Bramley v. State

• Decision Date: 11 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 20S00-8805-CR-458,20S00-8805-CR-458
• Citation: 543 N.E.2d 629
• Parties: William E. BRAMLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 629

543 N.E.2d 629

William E. BRAMLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 20S00-8805-CR-458.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Sept. 11, 1989.

Douglas D. Seely, Jr., Mishawaka, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Mary Dreyer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Following a jury trial in the Elkhart County Court, Defendant-Appellant William E. Bramley was convicted of the crime of Theft, a Class D felony, and was also found to be an habitual criminal offender. He received a term of four (4) years for the theft conviction, enhanced by thirty (30) years for the habitual offender finding, for a total of thirty-four (34) years, in addition to 360 days for contempt citations.

Bramley was apprehended for theft of a billfold from a Sears store on May 31, 1985, approximately three weeks after he had been paroled from the Indiana Department of Corrections Westville Correctional Center. He had been under the care and supervision of the Department of Corrections for five (5) years previous to his release pursuant to a conviction for robbery with a deadly weapon on May 9, 1980, for which he received a ten (10) year term. On November 13, 1980, he was charged in Elkhart County with robbery with a deadly weapon, found guilty of a lesser included offense of Theft, a Class D felony, and sentenced to a term of two (2) years, said sentence to run concurrently with the ten (10) year term in South Bend.

The only issue presented in this direct appeal is that of Bramley's competency to stand trial.

The trial court was faced with an extremely difficult situation in this cause. Bramley was totally uncooperative and disruptive, refusing to cooperate with anyone and refusing to follow any orderly procedure in the progress of the trial. He continually made demands on the court at the same time accusing the court and all others involved of being prejudiced against him and demanding that he be transferred to the federal system or have a federal officer present in court at all times. He refused representation by any attorney, claiming he was capable of representing himself. After advising Bramley of the hazards of self-representation, the trial court granted his wish but appointed a public defender as standby counsel. Bramley refused to cooperate with standby counsel and refused to remain in court, demanding to be sent back to the county jail in Goshen during the trial. The trial court granted his request, bringing him back to court from time to time including, but not limited to, the presentation of his defense and sentencing. He was so disruptive the court found him in contempt on four separate occasions.

On January 9, 1986, the prosecuting attorney filed a written motion to determine Bramley's competency to stand trial and the trial court appointed two physicians to examine him. The competency hearing was held on March 3 and 10, 1986, approximately one month before Bramley's jury trial began on April 3, 1986.

Dr. Gerald Kauffman testified he was board certified in both psychiatry and neurology. At the time of the hearing, he was a staff psychiatrist at the Oaklawn Mental Health Center in Elkhart, Indiana. Dr. Kauffman testified that Bramley sufficiently understood the nature of the charges against him and what was required of him to the extent that he was competent to stand trial in that regard. However, Dr. Kauffman doubted that Bramley could assist or cooperate with his attorney or that he could competently represent himself. He felt it was possible Bramley could be controlled with medication and psychiatric treatment to the point that he could represent himself logically, consistently and coherently, or have someone else represent him.

Dr. Carl Rutt was the medical director of the Oaklawn Center since 1982. He testified Bramley was competent to stand trial. He stated Bramley was capable of fully understanding the charges against him and what was required of him in the trial of the cause and was able to assist an attorney in his defense. He believed Bramley's conduct was part of a deliberate pattern; that is, Bramley determined he could come out ahead in the long run if he acted in this fashion. Rutt stated: "Now, I'm not suggesting he is mentally healthy, I'm not suggesting that he is acting fully in his best interest. But I believe there is a substantial thread of purposeful and voluntary behavior behind this." He felt Bramley was able to understand and respond when he wanted to but made a judgment that he would not do so because it disrupted the process against him. This was demonstrated by the fact that he would demand to represent himself and then demand to be removed from the courtroom, feeling that, therefore, the process could not continue without him and that he had frustrated it entirely.

Dr. Rutt was in the court for a period of about forty-five minutes prior to his testimony and observed Bramley's conduct for that period of time which culminated in a demand to be removed from the courtroom and taken back to the county jail. The trial judge asked Dr. Rutt if this observation caused him to change his opinion, included in his written report following his examination of Bramley, which was consistent with his testimony. Dr. Rutt testified he did not change his opinion, that it was still his conclusion that Bramley was purposefully, willfully, and intentionally conducting himself in that manner.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Bramley was competent to stand trial.

At sentencing, standby counsel requested the trial judge refer Bramley to the Department of Corrections, Reception/Diagnostic Center, for evaluation before sentencing. The court granted the motion and referred Bramley to the Reception/Diagnostic Center, continuing the sentencing hearing for a period of ninety (90) days. The trial judge received a report from the Reception/Diagnostic Center filed by John L. Clodfelter, Ph.D., a psychologist, stating that he and a consulting psychiatrist, Dr. Gary Bartell, had examined Bramley and it was their recommendation that he be given treatment in the "Community Mental Health system" outside the Department of Correction. They felt Bramley was very disturbed and was "unable to cooperate with others who might be trying to represent his best interests." Dr. Clodfelter indicated that, should the court decide to send Bramley to the Department of Correction, every effort would be made to provide needed treatment. He pointed out that Bramley recently had been released from the system and any attempts at intervention apparently were unsuccessful. Both of these examiners found it difficult to see how Bramley could have cooperated with anyone attempting to be of help to him, whether it be a mental health professional or an attorney appointed to represent him. Both felt he needed structured, institutional help. At the same time, they recognized he had not responded to treatment offered within the Department in the recent past and had no reason to believe he would do so later. In the record are reports showing that, during Bramley's previous incarceration, he was at times in the psychiatric ward but refused to cooperate with anyone and refused to take recommended medication. There is no showing in the record by either the personnel of the DOC Diagnostic/Reception Center or anyone else what "community mental health system" is available in the area providing services appropriate to Bramley's needs. The probation officer pointed out in his presentence report that Bramley's mother and aunt each expressed the opinion that he should receive psychiatric treatment rather than simply being incarcerated. They admitted he is irrational and unstable and is in no condition to be at large in the community but felt he should somehow be helped rather than merely "warehoused."

At sentencing, two...