Braggs v. Dunn, CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

• Decision Date: 11 February 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)
• Citation: 367 F.Supp.3d 1340
• Parties: Edward BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jefferson S. DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

367 F.Supp.3d 1340

Edward BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Jefferson S. DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed February 11, 2019

Andrew Philip Walsh, Patricia Clotfelter, William Glassell Somerville, III, Lisa Wright Borden, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Anil Ashok Mujumdar, Diandra S. Debrosse Zimmermann, Gregory Martin Zarzaur, Denise Wiginton, Zarzaur Mujumdar & Debrosse, Birmingham, AL, Jack Richard Cohen, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Maria Viette Morris, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Caitlin J. Sandley, Grace Graham, David Clay Washington, Jonathan Michael Barry-Blocker, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, William Van Der Pol, Jr., Glenn Nelson Baxter, Andrea Jane Mixson, Ashley Nicole Austin, Barbara Ann Lawrence, Lonnie Jason Williams, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Anne Adams Hill, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Gary Lee Willford, Jr., Stephanie Lynn Dodd Smithee, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Department of Corrections, David Randall Boyd, John W. Naramore, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Montgomery, AL, Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr., Mitesh Bansilal Shah, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, Matthew Reeves, William Richard Lunsford, Alyson Lee Smith, Melissa K. Marler, Melissa Neri, Pro Hac Vice, Stephen Clarence Rogers, Maynard, Cooper & Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants.

PHASE 2A SUPPLEMENTAL LIABILITY OPINION AND ORDER ON PERIODIC MENTAL-HEALTH EVALUATIONS OF PRISONERS IN SEGREGATION

Myron H. Thompson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On June 27, 2017, the court issued a liability opinion in which it found that the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC)'s provision of mental-health care to prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. That opinion noted "substantial evidence ... that ADOC is not conducting adequate periodic mental-health assessments of prisoners in segregation." Braggs v. Dunn , 257 F.Supp.3d 1171, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (Thompson, J.). The court, "out of an abundance of caution and exercising its discretion," reserved its judgment and left the Eighth Amendment finding open as to this discrete issue in order to "solicit more input from the parties."¹ Id. After further briefing and oral argument, the court now finds, based on a full reexamination of the record from the liability trial, that ADOC has not been conducting adequate periodic mental-health evaluations of prisoners in segregation, and that this failure has contributed to the ADOC defendants' violation of the Eighth Amendment discussed in the main liability opinion as to prisoners with serious mental-health needs in segregation.² See id.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

In its June 2017 opinion, the court discussed the applicable Eighth Amendment law at great length, both in the legal standard section and within the findings and facts and conclusions of law. In the interest of brevity, the court refers the reader to that earlier opinion.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Before turning to the evidence in the record that goes directly to the narrow issue presented, the court pauses to summarize those findings of fact and conclusions of law from the liability opinion that are most relevant to the decision today. However, this opinion is intended to be read in the context of the earlier liability opinion.

A. Serious Mental-Health Needs

To prove an Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate mental-health care, plaintiffs must show that they have serious mental-health care needs. A serious need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Farrow v. West , 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). As this court previously found, "It is clear that a number of prisoners in ADOC's custody have serious mental-health needs, and the issue is undisputed." Braggs , 257 F.Supp.3d at 1190. Because ADOC's contractor for mental-health care places on the mental-health caseload only those prisoners who have been diagnosed with a condition that requires treatment, all prisoners on the caseload meet the legal requirement for having a serious mental-health need. See Farrow , 320 F.3d at 1243.³

The court found that ADOC systemically "fails to identify and classify appropriately those with mental illnesses," and that the effects of this under-identification "cascade[ ] through the system." Braggs , 257 F.Supp.3d at 1201. ADOC's under-identification of prisoners results in an artificial, abnormally low number of ADOC prisoners on the mental-health caseload. Id. at 1201. Accordingly, the total number of prisoners with serious mental-health needs in ADOC's custody includes both all individuals on the caseload and those additional individuals with serious mental-health needs who ADOC has failed to identify.

