Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 1884.

• Decision Date: 04 November 1963
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1884.
• Citation: 223 F. Supp. 361
• Parties: Vincent P. BRADY, Plaintiff, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware, and the International Association of Machinists, an unincorporated association, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

223 F. Supp. 361

Vincent P. BRADY, Plaintiff, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware, and the International Association of Machinists, an unincorporated association, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 1884.

United States District Court D. Delaware.

November 4, 1963.

Irving Morris and Joseph A. Rosenthal of Cohen & Morris, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff, (withdrew after trial, plaintiff now appears pro se).

Stephen E. Hamilton, Jr., of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, Del., Edward R. Neaher and Richard S. Harrell, of Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside & Wolff, New York City, of counsel, for defendant, Trans World Airlines, Inc.

H. Albert Young and Bruce M. Stargatt, of Morford, Young & Conaway, Wilmington, Del., Edward J. Hickey, Jr., and James L. Highsaw, Jr., of Mulholland, Robie & Hickey, Washington, D. C., of counsel, for defendant, International Ass'n of Machinists.

CALEB M. WRIGHT, Chief Judge.

This is an action by an employee alleging that he was discharged from his job in violation of the Railway Labor Act.¹ The complaint seeks reinstatement and damages. Plaintiff, Vincent P. Brady, was and is a resident of Delaware. Defendant, Trans World Airlines, Inc., (TWA) is a Delaware corporation. Defendant, International Association of Machinists (IAM) is an unincorporated Labor Union. There is no diversity of citizenship. Damages have been severed from liability and this opinion deals only with the latter question.

In 1951, Brady was hired by TWA and worked for the company at the Philadelphia International Airport until May of 1956, the date of the alleged wrongful discharge.² He was a member of the IAM Local Lodge 1776 during this period. At a meeting of the Local on November 2, 1955, the membership voted to increase dues for workers in Brady's classification from $3.00 to $3.25.³ Plaintiff was not present at this meeting but at the next session appeared and challenged the legality of the dues increase.⁴

In the meantime, Gerald C. Coleman was elected financial secretary of the Local Lodge and took office early in January of 1956.⁵ Upon taking office he endeavored to get all members of the Union whose dues were in arrears to pay what they owed. Coleman posted a list of delinquent members⁶ and on February 15th posted another list of all members who were in arrears two or more months. These members were given ten days to pay on pain of being cited to the District Lodge. Everyone complied with the notice except plaintiff who steadfastly refused to pay or tender dues other than at the old rate of $3.00.⁷ He maintained this position even when asked by a Lodge officer to tender at the new rate under protest. The only reason given by plaintiff in justification of nonpayment was the illegality of the increase. On March 3, 1956 Coleman cited the plaintiff and requested District General Chairman Miller to cancel the plaintiff's membership in the IAM.

Miller was away from headquarters when the citation was received and first became aware of Brady's delinquency on March 13, 1956.⁸ Miller saw Brady at the Airport in Philadelphia at this time and spoke to him about the dues.⁹ Plaintiff explained his position and Miller advised him to pay under protest and appeal through channels.¹⁰ Brady then received a letter dated March 13th advising him to get in good standing by paying his dues. The request asked for unpaid dues including those for the month of March.¹¹ On March 27th, Brady sent a check to Coleman in the amount of $10.50 for dues for December 1955, January and February 1956, but did not send the March dues as requested in the letter of March 13th.¹²

This check was returned to Brady with a letter from Coleman which stated, "this amount $10.50 is not sufficient to cover your dues and reinstatement fee."¹³ The letter then demanded payment of $34.75 by April 4th to cover the reinstatement fee and three months dues. Miller, however, upon learning of the demand, decided it was in error and wrote Brady that a $25 reinstatement fee was sufficient.¹⁴ Plaintiff then asked permission to pay dues alone but his request was refused. On May 1, 1956, Miller requested Brady's discharge under the terms of the union shop agreement with TWA. Plaintiff appealed to the System Board of Adjustment. The Board upheld his discharge.

Plaintiff filed his complaint on May 10, 1957 and the case is now in the posture for final decision. Brady contends first that his discharge, committed at the behest of the Union, was prompted by the Union's hostile discrimination against him. Such conduct would be a breach of the bargaining agent's duty of fair representation and, if proven, appropriate relief would be granted by the Court. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944); Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191 (4 Cir. 1963). Brady's second argument is that the discharge was illegal in that it did not comply with Section 2 (Eleventh) of the Railway Labor Act¹⁵ governing union shop agreements. Because the Court finds Brady has proven facts sufficient to support recovery under this latter theory, the opinion will deal with that issue only, and no facts will be found on the hostile discrimination question.

I Jurisdiction

Defendants' threshold contention is that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Brady's claim since it involves application and interpretation of Section 2 (Eleventh) of the Railway Labor Act. That provision reads in part:

"Eleventh. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, * * * any carrier or carriers * * * and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the requirements of this chapter shall be permitted —

"(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no such agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees to whom membership is not available upon the same terms and conditions as are generally applicable to any other member or with respect to employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership." 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Eleventh).

Application and interpretation of this section, it is asserted, is the sole province of the System Boards of Adjustment since particular cases arising under it may involve interpretation of union security agreements and these Boards have exclusive jurisdiction of cases "* * * growing out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of agreements * * *."¹⁶ One line of cases has adopted this reasoning. E. g. Battle v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks & Steamship Clerks, etc., 320 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir.1963). Another line, however, has held to the contrary and has not found the federal courts powerless to act in cases involving 2 (Eleventh). E. g. Cunningham v. Erie R. R. Company, 266 F.2d 411 (2 Cir. 1959).

This Court finds jurisdiction. Section 2 (Eleventh) is not a self-contained, independent statutory provision. It is a proviso, an exception to an express prohibition of the Act beginning with the words "Notwithstanding any other provisions * * *." Prior to the enactment of this section, all forms of union security were barred by the broad provisions of Section 2 (Fourth) (Fifth)¹⁷ which prohibited all employer conduct designed "* * * to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor organization * * *."¹⁸ That 2 (Eleventh) was intended by Congress to be a proviso to this prohibition is authoritatively demonstrated by the Senate Report¹⁹ accompanying it. That Report stated, "it is intended to relax the prohibitions contained in paragraphs fourth and fifth of section 2 of the Railway Labor Act against all forms of union security agreements * * *." Indeed, Congress explicitly had the Taft-Hartley Act in mind,²⁰ and the union shop provisions of that statute are merely a proviso to the basic anti-discrimination section.²¹ Only when stated loosely, therefore, can plaintiff's claim be said to rest on 2 (Eleventh). More specifically, however, his claim is that because the discharge fell outside that exempting section and is not protected by it, it violated 2 (Fourth) for it was clearly designed "to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain * * * members of a labor organization."²²

Viewing plaintiff's claim in this manner puts the jurisdictional question in a very different light, for relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, as well as common sense, indicate that 2 (Fourth) is fully enforceable by the federal courts. In Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 50 S.Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034 (1930), a district court had issued an injunction restraining the company from interfering with its employees' right to select their bargaining representative freely. The complaint alleged that defendant had coerced members of the plaintiff, the Railway Clerks, to join the Association of Clerical Employees, a company dominated union. After the injunction issued the defendant proceeded to recognize the Association as the employees exclusive bargaining representative. A contempt citation issued and the company was ordered to disestablish the company union and reinstate the Railway Clerks as the bargaining representative.

On appeal, the Supreme Court found authority for the district court action in Section 2 (Third) of the Act. At that time the latter...