Brady v. United States, No. 270

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWHITE
PartiesRobert M. BRADY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES
Decision Date04 May 1970
Docket NumberNo. 270

397 U.S. 742
90 S.Ct. 1463
25 L.Ed.2d 747
Robert M. BRADY, Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES.

No. 270.
Argued Nov. 18, 1969.
Decided May 4, 1970.

Page 743

Peter J. Adang, Albuquerque, N.M., for petitioner.

Joseph J. Connolly, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1959, petitioner was charged with kidnaping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).1 Since the indictment charged that the victim of the kidnaping was not liberated unharmed, petitioner faced a maximum penalty of death if the verdict of the jury should so recommend. Petitioner, represented by competent counsel throughout, first elected to plead not guilty. Apparently because the trial judge was unwilling to try the case without a jury, petitioner made no serious attempt to reduce the possibility of a death penalty by waiving a jury trial. Upon learning that his codefendant, who had confessed to the authorities, would plead guilty and be available to testify against him, petitioner changed his plea to guilty. His plea was accepted after the trial judge twice questioned him as to the voluntariness of his plea.2

Page 744

Petitioner was sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment, later reduced to 30.

In 1967, petitioner sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily given because § 1201(a) operated to coerce his plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible pressure upon him, and because his plea was induced by representations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemency. It was also alleged that the trial judge had not fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.3

Page 745

After a hearing, the District Court for the District of New Mexico denied relief. According to the District Court's findings, petitioner's counsel did not put impermissible pressure on petitioner to plead guilty and no representations were made with respect to a reduced sentence or clemency. The court held that § 1201(a) was constitutional and found that petitioner decided to plead guilty when he learned that his codefendant was going to plead guilty: petitioner pleaded guilty 'by reason of other matters and not by reason of the statute' or because of any acts of the trial judge. The court concluded that 'the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made.'

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, determining that the District Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and specifically approving the finding that petitioner's plea of guilty was voluntary. 404 F.2d 601 (1968). We granted certiorari, 395 U.S. 976, 89 S.Ct. 2146, 23 L.Ed.2d 764 (1969), to consider the claim that the Court of Appeals was in error in not reaching a contrary result on the authority of this Court's decision in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968). We affirm.

I

In United States v. Jackson, supra, the defendants were indicted under § 1201(a). The District Court dismissed the § 1201(a) count of the indictment, holding

Page 746

the statute unconstitutional because it permitted imposition of the death sentence only upon a jury's recommendation and thereby made the risk of death the price of a jury trial. This Court held the statute valid, except for the death penalty provision; with respect to the latter, the Court agreed with the trial court 'that the death penalty provision * * * imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right * * *.' 390 U.S., at 572, 88 S.Ct., at 1211. The problem was to determine 'whether the Constitution permits the establishment of such a death penalty, applicable only to those defendants who assert the right to contest their guilt before a jury.' 390 U.S., at 581, 88 S.Ct., at 1216. The inevitable effect of the provision was said to be to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial. Because the legitimate goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends it could be achieved without penalizing those defendants who plead not guilty and elect a jury trial, the death penalty provision 'needlessly penalize(d) the assertion of a constitutional right,' 390 U.S., at 583, 88 S.Ct., at 1217, and was therefore unconstitutional.

Since the 'inevitable effect' of the death penalty provision of § 1201(a) was said by the Court to be the needless encouragement of pleas of guilty and waivers of jury trial, Brady contends that Jackson requires the invalidation of every plea of guilty entered under that section, at least when the fear of death is shown to have been a factor in the plea. Petitioner, however, has read far too much into the Jackson opinion.

The Court made it clear in Jackson that it was not holding § 1201(a) inherently coercive of guilty pleas: 'the fact that the Federal Kidnaping Act tends to discourage defendants from insisting upon their innocence and demanding trial by jury hardly implies that

Page 747

every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the Act does so involuntarily.' 390 U.S., at 583, 88 S.Ct., at 1217. Cited in support of this statement, 390 U.S., at 583 n. 25, 88 S.Ct., at 1217, was Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F.Supp. 581 (D.C.N.J.1967), where a plea of guilty (non vult) under a similar statute was sustained as voluntary in spite of the fact, as found by the District Court, that the defendant was greatly upset by the possibility of receiving the death penalty.

Moreover, the Court in Jackson rejected a suggestion that the death penalty provision of § 1201(a) be saved by prohibiting in capital kidnaping cases all guilty pleas and jury waivers, 'however clear (the defendants') guilt and however strong their desire to acknowledge it in order to spare themselves and their families the spectacle and expense of protracted courtroom proceedings.' '(T)hat jury waivers and guilty pleas may occasionally be rejected' was no ground for automatically rejecting all guilty pleas under the statute, for such a rule 'would rob the criminal process of much of its flexibility.' 390 U.S., at 584, 88 S.Ct., at 1218.

