Bragg v. Marshall Cnty.
| Decision Date | 22 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:12-cv-00080,1:12-cv-00080 |
| Parties | SAMUEL LEE BRAGG, Plaintiff, v. MARSHALL COUNTY, TN, a county government body operating under the laws of the State of Tennessee; NORMAN DALTON, Individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Marshall County, TN; JOE MOSS, Individually and in his official capacity as a Civil Service Board member; LEON FINLEY, Individually and in his official capacity as a Civil Service Board member; JOHNNY GUFFEE, Individually and in his official capacity as a Civil Service Board member, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, Samuel Lee Bragg, originally filed this action in the Circuit Court of Marshall County, Tennessee, against the Defendants: Marshall County, Tennessee; Norman Dalton, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Marshall County; Joe Moss, Leon Finley, and Johnny Guffee, individually and in their official capacities as members of the Marshall County Civil Service Board ("the Board"). Plaintiff asserts claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments for Defendants' alleged denial of his right to address his grievances and provide information in his defense to local government officials and state law claims for negligence and negligence per se. Defendant removed this action to this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1331, the federal question statute, without objection.
Before the Court is Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket Entry No. 11), contending, in sum: (1) that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, common-law immunity, and statutory immunity; (2) that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim; (3) that Plaintiff has not alleged that Marshall County had a custom or policy that directly caused his alleged injuries; (4) that Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts on his First Amendment claims that these claims involve a matter of public concern; (5) that Plaintiff received due process when although not required by law, the Board heard Plaintiff's appeal; and (6) that Plaintiff's failure to receive a different promotion is not protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In response (Docket Entry No. 20), Plaintiff contends that he has sufficiently pled claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law on negligence claims and that Defendants are not immune from this action.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted because Plaintiff's complaint do not satisfy the requirements of applicable federal law. In addition, without a viable federal law claims, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims.
Plaintiff, a former deputy with the Marshall County, Tennessee Sheriff's Department, alleges that Defendants changed his and other employees' employment statuses in violation of the County Sheriff's Civil Service Law of 1974, Tenn. Code Ann. 8-8-401 et seq. (Docket Entry No. 1, Attachment thereto, Complaint, at ¶¶ 3, 5) Id. On February 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") for age discriminationfor denial of the promotion given to another employee of the Sheriff's office (Docket Entry No. 11, Attachment thereto, Exhibit 2, EEOC Complaint). Plaintiff's EEOC charge alleges, in part:
On June 1, 2011, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the Marshall County Civil Service Board and requested a hearing. (Docket Entry No. 1-1 at ¶ 7). Plaintiff also requested the names and contact information of the witnesses whom Marshall County intended to call at the hearing. Plaintiff also requested information on the procedure to subpoena his witnesses, as well as "any tangible documents, written statements, documents, tapes or statements," and various employee records under the Tennessee Open Records Act." Id. Plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining these materials. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants scheduled the hearing for June 23, 2011, aware that Plaintiff had a conflicting doctor's appointment and would be unable to attend. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges this setting denied him the opportunity to address his grievances in the forum provided by state law. Id. After filing his EEOC complaint and requesting a hearing with the Marshall County Civil Service Board, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Dalton subjected Plaintiff to "an atmosphere of harassment, intimidation and mental abuse." Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff was terminated on September 19, 2011. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants owed Plaintiff "a duty of care" to be trained properly on compliance with the "Civil Service laws adopted by Marshall County Tennessee." Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. According to Plaintiff, Defendants breached that duty and "were negligent in that they knew or should have known that their failure to properly train themselves and comply with state law of the Civil Service Laws [under Term. Code Ann. § 8-8-409]." Id. at 7. Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants "were negligent per se because they failed to exercise due care and their duty under the circumstances to prevent injury," and "Defendants acted individually and under color of law to restrain his right of free speech and to peacefully address his grievances to local government officials guaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendment." Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff also contends that "Defendants denied Plaintiff the right to speak to local officials and address his concerns and provide information in his defense before legal action was taken." Id. at 8. Plaintiff also asserts that he was denied "Due Process of Law since he was denied the opportunity to address his grievances to his local elected officials." Id.
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) after the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is analyzed under the same legal standards as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718, 728 (6th Cir. 2012); Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 437 n.5 (6th Cir. 2007). When one party moves for judgment on the pleadings, '"all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.'" Id. . "A motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(c) is appropriately granted 'when no material issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacv Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Upon a motion to dismiss, "a civil complaint only survives a motion to dismiss if it 'contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (citation omitted). The Court must '"construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'" In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). However, the Court '"need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences . . . and conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.'" Id. at 903 (citations and quotation marks omitted); HDC. LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 611 () (citations omitted)).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court explained the requirements for sustaining a motion to dismiss under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6):
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