Braffith v. People of Virgin Islands

• Decision Date: 27 April 1928
• Docket Number: No. 3812.,3812.
• Citation: Braffith v. People of Virgin Islands, 26 F.2d 646 (3rd Cir. 1928)
• Parties: BRAFFITH v. PEOPLE OF VIRGIN ISLANDS.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

26 F.2d 646 (1928)

BRAFFITH v.PEOPLE OF VIRGIN ISLANDS.

No. 3812.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

April 27, 1928.

D. Hamilton Jackson, of Christiansted, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, for appellant.

James C. Fox, of Christiansted, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, for the People.

Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

WOOLLEY, Circuit Judge.

This case calls for a construction of a penal statute of the Virgin Islands.

Braffith was charged with murder in the first degree.When arraigned, he pleaded guilty.The learned trial judge before accepting this unusual plea acquainted him with its meaning and consequences.He expressed full understanding and stated that he had nothing to say why sentence should not be imposed.The judge accepted the plea but before pronouncing sentence he appointed a Board of Medical Examiners consisting of two physicians and one layman to inquire into the prisoner's mental condition.The Board made a unanimous report that in its opinion he"is in his sane and right mind and thoroughly able to determine right from wrong.His reactions clearly indicate that his moral conceptions are sufficiently developed to allow an appreciation of his crime."The court then pronounced sentence of death.Immediately the prisoner's attorney moved for a stay of execution to allow him "a reasonable time to perfect an appeal from the sentence as provided by title V,chapter 19, section 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."The learned trial judge, after carefully considering the provisions of the Code and holding they do not give a prisoner a right of appeal after pleading guilty, denied the motion.To the order denying the motion to stay execution the prisoner, through his attorney, excepted and gave notice of an appeal.The judge allowed the exception, granted an appeal from the order and entered a stay pending its determination.The case is here on a record altogether admirable for brevity and clarity of statement and argument, raising these two questions of law:

1.Is the judge of the District Court of the Virgin Islands authorized by the Code to sign and issue a death warrant commanding the sheriff to execute a prisoner on a plea of guilty before the proceedings and the judgment are reviewed by the appellate court having jurisdiction?

2.Is the attorney for a prisoner charged with murder required by law to take an appeal from a sentence of death where the prisoner has pleaded guilty?

These questions arise from sections 3and4 of chapter 5andsections 12,13and14 of chapter 19,title 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Virgin Islands, which we quote (with their seemingly conflicting provisions italicized) as follows:

"Section 3.Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or if there be extenuating circumstances, shall suffer confinement in the penitentiary for life.Upon a plea of guilty the court shall determine the punishment.Upon a verdict of guilty the jury in the verdict shall recommend whether the punishment be death or imprisonment.

"Section 4.When judgment of death is rendered, a warrant signed by the judge * * * must be drawn and delivered to the sheriff.It must * * * appoint a day on which the judgment is to be executed, which must not be less than sixty nor more than ninety days from the time of the judgment. * * *"

"Section 12.In every case in which a sentence of death has been pronounced, it shall be the duty of the attorney for the defendant to take proper appeal of said case to such appeal court as has jurisdiction of appeals from the courts of the Virgin Islands of the United States.

"Section 13.In case the attorney for the defendant in a case where a death sentence has been pronounced fails to perfect an appeal as provided in the section next preceding, the clerk of the District Court shall notify the District Judge of that fact, and it shall then become the duty of the District Judge, within thirty days, to have prepared and certify * * * a record of the caseand the evidence submitted to the jury, and to file the same with the appellate court for review.

"Section 14.In all such cases the time for execution of the death sentence is stayed until after final action by the appellate court — after which, if the sentence of death is sustained, the same shall be executed as herein provided."

