Brady v. Daily World

CourtWashington Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBRACHTENBACH; DOLLIVER
CitationBrady v. Daily World, 105 Wn.2d 770, 718 P.2d 785 (Wash. 1986)
Decision Date01 May 1986
Docket NumberNo. 52183-2
Parties, 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 397, 106 Lab.Cas. P 55,716, 1 A.D. Cases 891 Ralph O. BRADY, Appellant, v. The DAILY WORLD, a Washington corporation, Respondent. En Banc

Walstead, Mertsching, Husemoen, Donaldson & Barlow, John A. Barlow, Longview, for appellant.

Karr, Tuttle, Koch, Campbell, Mawer & Morrow, James Dickens, Seattle, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

Plaintiff was employed as a pressman at defendant's newspaper, The Daily World. He was discharged on December 7, 1981, after 32 years of employment there. Plaintiff sued for damages, alleging: (1) termination of employment without cause when an express or implied contract required good cause; (2) termination based solely or for the most part upon plaintiff's age; and (3) termination based upon a perceived handicap. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims. We reverse on the first claim--the contract claim--but affirm the trial court on the age and handicap discrimination claims.

Regarding the first claim, there is wide disparity in the evidence. Plaintiff alleges an express or implied employment contract, a term of which provided that he would be discharged only for good cause, and further alleges that no good cause existed. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that its employment rules prohibited an employee being intoxicated on the job and that defendant was under the influence or intoxicated, was warned thereof, and was discharged solely for that reason. The trial court was presented with affidavits, parts of depositions and exhibits. From this material we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, considering all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). The pertinent evidence may be summarized as follows.

Plaintiff's depositions and affidavit claim that he never drank on the job, that he was never intoxicated at work, that he occasionally drank one or two beers with dinner several hours before reporting for work on the weekend evening shift, that on one occasion he was told not to come to work drunk, and that no one ever told him not to come to work after drinking his one or two beers. Plaintiff also claims that he was told that he was doing a good job, that so long as he did so he would have a job, and that he would be discharged only for cause.

Written reports in plaintiff's personnel file alleged that on three or four occasions plaintiff appeared to be under the influence, that sometimes his speech was slurred, and that he was unsteady at times. However, a month before discharge a comprehensive evaluation by his supervisor did not mention drinking, rated him above or well above minimum job requirements (the latter included "safety", which was an expressed employer concern about drinking), and stated that plaintiff was capable of running the entire pressroom operation. Plaintiff was the assistant pressroom foreman until demoted for errors in production, with no mention of drinking as a factor.

About 8 years before discharge, plaintiff acknowledged in writing that he had received, read, and understood the personnel handbook and that violation of those rules might make him subject to immediate termination. The handbook contained the following section:

DISMISSAL FOR CAUSE

When an employee joins the company, we hope he/she will be associated with us for a long time. Unfortunately, some employees do not meet the standards of conduct and performance which we expect. If this happens, it may become necessary to effect a termination.

Any decision which requires such action is made only after careful consideration of all known facts. Any of the following may be considered sufficient grounds for dismissal.

* * *

Intoxication or drug abuse.

* * *

An employee dismissed for cause forfeits all privileges and benefits.

Clerk's Papers, at 199-200.

Defendant alleges that on December 5, 1981, a report from plaintiff's supervisor states that plaintiff was "under the influence of alcohol, speech and motion" [sic], and that while the supervisor did not detect any odor of alcohol, he was of the opinion that plaintiff had been drinking. Clerk's Papers, at 192. Plaintiff worked the entire shift on December 5th. Plaintiff was asked about his condition. Plaintiff said he had had a beer 3 hours before coming to work. Two days later, plaintiff's supervisor told his superior of the December 5th incident. It was decided then that plaintiff would be terminated for being under the influence on December 5th and for earlier incidents of drinking and warnings based upon prior reports. Plaintiff was advised that he should seek professional help, and if he did, his job would be held open for 6 weeks. Plaintiff was told, and he denied, that he was an alcoholic.

Defendant's management testified that the policy of not working under the influence was a strictly enforced rule, that the employee was given at least two verbal or written warnings, that plaintiff was discharged solely for appearing for work under the influence of alcohol, and that age or handicap was not a consideration.

Before analyzing the factual issues and inferences therefrom, we turn to the law. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) is controlling. There we delineated principles applicable in this case.

[W]e hold that employers may be obligated to act in accordance with policies as announced in handbooks issued to their employees. When the employment relationship is not evidenced by a written contract and is indefinite in duration, the parties have entered into a contract whereby the employer is essentially obligated to only pay the employee for any work performed. In this contractual relationship, the employer exercises substantial control over both the working relationship and his employees by retaining independent control of the work relationship. Thus, the employer can define the work relationship. Once an employer takes action, for whatever reasons, an employee must either accept those changes, quit, or be discharged. Because the employer retains this control over the employment relationship, unilateral acts of the employer are binding on his employees and both parties should understand this rule.

However, absent specific contractual agreement to the contrary, we conclude that the employer's act in issuing an employee policy manual can lead to obligations that govern the employment relationship. Thus, the employer's reason for unilaterally issuing an employee policy manual or handbook, purporting to contain the company policy vis-a-vis employee relations, becomes relevant.

We are persuaded that the principal, though not exclusive, reason employers issue such manuals is to create an atmosphere of fair treatment and job security for their employees.... It would appear that employers expect, if not demand, that their employees abide by the policies expressed in such manuals. This may create an atmosphere where employees justifiably rely on the expressed policies and, thus, justifiably expect that the employers will do the same. Once an employer announces a specific policy or practice, especially in light of the fact that he expects employees to abide by the same, the employer may not treat its promises as illusory.

Therefore, we hold that if an employer, for whatever reason, creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, those promises are enforceable components of the employment relationship. We believe that by his or her unilateral objective manifestation of intent, the employer creates an expectation, and thus an obligation of treatment in accord with those written promises. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1981) (promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promise in understanding a commitment has been made).

(Citations omitted.) Thompson, at 229-30, 685 P.2d 1081.

Our first inquiry is whether the Thompson holdings should be...

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35 cases
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    • Washington Supreme Court
    • March 5, 1992
    ...treatment in specific circumstances, aside from strictly contractual obligations, is for the trier of fact. See Brady v. Daily World, 105 Wash.2d 770, 718 P.2d 785 (1986). As emphasized above, the central question here is what are the terms of the parties' employment relationship. Defendant......
  • Carle v. McChord Credit Union
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • April 15, 1992
    ...work; and (4) that he or she was replaced by a younger person. Grimwood, 110 Wash.2d at 362, 753 P.2d 517; Brady v. Daily World, 105 Wash.2d 770, 776, 718 P.2d 785 (1986); Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash.2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977). Because they are derived from McDonnell Douglas, these four eleme......
  • Kries v. Wa-Spok Primary Care, LLC
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • September 10, 2015
    ...and this court has already applied the bona fide occupational qualification defense in a wrongful discharge case. Brady v. Daily World, 105 Wash.2d 770, 718 P.2d 785 (1986) ; Rhodes v. URM Stores, Inc., 95 Wash.App. 794, 977 P.2d 651 (1999).¶ 74 We see no reason to distinguish between a dis......
  • Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. # 1 of Kittitas Cnty.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • September 13, 2016
    ...as part of his prima facie case that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the WLAD. Brady v. Daily World, 105 Wash.2d 770, 777, 718 P.2d 785 (1986). The employee in Brady did not challenge the replacement element.¶47 Two years thereafter, in Grimwood, our Supreme Co......
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