Brady v. Nat'l Football League
| Citation | 644 F.3d 661,190 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3441 |
| Decision Date | 08 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–1898.,11–1898. |
| Parties | Tom BRADY; Drew Brees; Vincent Jackson; Ben Leber; Logan Mankins; Peyton Manning; Von Miller; Brian Robison; Osi Umenyiora; Mike Vrabel; Carl Eller; Priest Holmes; Obafemi Ayanbadejo; Ryan Collins; Antawan Walker, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellees,v.NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; Arizona Cardinals Football Club, LLC; Atlanta Falcons Football Club, LLC; Baltimore Ravens Limited Partnership; Buffalo Bills, Inc.; Panthers Football, LLC; The Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc.; Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.; Cleveland Browns Football Company LLC; Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd; PDB Sports, Ltd., doing business as The Denver Broncos Football Club, Ltd.; The Detroit Lions, Inc.; Green Bay Packers, Inc.; Houston NFL Holdings, L.P.; Indianapolis Colts, Inc.; Jacksonville Jaguars, Ltd.; Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc.; Miami Dolphins, Ltd.; Minnesota Vikings Football, LLC; New England Patriots L.P.; New Orleans Louisiana Saints, L.L.C.; New York Football Giants, Inc.; New York Jets LLC; The Oakland Raiders, L.P.; Philadelphia Eagles, LLC; Pittsburgh Steelers LLC; The St. Louis Rams LLC; Chargers Football Company, LLC; San Francisco Forty Niners, Limited; Football Northwest LLC; Buccaneers Limited Partnership; Tennessee Football, Inc.; Pro–Football, Inc., Appellants. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Paul D. Clement, argued, Washington, DC, Gregg H. Levy, Benjamin C. Block, Washington, DC, David Boies, William A. Isaacson, Armonk, NY, Daniel J. Connolly, Aaron Daniel Van Oort, Minneapolis, MN, on the brief, for appellant.Theodore Olson, argued, Washington, DC, Andrew Tulumello, Scott P. Martin, Travis D. Lenker, John F. Bash, Washington, DC, James W. Quinn, Jeffrey L. Kessler, Bruce S. Meyer, David G. Feher, David L. Greenspan, New York, NY, Barbara P. Berens, Justi Rae Miller, Timothy R. Thornton, Minneapolis, MN, on the brief, for appellee.Shepard Goldfein, James A. Keyte, Elliot A. Silver, New York, NY, on the amicus brief filed by National Hockey League in support of Appellants.Robin S. Conrad, Shane B. Kawka, Stephen B. Kinnaird, Neal D. Mollen, Zachary D. Fasman, Washington, DC, on the amicus brief filed by The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in support of Appellants.Stephen F. Ross, University Park, PA, Daniel R. Shulman, Minneapolis, MN, on the amicus brief filed by Sports Fans Coalition in support of Appellees.Donald M. Fehr, Toronto, Canada, G. William Hunter, Michael S. Weiner, New York, NY, Steven A. Fehr, Donald R. Aubry, Kansas City, MO, on the amicus brief filed by Major League Baseball Players' Association, National Hockey League Players' Association and National Basketball Players' Association in support of Appellees.Mark T. Stancil, Donald Burke, Washington, DC, on the amicus brief filed by Elected Officials and Small Business Owners in support of Appellees.Professor Barak D. Richman, Durham, NC, on the amicus brief filed by The National Football League Coaches Association in support of Appellees.Before BYE, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from an action filed by nine professional football players and one prospective football player (“the Players”) against the National Football League and its thirty-two separately-owned clubs, more commonly known as football teams (collectively, “the NFL” or “the League”). On March 11, 2011, a collective bargaining agreement between the League and a union representing professional football players expired. The League had made known that if a new agreement was not reached before the expiration date, then it would implement a lockout of players, during which the athletes would not be paid or permitted to use club facilities. The League viewed a lockout as a legitimate tactic under the labor laws to bring economic pressure to bear on the players as part of the bargaining process. See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 301–02, 318, 85 S.Ct. 955, 13 L.Ed.2d 855 (1965).
