Bragado v. Cherry Elec. Products Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 2-89-0079,2-89-0079
• Citation: 547 N.E.2d 643,138 Ill.Dec. 476,191 Ill.App.3d 136
• Parties: , 138 Ill.Dec. 476 Amorfina BRAGADO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHERRY ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 643

547 N.E.2d 643

191 Ill.App.3d 136, 138 Ill.Dec. 476

Amorfina BRAGADO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHERRY ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 2-89-0079.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

Nov. 17, 1989.

G. Douglas Grimes, Law Offices of G. Douglas Grimes, Waukegan, for Amorfina Bragado.

Carol L. VanHal, John P. Jacoby, Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, Chicago, for Cherry Elec. Products Corp., Scott Wetzel Services.

Barry L. Kroll, Lawrence K. Rynning, Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., Williams & Montgomery, Ltd., Chicago, for Scott Wetzel Services.

Justice DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Amorfina Bragado, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing her amended complaint for retaliatory discharge for failure to state a claim pursuant to motions brought under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-615). Plaintiff had filed a complaint alleging retaliatory discharge by defendant, Cherry Electrical Products Corporation (Cherry), her employer, and defendant Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. (Wetzel), its adjustment agent. Both defendants filed motions which argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that her remedy was available exclusively under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). Defendant Wetzel argues on appeal an additional reason that retaliatory discharge exists only against the employer and not against third parties where the third party was not the employer and did not discharge the employee. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

In her amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that she was an employee of Cherry and that on October 24, 1985, she was injured in the scope of her duties. Pursuant to the Act, Cherry, through the services of Wetzel, paid certain medical bills and temporary total disability benefits (TTD). On or about February 3, 1986, defendants stopped paying TTD benefits. Plaintiff alleged that this termination was improper as her treating physician had restricted her from performing her normal duties, although he released her for "light duty." Nevertheless, plaintiff returned to full regular duties on February 25, 1986, until March 10, 1986, when she became physically unable to continue her duties. Her doctor imposed a restriction that she not return to regular duty until at least March 31, 1986. In the meantime, Cherry did not reinstate TTD benefits, and on March 25, 1986, Cherry terminated her employment. Prior to the date of termination, plaintiff had been scheduled for a physical examination by a physician of defendants' choosing for April 4, 1986.

Plaintiff further alleged that defendants violated section 4(h) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 138.4(h)), which prohibits an employer from interfering with, restraining, or coercing an employee from her exercise of any right granted by the Act, or from discharging an employee for exercising her rights granted by the Act. She alleged that defendants violated public policy in requiring plaintiff to return to work against medical advice and in terminating her employment while she was medically restricted. She alleged that she suffered loss of TTD benefits, aggravation of her injury and pain and suffering. She prayed for monetary damages.

Plaintiff's allegations against Wetzel were substantially the same. She also stated that Wetzel was a service or adjustment company and acted on behalf of Cherry to process her claim. She alleged that Wetzel was aware that Cherry was not treating her in accordance with her doctor's orders, but that Wetzel still refused to pay her TTD benefits. She alleged that Cherry, acting in concert with Wetzel, terminated plaintiff's employment.

Defendants did not answer the complaint but instead moved to dismiss it pursuant to section 2-615 for failure to state a cause of action. The trial court granted their motions, and this appeal followed. In reviewing the order of dismissal on appeal, this court will accept as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences flowing from the complaint and must determine whether, as a matter of law, the complaint states a cause of action. (Spengler v. V & R Marathon, Inc. (1987), 162 Ill.App.3d 715, 717, 114 Ill.Dec. 632, 633, 516 N.E.2d 787, 788; see also Parton v. A.L. Randall Co. (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 856, 861, 128 Ill.Dec. 632, 636, 534 N.E.2d 1077, 1081.) Under section 2-612 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-612), no pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill.2d 124, 134, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 17, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880.

