Bram v. United States, 340
Decision Date | 13 December 1897 |
Docket Number | No. 340,340 |
Citation | 42 L.Ed. 568,168 U.S. 532,18 S.Ct. 183 |
Parties | BRAM v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
[Syllabus from pages 532-534 intentionally omitted] Asa P. French and James E. Cotter, for plaintiff in error.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Boyd, for the United States.
This writ of error is prosecuted to a verdict and sentence thereon, by which the plaintiff was found guilty of murder, and condemned to suffer death. The homicide was committed on board the American ship Herbert Fuller, While on the high seas, bound from Boston to a port in South America. The accused was the first officer of the ship, and the deceased, of whose murder he was convicted, was the master of the vessel. The bill of exceptions, after stating the sailing of the vessel from Boston on the 2d of July, 1896, with a cargo of lumber, gives a general summary of the facts leading up to and surrounding the homicide, as follows:
'She had on board a captain, Charles I. Nash; Bram, the defendant; a second mate, August W. Blomberg; a steward; and six seamen; also the captain's wife, Laura A. Nash, and one passenger, Lester H. Monks.
'The whole crew was called at or about daylight, and were informed of the deaths.
'At first, after the discovery of the murders, Bram, on whom had devolved the command of the ship, made Brown chief mate and Loheac second mate.
'No blood or spots of blood were ever discovered on the person or the clothing of any person on board, nor did anything direct suspicion to any one.
The bill of exceptions further states that, when the ship arrived at Halifax, the accused and Brown were held in custody by the chief of police at that place, and that, while in such custody, the accused was taken from prison to the office of a detective, and there questioned, under circumstances to be hereafter stated. Subsequently to this occurrence at Halifax, all the officers, the crew, and the passenger were examined before the American consul, and gave their statements, which were reduced to writing and sworn to. They were thereafter, at the request of the American consul, sent to Boston, where the accused was indicted for the murder of Nash, the captain, of Mrs. Nash, and the second mate, Blomberg. The trial and the conviction now under review related to the first of these charges. The errors which are here assigned as grounds for reversal are more han 60 in number, and are classified by the counsel for the accused as follows: (a) Questions raised preliminary to the trial; (b) questions raised during the trial; (c) questions raised in connection with two motions for a new trial.
We first examine the error relied on which seems to us deserving of the most serious consideration. During the trial, a detective, by whom the accused was questioned while at Halifax, was placed upon the stand as a witness for the prosecution, for the purpose of testifying to the conversation had between himself and the accused at Halifax, at the time and place already stated. What took place between the accused and the detective at the time of the conversation, and what occurred when the witness was tendered in order to prove the confession, is thus stated in the bill of exceptions:
'Nicholas Power, of Halifax, called by the government, testified that he was connected with the police department of Halifax, and had been for thirty-two years, and for the last fifteen years of that time as a detective officer; that after the arrival of the Herbert Fuller at Halifax, in consequence of a conversation with Charles Brown, he made an examination of Bram, the defendant, in the witness' office, in the city hall at Halifax, when no one was present besides Bram and the witness. The witness testified that no threats were made in any way to Bram, nor any inducements held out to him.
'The witness was then asked: 'What did you say to him and he to you?'
'To this the defendant's counsel objected. The defendant's counsel was permitted to cross-examine the witness before the court ruled upon the objection, and the witness stated that the conversation took place in his office, where he had caused the defendant, Bram, to be brought by a police officer; that up to that time the defendant had been in the custody of the police authorities of Halifax, in the custody of the superintendent of police, John O'Sullivan; that the witness asked that the defendant should be brought to his office for the purpose of interviewing him; that at his office he stripped the defendant, and examined his clothing, but not his pockets; that he told the defendant to submit to an examination, and that he searched him; that the defendant was then in custody, and did everything the witness directed him to do; that the witness was then a police officer, acting in his official capacity; that all this took place before the defendant had been examined before the United States consul; and that the witness did not know that the local authorities had at that time taken any action, but that the defendant was held for the United States,—for the consul general of the United States.
'The witness answered questions by the court as follows:
'The defendant then renewed his objection to the question what...
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