B. Serious Harm and Substantial Risks of Serious Harm Posed by Inadequate Periodic Mental-Health Evaluations in Segregation

In addition to showing a serious mental-health need, plaintiffs must establish that they have been subjected to either serious harm, or a substantial risk of serious harm--the second part of the ‘objective’ test under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence--as a result of inadequate mental-health care. Put another way, plaintiffs must show that their serious mental-health need, "if left unattended, ‘poses a substantial risk of serious harm.’ " Farrow , 320 F.3d at 1243 n.13 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ).

Defendants may be held liable for "incarcerating prisoners under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Plaintiffs may bring an Eighth Amendment challenge to a condition to prevent serious harm which is substantially likely to occur in the future--a substantial risk of serious harm. That is, a showing of either actual serious harm or a substantial risk of serious harm is sufficient to sustain the harm requirement. See Helling v. McKinney , 509 U.S. 25, 33-34, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) ("a remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event," because "the Eighth Amendment protects against future harms to inmates," even when the harm "might not affect all of those exposed" to the risk and even when the harm would not manifest itself immediately). In other words, plaintiffs must show "that they have been subjected to the harmful policies and practices at issue, not (necessarily) that they have already been harmed by these policies and practices." Dunn v. Dunn , 219 F.Supp.3d 1100, 1123 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (Thompson, J.).

Moreover, multiple policies or practices that combine to deprive a prisoner of a "single, identifiable human need," such as mental-health care, can support a finding of Eighth Amendment liability. Gates v. Cook , 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004) ; see also Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty. , 774 F.2d 1567, 1575–76 (11th Cir. 1985) (recognizing ‘totality of conditions’ approach in prison-conditions cases).

For the following reasons, the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendants are conducting inadequate periodic mental-health evaluations of prisoners in segregation, and that this inadequacy subjects prisoners with serious mental-health needs to a substantial risk of serious harm.

1. Psychological Harms of Segregation

In order to understand the harm of failing to provide adequate evaluations of the mental health of prisoners in segregation, it is necessary to understand the substantial risk of psychological harm and decompensation posed by extended placement in segregation. Therefore, the court now summarizes its previous findings on the harms posed by segregation.

As mental-health and correctional professionals have recognized, and as this court previously observed, long-term isolation resulting from segregation or solitary confinement has crippling consequences for mental health. Dr. Hunter, the medical director for ADOC's mental-health contractor, testified that it is "generally recognized" in the profession, including within ADOC, that "prolonged segregation is deleterious to one's psyche and one's mental health function." Hunter Trial Tr. Vol. II at 77:24-78:2. The psychological harm from segregation can lead to symptoms including hallucinations, chest pain, palpitations, anxiety attacks, and self-harm. See Burns Trial Tr. Vol. I at 209; see also Palakovic v. Wetzel , 854 F.3d 209, 225-26 (3d. Cir. 2017) (summarizing the "robust body of legal and scientific authority recognizing the devastating mental health consequences caused by long-term isolation in solitary confinement," including "anxiety, panic, paranoia, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder

, psychosis, and even a disintegration of the basic sense of self-identity," as well as physical harm). "The potentially devastating effects of these conditions are reflected in the characteristically high numbers of suicide deaths, and incidents of self-harm and self-mutilation that occur in many of these units." Joint Ex. 459, Haney Expert Report (doc. no. 1038-1043) at 130-31. Moreover, the harmful effects of segregation--even apart from suicide--"can be irreversible," and "can persist beyond the time that prisoners are housed in isolation and lead to long-term disability and dysfunction." Id. ; see also

Davis v. Ayala , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2210, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (summarizing case law and historical texts that "understood[ ] and questioned" the "human toll wrought by extended terms of isolation" and observing that "research still confirms what this Court suggested over a century ago: Years on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.").

As experts from both sides...