The players, aware of the League's strategy, opted to terminate the union's status as their collective bargaining agent as of 4:00 p.m. on March 11, just before the agreement expired. Later that day, the Players filed an action in the district court alleging that the lockout planned by the League would constitute a group boycott and price-fixing agreement that would violate § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The complaint explained that “the players in the NFL have determined that it is not in their interest to remain unionized if the existence of such a union would serve to allow the NFL to impose anticompetitive restrictions with impunity.” The plaintiffs also alleged other violations of the antitrust laws and state common law.
The League proceeded with its planned lockout on March 12, 2011. The Players moved for a preliminary injunction in the district court, urging the court to enjoin the lockout as an unlawful group boycott that was causing irreparable harm to the Players. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, and the League appealed. We conclude that the injunction did not conform to the provisions of the Norris–LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., and we therefore vacate the district court's order.
Some historical background will place this case in context. In Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 451–52, 77 S.Ct. 390, 1 L.Ed.2d 456 (1957), the Supreme Court held that professional football—unlike major league baseball—is not categorically exempt from the antitrust laws. In 1968, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recognized the NFL Players Association (“NFLPA”) as the exclusive bargaining representative of all NFL players, and the NFL and the NFLPA entered into their first collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir.1976). Since then, the relationship between the League and its players has been punctuated by both collective bargaining agreements and antitrust lawsuits.
In 1972, several players filed an antitrust action against the League in Mackey v. NFL, alleging that the League's policy with respect to free agents—that is, players whose contracts with a particular team have expired—violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.1 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609. This court concluded that the restriction at issue, known as the “Rozelle Rule,” unreasonably restrained trade in violation of § 1, because it was “significantly more restrictive than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes” of maintaining competitive balance in the NFL. Id. at 622. While the Mackey litigation was pending, the CBA between the League and the NFLPA expired, and seventy-eight NFL players filed a separate class action antitrust suit against the League. See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 282 (8th Cir.1978); Alexander v. NFL, No. 4–76–123, 1977 WL 1497, at *1 (D.Minn. Aug. 1, 1977). In 1977, the League and the players entered into a settlement agreement incorporating a new CBA that implemented a revised system of free agency known as “right of first refusal/compensation.” Alexander, 1977 WL 1497, at *1–2. As part of the settlement, the League withdrew its petition for a writ of certiorari in Mackey. Reynolds, 584 F.2d at 282.
This state of affairs lasted until December 1982, when the NFL players engaged in a fifty-seven-day strike before agreeing to a new CBA that included a modified version of the “right of first refusal/compensation” system. Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1295–96 (8th Cir.1989); Powell v. NFL, 678 F.Supp. 777, 780–81 (D.Minn.1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293. This CBA expired in 1987, and when negotiations for a new CBA proved unsuccessful, the NFLPA conducted another strike. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1296. Immediately after the strike ended in October 1987, the NFLPA and several individual players commenced an antitrust suit in Powell v. NFL, alleging among other things that the League's free agency restrictions violated the Sherman Act. Id. This court held that a nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws shielded the League from antitrust liability. Id. at 1303. The Supreme Court “has implied this exemption from federal labor statutes,” reasoning that “to give effect to federal labor laws and policies and to allow meaningful collective bargaining to take place, some restraints on competition imposed through the bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions.” Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236–37, 116 S.Ct. 2116, 135 L.Ed.2d 521 (1996). This court in Powell concluded that the nonstatutory labor exemption can extend beyond an impasse in negotiations, and that application of the exemption was appropriate in that case, because the parties still could resolve their differences through the use of the “offsetting tools” of labor law, including strikes, lockouts, and petitions for intervention by the NLRB. 930 F.2d at 1302–03. The court declined, however, “to look into the future and pick a termination point for the labor exemption.” Id. at 1303.
Two days after this court's decision in Powell, on November 3, 1989, the NFLPA's executive committee decided to abandon the organization's collective bargaining rights in an effort to end the NFL's nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws. Powell v. NFL, 764 F.Supp. 1351, 1354 (D.Minn.1991). The NFLPA disclaimed its union status, enacted new bylaws prohibiting it from engaging in collective bargaining with the League, filed a labor organization termination notice with the U.S. Department of Labor, obtained a reclassification by the Internal Revenue Service as a “business league” rather than a labor organization, and notified the NFL that it would no longer represent players in grievance proceedings. Id.
In 1990, eight individual football players brought a new antitrust action against the...
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