Brady v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Citation: 255 A.2d 427,254 Md. 598
• Decision Date: 08 July 1969
• Docket Number: No. 368,368
• Parties: John F. BRADY, Jr. and Mildred C. Brady, Adm'rs of the Estate of John F. Brady, III, et al. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Page 598

254 Md. 598

255 A.2d 427

John F. BRADY, Jr. and Mildred C. Brady, Adm'rs of the Estate of John F. Brady, III, et al. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 368.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 8, 1969.

Thomas D. Noeth, Jr., Baltimore, for appellants.

Daniel O'C. Tracy, Jr., Towson (James H. Cook, Cook, Mudd & Howard and George B. Johns, Towson, on the brief), for appellees.

Before HAMMOND, C. J., and MARBURY, McWILLIAMS, FINAN, SINGLEY and SMITH, JJ.

MARBURY, Judge.

On September 12, 1966, John F. Brady, III, died as the result of injuries he sustained while riding as a passenger in an automobile operated by the appellee, Judith A. Fenner, in the State of Alabama. Thereafter, the appellants John F. Brady, Jr. and Mildred C. Brady, as administrators of the estate of John F. Brady, III, brought suit against Miss Fenner for pain and suffering, hospital and funeral expenses. They also sued in their own right as surviving parents for the loss they sustained by virtue of their son's death. Further, in an additional count they sued the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company alleging the existence of an insurance contract the terms of which entitled them to certain benefits. After State Farm filed a plea on its behalf, an order of satisfaction as to this count was entered by the appellants.

Following the taking of the deposition of the appellee, she filed a motion for summary judgment, citing the Alabama automobile guest statute. After hearing argument of counsel, the lower court (Raine, J.) granted appellee's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment for costs in her favor on November 19, 1968. From that judgment the Bradys have appealed.

The facts of this case are found in the transcript of the deposition of the appellee which was taken on October 6, 1967. On September 10, 1966, Judith Fenner left her home in Parkville, Baltimore County, Maryland, where she resided with her parents, en route to Rice University in Houston, Texas. Miss Fenner was going to begin her third year as a graduate student. She was accompanied on her trip by John F. Brady, III, whom she had been dating during the prior four and a half years and 'very frequently' during the months of July and August 1966. According to the appellee's testimony, the deceased had been concerned about her driving alone and since he was on vacation for a few days and had never taken the trip, he offered to accompany her on the trip and assist in the driving. As they proceeded south, Miss Fenner and Mr. Brady shared the driving. However, the appellee testified that she paid for the gasoline used on the trip. Although Mr. Brady paid for her meals, Miss Fenner stated that such payments were made as a matter of convenience and that they had an agreement whereby she would reimburse him for the cost of her meals. Further, she indicated that she had paid for her own lodging for the nights of September 10 and 11.

On the morning of September 12, 1966, in a 'heavy drizzle' Miss Fenner was operating a 1956 Ford tudor coupe at a speed of between sixty-five and seventy miles per hour on Interstate Route No. 59, near Attalla, Alabama. The speed limit on that highway was seventy miles per hour according to Miss Fenner. While her vehicle was crossing a four lane bridge it went into a skid, 'fish tailed', and collided with the side of the bridge. As a result of the accident, Mr. Brady apparently struck his eye on the gear shift of the automobile and following that injury he died two days later.

On appeal the Bradys present three questions:

'1. Was John F. Brady, III, deceased, a guest or a passenger in an automobile driven by the appellee, Judith A. Fenner, within the meaning of the Alabama Law?

'2. If John F. Brady, III, deceased, was a guest within the meaning of the Alabama Law, was the negligence on the part of the appellee, Judith A. Fenner, willful or wanton?

'3. Did the lower court err in granting the motion for summary judgment of the defendant as there is a genuine dispute as to the material facts in said case?'

The rule is well established that Maryland applies the lex loci delicti to cases such as the instant one, Cook v. Pryor, 251 Md. 41, 246 A.2d 271 (1968) and cases cited therein, and the parties agree that substantive Alabama law applies.

The legislature of Alabama has enacted an automobile guest law which provides as follows:

'Liable only for willful or wanton misconduct.-The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.'

Code of Alabama 1940 (Recompiled 1958), Title 36, Section 95. That section does not undertake to define the term 'guest' but that responsibility has been left to judicial construction. Harrison v. McCleary, 281 Ala. 87, 199 So.2d 165 (1967); Sullivan v. Davis, 263 Ala. 685, 83 So.2d 434, 59 A.L.R.2d 331 (1955). The most recent Alabama case setting forth the legal guide lines on this subject is Harrison v. McCleary, supra. In that case the Supreme Court of Alabama quoted from Wagnon v. Patterson, 260 Ala. 297, 70 So.2d 244 (1954):

"The general rule is that if the transportation of a rider confers a benefit only on the person to whom the ride is given, and no benefits other than such as are incidental to hospitality, good will or the like, on the person furnishing the transportation, the rider is a guest; but if his carriage tends to promote the mutual interest of both himself and driver for their common benefit, thus creating a joint business relationship between the motorist and his rider, or where the rider accompanies the driver at the instance of the latter for the purpose of having the rider render a benefit or service to the driver on a trip which is primarily for the attainment of some objective of the driver, the rider is a passenger and not a guest." 281 Ala. at 90, 199 So.2d at 167.

Applying this test, we conclude that the lower court was correct in finding, as it apparently did, that Brady was a guest in Miss Fenner's automobile and as such the appellants could recover only if they established that the appellee's conduct was wanton and willful. An examination of Miss Fenner's deposition reveals that she received no benefits other than those which are incidental to hospitality and social amenities. According to her testimony, she paid for the costs of operating the automobile, and the expense of her lodging...