Plainly, it seems to us, Jackson ruled neither that all pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged pleas are invalid wheth-involuntary or not. Jackson prohibits the imposition of the death penalty under § 1201(a), but that decision neither fashioned a new standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas nor mandated a new application of the test theretofore fashioned by courts and since reiterated that guilty pleas are valid if both 'voluntary' and 'intelligent.' See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711—1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).4

Page 748

That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment has long been recognized. Central to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant's admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment. He thus stands as a witness against himself and he is shielded by the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do so—hence the minimum requirement that his plea be the voluntary expression of his own choice.5 But the plea is more than an admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.6 On neither score was Brady's plea of guilty invalid.

Page 749

II

The trial judge in 1959 found the plea voluntary before accepting it; the District Court in 1968, after an evidentiary hearing, found that the plea was voluntarily made; the Court of Appeals specifically approved the finding of voluntariness. We see no reason on this record to disturb the judgment of those courts. Petitioner, advised by competent counsel, tendered his plea after his codefendant, who had already given a confession, determined to plead guilty and became available to testify against petitioner. It was this development that the District Court found to have triggered Brady's guilty plea.

The voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it. Cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1343, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558, 74 S.Ct. 716, 717, 98 L.Ed. 948 (1954). One of these circumstances was the possibility of a heavier sentence following a guilty verdict after a trial. It may be that Brady, faced with a strong case against him and recognizing that his chances for acquittal were slight, preferred to plead guilty and thus limit the penalty to life imprisonment rather than to elect a jury trial which could result in a death penalty.7 But

Page 750

even if we assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty except for the death penalty provision of § 1201(a), this assumption merely identifies the penalty provision as a 'but for' cause of his plea. That the statute caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act.

The State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty at every important step in the criminal process. For some people, their breach of a State's law is alone sufficient reason for surrendering themselves and accepting punishment. For others, apprehension and charge, both threatening acts by the Government, jar them into admitting their guilt. In still other cases, the post-indictment accumulation of evidence may convince the defendant and his counsel that a trial is not worth the agony and expense to the defendant and his family. All these...

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6671 practice notes
  • Hays v. Farwell, No. 3:04-cv-0011-RLH-VPC.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. District of Nevada
    • March 22, 2007
    ...determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within th[e] general rule [of Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)]." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). This rule encompasse......
  • United States v. Ochoa, No. 15-10354
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • July 3, 2017
    ...interpretation of existing law is not rendered faulty by later jurisprudential developments." Id. at 123 (citing Brady v. United States , 397 U.S. 742, 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) ). The court denied this challenge without "reach[ing] the question of whether he satisfied eithe......
  • Fautenberry v. Mitchell, No. 05-3568.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • January 25, 2008
    ...intelligent act[ ] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences," see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). On appeal, Fautenberry asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary for four reasons: (1) his......
  • Williams v. Chrans, No. 87 C 02084.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • July 5, 1990
    ...plea, United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1989), citing Brady v. United States, 397 742 F. Supp. 480 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), the competent advice of counsel, however strongly presented, does not constitute undue coercion or ineffective a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6668 cases
  • Hays v. Farwell, No. 3:04-cv-0011-RLH-VPC.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. District of Nevada
    • March 22, 2007
    ...determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within th[e] general rule [of Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)]." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). This rule encompasse......
  • United States v. Ochoa, No. 15-10354
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • July 3, 2017
    ...interpretation of existing law is not rendered faulty by later jurisprudential developments." Id. at 123 (citing Brady v. United States , 397 U.S. 742, 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) ). The court denied this challenge without "reach[ing] the question of whether he satisfied eithe......
  • Fautenberry v. Mitchell, No. 05-3568.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • January 25, 2008
    ...intelligent act[ ] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences," see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). On appeal, Fautenberry asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary for four reasons: (1) his......
  • Williams v. Chrans, No. 87 C 02084.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • July 5, 1990
    ...plea, United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1989), citing Brady v. United States, 397 742 F. Supp. 480 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), the competent advice of counsel, however strongly presented, does not constitute undue coercion or ineffective a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Reforming Plea Bargaining To Facilitate Ethical Discourse
    • United States
    • Criminal Justice Policy Review Nbr. 5-4, December 1991
    • December 1, 1991
    ...418 U.S. 683,at 693 (1974)), courts are required to assure that pleas of guilty are voluntarilyand intelligently made (Brady v U.S., 397 U.S. 742, at 758 (1970)). However,appellate courts do not review the substance or pressures of the process (Weatherford v Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, at 561 (19......
  • The Use of Life and Death as Tools in Plea Bargaining
    • United States
    • Criminal Justice Review Nbr. 37-1, March 2012
    • March 1, 2012
    ...step toward filling a gap in the research literature. Cases Cited Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 Declaration of ......
  • The Supreme Court of the United States, 1969-1970
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly Nbr. 23-4, December 1970
    • December 1, 1970
    ...asked that his conviction be set aside because his guilty plea had been coerced by fear of the death penalty.In Brady v. United States (397 U.S. 742; 90 S. Ct. 1463) the Court, speakingthrough Justice White (vote: 8-0), held that the guilty plea had been made vol-untarily and intelligently ......

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