Braithwaite v. The Timken Co.

Decision Date12 June 2001
Docket NumberNo. 99-3188,99-3188
Citation258 F.3d 488
Parties(6th Cir. 2001) Harold F. Braithwaite, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The Timken Company, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Allen G. Carter, Sr., Canton, Ohio, for Appellant.

J. Sean Keenan, Robert J. McBride, DAY, KETTERER, RALEY, WRIGHT & RYBOLT, LTD., Canton, Ohio, for Appellees.

Before: JONES, SUHRHEINRICH, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.

On September 4, 1997, plaintiff-appellant, Harold F. Braithwaite ("plaintiff" or "Braithwaite"), filed a complaint against his employer, The Timken Company ("Timken"), and several of its employees. Braithwaite alleged that defendants, by their actions which resulted in the termination of his employment, violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(a), and 1988. Braithwaite also alleged that some of his fellow employees defamed him. On January15, 1999, United States Magistrate Judge James Thomas granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of the plaintiff's claims. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the Magistrate Judge's decision.

I. FACTS

In January 1989, Timken hired Harold Braithwaite, an African-American male, to work in the Company's Gambrinus Roller Plant as a cell processor. As a cell processor, Braithwaite was responsible for grinding rollers, which are component parts of the company's principal product, roller bearings.

At the time when Braithwaite was hired, he was given a Company Hourly Associate Handbook. At a later date, he received an updated handbook as well. One section of the handbook is devoted to workplace rules. The rules are organized in three separate categories, which reflect the importance of the rule. Category I contains the most serious violations including striking or manhandling another person (Rule 8), and theft or destruction of company property (Rules 10, 11). According to the handbook, employees who violate Category I rules will be discharged without warning. In comparison, Category II describes less serious violations such as threatening or coercing another person (Rule 16) and sleeping on company time (Rule 17). Accordingly, violators of Category II rules are subjected to discipline ranging from time off to discharge depending on the nature of the act.

On November 8, 1995, plaintiff was working the afternoon shift on a production line in Cell B. According to Braithwaite, the afternoon shift typically runs from 3:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m., however, on that day, his co-worker, Roy Dowdell, left the line early and stopped the production flow of the roller bearings at approximately 10:00 p.m. Braithwaite told Dowdell that he and his other co-workers did not want to end the shift early because they were concerned that if they did, they would not receive a wage incentive because of lack of production. Braithwaite informed Dowdell that he was going to report to management that he left the production line early.

Plaintiff claims that Dowdell became very angry and repeatedly shouted in a loud voice, "you are not going to management with this." According to Braithwaite, Dowdell moved towards him and threatened to strike him. Braithwaite acknowledges that he told Dowdell that "after work, your butt is mine," and alleges that Dowdell replied "we can take care of it right here." J.A. at 421. However, he maintains that no physical fighting took place that evening and that he had no intention of engaging in a fight with Dowdell at the close of their shift. Id.

In contrast, Dowdell and some other employees offer a very different version of the confrontation. Dowdell contends that when Braithwaite accused him of shutting down the line, he approached him to explain that he had not shut down the line. In response, Braithwaite threatened him several times saying "after work, your butt is mine," and "I'm going to kick your fucking ass." According to Dowdell and others, Braithwaite shoved Dowdell several times during the argument, before other workers stepped in and separated them. J.A. at 111-113, 137, 141, 193, 446.

After this incident, Dowdell went to see his supervisor, Steve Tornero, to explain what had happened on the line in Cell B. Shortly thereafter, Braithwaite arrived at the supervisor's office and the two began arguing again. When another supervisor, Lester Knight, ordered Braithwaite to quiet down, Braithwaite allegedly pointed at Dowdell and said, "you've had it at 11:00 p.m." J.A. at 179, 190. Braithwaite then left the office. Because of Braithwaite's threats, Dowdell requested and was permitted to work the first four hours of the next shift in order to avoid a further confrontation with Braithwaite. Later that night, Tornero saw Dowdell and asked him if everything was okay. At that point, Dowdell told his supervisor that Braithwaite had shoved him while they were arguing on the plant floor.

