellees.
Ninth Circuit.
As Amended Feb. 17, 1978.
Page 1067
Nancy S. Bradshaw, in pro per.
Sharyn L. Danch (argued), of Equal Employment Opport. Comm., Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard A. Paul (argued), San Diego, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
On appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
Before MERRILL and ELY, Circuit Judges, and HARPER, * District Judge.
MERRILL, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, Bradshaw, brought this action against appellees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In November, 1971, she had applied for the position of education director of the appellee zoo. Thereafter a male had been employed for the position. Appellant alleges employment discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status, and in retaliation for prior charges of discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, and this appeal followed.
1. Limitations; Title VII
The district court concluded that appellant's Title VII claim was time barred. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had resorted to its practice, now discontinued, of giving notice to a claimant in two stages: first, notice of the Commission's inability to reach settlement with the employer and effect voluntary compliance, and, later, notice of the claimant's right to bring suit. By the Act, a claimant is required to bring suit within 90 days of notice from the Commission (1) that it had dismissed the charge, or (2) after 180 days had elapsed after the filing of the charge, that it had failed to bring suit, or (3) that it had failed to reach a conciliation agreement with the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The question presented to the district court was whether the 90-day period started to run from the first notice from the Commission or from the second. In this case, if the limitations period ran from the first notice, the suit was time barred; if it ran from the second, the suit was timely filed. The district court in granting summary judgment held that it ran from the first notice.
Since the decision of the district court, this court has held in Lynn v. Western Gilette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977), that when this two-letter procedure was followed the 90-day period starts to run from the second, or right-to-sue, letter. Accordingly the district court must be reversed on this ruling.
Page 1068
2. Limitations; § 1983
The district court concluded that appellant's § 1983 claim was time barred. Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations and the federal courts must apply the most analogous state statute of limitations. E. g., Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 1977). This court has held that the three-year statute of limitations of California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(1) is applicable to § 1983 actions brought in California. Id. The question presented here is when California's three-year statute of limitations started to run on this claim; whether it ran from (a) the date on which the position sought by appellant was actually assumed by the successful applicant or filled to appellant's knowledge, or, (b) the date on which it was contractually filled by offer and acceptance. If, as appellant contends, the former is the rule, the suit was timely brought; if the latter, the suit is time barred. In holding the claim time barred the district court held that the statute commenced to run from the date the position was filled by offer and acceptance.
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Polson v. Davis, Civ. A. No. 84-2211.
...great weight of authority." Id. (citing various district court decisions). The holding in Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir.1978), would appear to be at least as broad as that of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in Day and Trigg. Although some of the Bradshaw......
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EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 79 C 4373.
...report excluded, but district court permitted investigator to testify). But see Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1978) (error to exclude, but weight determined by district court); Smith v. Universal Services, Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 157-158 (5th Cir. 19......
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Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Services, No. 81-C-1004.
...joining of actions under Title VII and § 1983 did not preclude an award of punitive damages. Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff in Bradshaw alleged sexual discrimination and retaliation, apparently without basing the § 1983 claim on a c......
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Black v. Brown University, Civ. A. No. 82-0702S.
...the EEOC permitting the institution of suit in federal court (the "right-to-sue letter"). Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066, 1067 (9th Cir.1978); Page v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 890, 54 L.Ed.2d ......
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Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, Nos. 83-5606
...801 (9th Cir.1973); see White v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 692 F.2d 1286, 1290 (9th Cir.1982); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 569 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.1978). We recognize that one of the reasons that the award of punitive damages is permitted in cases like this is that such awar......
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Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. of San Diego, No. 79-3051
...of this court reversed both determinations, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. Proceedings in the district court resumed with the filing of an answer to the complaint in April of 1978. Shortly thereafter, Brads......
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Black v. Brown University, Civ. A. No. 82-0702S.
...the EEOC permitting the institution of suit in federal court (the "right-to-sue letter"). Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066, 1067 (9th Cir.1978); Page v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 890, 54 L.Ed.2d ......
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Polson v. Davis, Civ. A. No. 84-2211.
...great weight of authority." Id. (citing various district court decisions). The holding in Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir.1978), would appear to be at least as broad as that of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in Day and Trigg. Although some of the Bradshaw......