The learned trial judge in a well-reasoned opinion construed these provisions as not affording or requiring an appeal on behalf of one charged with murder and sentenced to death on a plea of guilty, holding, against the provision for an appeal "in every case," that it would be unnecessary, if not futile, to take an appeal in a case where the accused had pleaded guilty, and relying mainly on the implication of section 13, prescribing an appeal record containing "the evidence submitted to the jury," that appeals are contemplated and allowable only where on a plea of not guilty the case has been tried to a jury and a record containing evidence can be made; and, finally, relying on an interpretation of the expression in section 14 that "in all such cases" a stay shall be allowed pending appeal as applying only to "cases" where, in compliance with the section immediately preceding, a record with the trial evidence has been prepared and sent up.

For this appellate court of the United States to construe a statute of a territory, adopted by yet not incorporated into the United States (The Insular Cases, 182 U. S. 1, 222, 244, 21 S. Ct. 743, 762, 770, 45 L. Ed. 1041, 1074, 1088; 190 U. S. 197, 23 S. Ct. 787, 47 L. Ed. 1016; 195 U. S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 808, 49 L. Ed. 128, 1 Ann. Cas. 697;Soto v. United States C. C. A.273 F. 628, 633), is a matter not only of grave importance to the condemned but of some delicacy when the relation of the two governments, each sovereign in its sphere, is considered.Over the Virgin Islands, previously known as the Danish West Indies, the United States first exercised legislative dominion by what is there locally known as the Organic Act, being the Act of Congress of March3, 1917, 39 Stat. c. 171 (48 USCA §§ 1391-1398), providing that until the Congress shall otherwise provide, local laws, "in so far as compatible with the changed sovereignty," shall remain in force to be administered by local judicial tribunals with right of appeal to this court.So far as we have been informed this is the only law which the Congress has enacted with respect to those islands.Thus the United States, recognizing and in a sense creating this municipal organization (Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 21 S. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088), has left to its people full right to enact, amend and repeal laws for their own governance without hindrance by the United States except, it may be, when not "compatible with the changed sovereignty"; and so, since the Organic Act, the people of the Virgin Islands have seen proper to enact and declare as one of their laws the statute here in question.This court therefore is sensitive to its responsibility that in construing this law it should not violate any principle of public policy or impair or unsettle the prerogatives of that territorial government.

Before construing the statute in question we bring into view certain canons of construction which are peculiarly applicable to this case.25 R. C. L. 955 et seq.The first is that when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and it conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion to construe it and no justification for enforcing it otherwise than in accordance with its plain meaning.This is because courts have no legislative powers.When, however, a statute is ambiguous in terms or because of doubtful language it would seem to have two meanings, courts are called upon to construe it by finding which meaning reflects the intention of the Legislature that enacted it.36 Cyc. 1106.This is the fundamental canon of construction.But the true intention of a legislative body is sometimes not plainly told by its words.In that event the law provides further rules, as that laws should be construed so that they shall not lead to injustice, oppression, or absurd consequences.To this end courts adhere closely to the use of words in their commonly understood meaning and in immediate relation to their subject-matter.Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 41 S. Ct. 386, 65 L. Ed. 751, 15 A. L. R. 1305;Rodenbough v. United States (C. C. A.)25 F.(2d) 13.Another rule is that every part of an act should be given effect conformably with the legislative intent; therefore all its language should be considered and brought into accord.Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch, 33, 2 L. Ed. 199;United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 2 L. Ed. 304.It is never safe and rarely permissible to base a construction on a particular word or phrase and to ignore other words and phrases.

Rules of construction, however, distinguish between civil and penal statutes; the former may be construed liberally; the latter must be construed strictly.

The statute in question is a highly penal statute providing punishment by death and prescribing the offender's rights of trial and appeal.The rule has long been settled in American jurisdictions that all such statutes must be construed strictly against the state and favorably to the liberty of the citizen.8 R. C. L. 59, 60;25 R. C. L. 1081 et seq.This rule is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and upon the plain principle that the power to decide what is a crime and the power to punish are vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L. Ed. 37.Penal statutes will not be construed to include anything beyond their letter even though within their spirit; nothing can be added to them and nothing can be taken from them by inference or intendment.Hronek v. People, 134 Ill. 139, 24 N. E. 86, 8 L. R. A. 837, 23 Am. St....