The next day, November 9, 1995, Tonero reported the incident to his supervisor Randy Toney. Toney instructed Tonero to obtain witness statements from employees who worked in Department 74 as to what took place the previous evening. Tonero asked employees to provide written statements concerning what happened between the plaintiff and Mr. Dowdell. Tonero received statements from Braithwaite, Dowdell and three other hourly associates, Dave Keenan, Jeremy McCartney, and Lamar Talley.

Braithwaite's statement focused on the shutting down of Cell B, but made no mention of the incident between himself and Dowdell. J.A. at 90-91. In contrast, Dowdell's statement outlined the argument between himself and Braithwaite in detail and alleged that Braithwaite had shoved him a number of times. J.A. at 111-114. Dowdell's statement was supported by both Keenan and McCartney who stated that Braithwaite shoved Dowdell several times during the argument. J.A. at 137, 141. Lamar Talley's statement confirmed that Braithwaite and Dowdell had exchanged words, but did not mention any pushing or shoving. 1 Supervisors Tonero and Knight stated that they did not see the incident, but that they heard Braithwaite threaten Dowdell in the supervisor's office after the incident. J.A. at 189-190.

Tornero passed the information that he had collected to Toney. Superintendent of Labor Relations, Debra J. Rankine, reviewed the information. Shortly thereafter, Department 74 Operations Management determined, with approval of the Industrial Relations Department, that Braithwaite had violated Rule 8 (striking another person) and Rule 16 (threatening another person) of the Company's Rules of Conduct and that he should be discharged. On November 10, 1995, Supervisor Tonero met with Braithwaite and a union steward. Braithwaite was informed that his employment was being terminated immediately for violation of Rule 8 and Rule 16.

As a member of the United Steel Worker's Union, Braithwaite filed a grievance and utilized the entire grievance procedure, which concluded with a binding arbitration on February 16, 1996. In a day long arbitration hearing, Timken presented four witnesses and the union presented two witnesses including Braithwaite. The Arbitrator found that:

Although the grievant testified that on the November 8 date he was not involved in pushing, shoving or "anything of that nature," the evidence presented by the Company indicates otherwise. Testimony of the Company's supervisory personnel indicates that the investigation conducted by the Company was in no way different than any other investigation that they may have conducted as a result of receiving allegations of a similar nature.

J.A. at 100-101.

In September 1997, Braithwaite filed suit in federal court alleging that he was terminated from his employment on account of his race, that he was treated differently than white employees, and that he was defamed by defendants. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that Timken and its supervisory and management employees, Steven B. Tornero, Randy Toney, Lester Knight, and Debra J. Rankine violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(a) and 1988. Plaintiff also alleged that hourly employees Roy Dowdell, Jeremy McCartney, and Dave Keenan conspired against him and defamed him in his name and reputation. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties consented to have their case handled by a United States Magistrate Judge.

On January 14, 1999, Magistrate Judge Thomas granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Magistrate found that the plaintiff did not offer sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that the defendants fired him on account of his race in violation of the Civil Rights Acts. In addition, he also held that plaintiff's defamation claim was collaterally barred by the arbitrator's finding that the plaintiff had in fact manhandled Mr. Dowdell. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the dismissal of his Civil Right claims.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court exercises de novo review over the Magistrate Judge's grant of summary judgment. See Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., Inc., 96 F.3d 174, 178 (6th Cir. 1996). When reviewing the record, all inferences shall be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Woythal v. Tex-Tenn Corp., 112 F.3d 243, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1997). However, an opponent of a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Miller v. Lorain County Bd. of Elections, 141 F.3d 252, 256 (6th Cir. 1998). "If after reviewing the record as a whole a rational factfinder could not find...

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