We address first defendants' contention that the complaint was improper because the Act provides the exclusive remedy, making the complaint improper to the extent it seeks recovery for TTD benefits to compensate plaintiff for her work-related injury. (Robertson v. Travelers Insurance Co. (1983), 95 Ill.2d 441, 449, 69 Ill.Dec. 954, 957, 448 N.E.2d 866, 869; Collier v. Wagner Castings Co. (1980), 81 Ill.2d 229, 241, 41 Ill.Dec. 776, 781, 408 N.E.2d 198, 203.) Plaintiff concedes that she cannot receive TTD benefits as a result of this action. In fact, we note that the record reflects that she has filed a claim before the Industrial Commission to collect these benefits. However, plaintiff has also alleged that she suffered pain, suffering and aggravation of her injury when defendants coerced her to return to work prematurely by cutting off her TTD benefits. Thus, she prayed for monetary damages. For example, the plaintiff in Kelsay v. Motorola Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353, the seminal case on this issue, was awarded monetary damages representing lost wages from the time she was terminated until the time she found a new job. Thus, the claim for monetary damages in this cause is appropriate. However, on remand, plaintiff's complaint should be stricken to the extent that she prays for TTD benefits. The Industrial Commission is determining whether she was entitled to receive those benefits. In the circuit court, plaintiff is restricted to a claim for wrongful discharge and the damages resulting from the wrongful discharge, rather than for any claim for lost benefits which are to be compensated under the Act.

Defendants' other argument is that the complaint was legally insufficient because it appears that no set of facts could be proved which would entitle plaintiff to recover. In particular, they state that plaintiff has failed to allege that her discharge was causally related to the filing of a claim under the Act and that because she was physically unable to perform her duties, defendants could justifiably discharge her.

A plaintiff states a valid claim for retaliatory discharge only if she alleges she was (1) discharged; (2) in retaliation for her activities; and (3) that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, Inc. (1988), 119 Ill.2d 526, 529, 116 Ill.Dec. 694, 696, 519 N.E.2d 909, 911.

There is no dispute that plaintiff was discharged. Defendants argue that plaintiff has not met the second element, which basically requires that a plaintiff allege a causal relationship between the employee's activities and the discharge. (Hinthorn, 119 Ill.2d at 532, 116 Ill.Dec. at 697, 519 N.E.2d at 912; Slover v. Brown (1986), 140 Ill.App.3d 618, 620, 94 Ill.Dec. 856, 858, 488 N.E.2d 1103, 1105.) However, plaintiff's complaint does spell out the course of events which led to her discharge. A fair reading of the complaint informs defendants that her discharge was triggered when she refused to work when she was disabled and made claims for TTD benefits under the Act and that defendants coerced her to forego her rights and return to work by terminating benefits before she was rehabilitated. (Hinthorn, 119 Ill.2d at 532, 116 Ill.Dec. at 697, 519 N.E.2d at 912.) The complaint also alleges that the discharge violated public policy. Hinthorn also makes it clear that retaliatory discharge can be alleged not only after the employee files a benefits claim, but after she asserts other rights such as seeking medical attention. (119 Ill.2d at 534, 116 Ill.Dec. at 698, 519 N.E.2d at 913.) The plaintiff has alleged that the defendants were well aware that she was asserting her rights under the Act. Thus, her complaint differs from that in Burgess v. Chicago Sun-Times (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 181, 185, 87 Ill.Dec. 292, 295, 476 N.E.2d 1284, 1287 (no allegation that defendant was informed, or in any way found out, that plaintiff was pursuing any remedy under the Act), or Thomas v. Zamberletti (1985), 134 Ill.App.3d 387, 390, 89 Ill.Dec. 387, 389, 480 N.E.2d 869, 871 (no allegation that defendant knew of the reason for plaintiff's failure to report to work). Moreover, plaintiff has alleged a prima facie case by alleging a short time span between the assertion of her rights and her employer's adverse action. Hugo v. Tomaszewski (1987), 155 Ill.App.3d 906, 910, 108 Ill.Dec. 562, 564, 508 N.E.2d 1139, 1141.

Defendants also argued in their motion to dismiss that Cherry was justified in discharging plaintiff because she was unable to do the work. They take her allegation that she did not return to work because she was physically unable to perform her duties as an admission in support of their claim that Cherry discharged her for the reason that she was unable to perform her duties. They assert that this reason was not a pretextual basis for her discharge and thus the termination of her employment was justified. (See ...