Bradycamp v. Metzger
| Citation | 165 A. 387,310 Pa. 320 |
| Decision Date | 01 February 1933 |
| Docket Number | 140 |
| Parties | Bradycamp, Appellant, v. T. Warren Metzger, Mayor, et al., Members of Council of Lancaster City |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
Argued January 3, 1933
Appeal, No. 140, Jan. T., 1933, by plaintiff, from order of C.P. Lancaster Co., Trust Book 30, page 378, quashing writ of alternative mandamus, in case of Frank B. Bradycamp v. T Warren Metzger, Mayor, et al., Members of Council of Lancaster City. Affirmed.
Petition for an alternative writ of mandamus to compel reinstatement of police officer. Before ATLEE, P.J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Alternative writ quashed. Plaintiff appealed.
Error assigned, inter alia, was decree, quoting record.
The order and judgment of the court below is affirmed at appellant's cost.
Robert Ruppin, for appellant.
H Edgar Sherts, with him Wm. B. Arnold, for appellee.
Before FRAZER, C.J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW and LINN. JJ.
Plaintiff petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County for a writ of mandamus directed to the mayor and council of the City of Lancaster to compel his reinstatement as a police officer of that municipality. An alternative writ having been issued, respondents filed a motion to quash, alleging the court of common pleas is without authority in mandamus proceedings to set aside the council's findings of fact and conclusions of law, where, in a case involving the discharge of an officer, all legal requirements have been complied with. After argument the court quashed the writ, whereupon plaintiff appealed.
Lancaster is a city of the third class and the proceedings in question here are governed by the provisions of the Act of 1931, P.L. 932, section 4408. The record indicates that the requirements of the statute were fully complied with. Two charges were preferred against plaintiff, the first containing four specifications under the heading, "Conduct Unbecoming an Officer," and the second alleging physical disability. Plaintiff was given a hearing before the city council at which he was not only personally present but also was represented by counsel and had adequate opportunity to present a defense to these charges. After hearing and deliberation, council sustained the complaint as to the first charge and dismissed plaintiff from office.
Appellant now asserts the evidence presented at the hearing before council was not legally sufficient to support the charges preferred against him. This evidence was not before the lower court, nor is it set out in the printed record on this appeal. There is no indication in what respects...
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