Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1967
• Docket Number: No. 10750,10750
• Citation: 102 R.I. 8,227 A.2d 582
• Parties: Harry P. BRAGG v. WARWICK SHOPPERS WORLD, INC. Ex.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 582

227 A.2d 582

102 R.I. 8

Harry P. BRAGG v. WARWICK SHOPPERS WORLD, INC.

Ex. No. 10750.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 20, 1967.

Abedon, Michaelson, Stanzler & Biener, Richard A. Skolnik, Richard S. Mittleman, Providence, for plaintiff

Martin M. Zucker, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

JOSLIN, Justice.

This action of trespass on the case was brought by a business invitee to recover for personal injuries resulting from the alleged negligence of the owner and occupier of a large self-service mill outlet type of department store. It is here on the plaintiff's exception to a ruling of a justice of the superior court sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the fourth amended declaration.

The trial justice ruled in substance that the declaration was insufficient in law because its allegations were conclusionary rather than factual, and vague rather than certain. If we were required to apply the same standards which were controlling when the case was before him, we would undoubtedly affirm. His ruling, however, antedated the January 10, 1966 adoption by the superior court of a modern simplified set of rules of civil procedure. Those rules were designed 'to liberalize and facilitate the practice in this jurisdiction.' Industrial National Bank of Providence v. Colt, R.I., 224 A.2d 900.

In keeping with the spirit which led to their adoption, this court, in cases argued since January 10, 1966, has, where feasible and where no injustice would result, applied the new rules even in situations where our review has been of rulings made prior to their effective date. Milliken v. Milliken, R.I., 225 A.2d 661; Legare v. Urso, R.I., 216 A.2d 506. We follow that policy in this case and we consider the declaration as if it were a complaint. Stripped of its common-law formalisms it makes the following recitals. The plaintiff alleges that he was invited along with other members of the general public to come upon defendant's premises in the expectation that he would inspect and, hopefully, purchase of the goods, wares and merchandise there offered for sale. his injury occurred, he states, when he was struck by a fishing pole which protruded from a merchandise cart which defendant provided to facilitate the transportation of purchases from the display counters to the check-out exits, and he also avers that defendant either knew or should in the exercise of due care have known that the cart with the pole protruding was being pushed on and along a narrow aisle by a child of tender years. Finally, he alleges that defendant did not properly supervise either the loading or the use of the merchandise carts which it provided. Additionally, of course, the declaration contains the customary allegations relevant to jurisdiction, the relief requested, plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence and the nature and extent of his injuries.

In testing whether a complaint containing such allegations can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we treat the demurrer as if it were such a motion, and we apply the guides established in the federal courts for the construction of their rules upon which ours have been modeled. Industrial National Bank v. Colt, supra. See also George A. Fuller Co. v. Schacke, 71 R.I. 322, 45 A.2d 175, and Gemma v. Rotondo, 62 R.I. 293, 5 A.2d 297, 122 A.L.R. 223.

Those guides differ substantially from common-law standards. No longer do pleadings play as important a role in litigation as they formerly did. Today's goal is the attainment of substantial justice, rather than the exact formulation of issues. Instead of demanding that a declaration be replete with factual assertions and be attentive to formalisms, the new rules require only "a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. * * * (They) reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.' Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80. Consonant with the fair-notice concept, no complaint will be deemed insufficient unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove his right to relief, Conley v. Gibson, supra, that is to say, unless it appears to a certainty that he will not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which might be proved in support of his claim. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988; Leimer v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co., 8 Cir., 108 F.2d 302; Erk v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 4 Cir., 116 F.2d 865.

In determining whether there is such a doubt or lack of certainty as will justify a termination of litigation at this stage of the pleadings, we follow the federal rule as stated by the present Chief Justice when he sat as a federal district judge before coming to the bench in this state, and we construe the complaint 'in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with all doubts resolved in his favor and the allegations accepted as true.' Garcia v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., D.C., 97 F.Supp. 5, 8. See also Schram v. Lucking, D.C., 31 F.Supp. 749, and Gray v. Schoonmaker, D.C., 30 F.Supp. 1019. In addition, vagueness, lack of...